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Although not well known to students of American history today,
General John Armstrong was, in his day, a prominent and colorful public
figure.

From 1804 to 1810, he held the difficult position of United

States Minister to France at a time when the world was in upheaval
resulting from the Napoleonic Ware.

Aa Great Britain and France

struggled for supremacy, the United States--the world's foremost
neutral cOD111ercial power--was slowly, but inevitably, drawn into this
struggle, becoming the victim of the hostile edicts of the two major
belligerents, as they wantonly violated established practices of
international law.
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As the diplomatic representative of the American government in
France, General Armstrong was reponeible for defending the rights
and pursuing the interests of his country.

The difficulty of his

task was compounded by the United States• military and naval weakness.

General Armstrong's position was further undermined by the

philosophical beliefs of American leadership, who shied away from
possible confrontation, and who would have done ao even if they had
possessed adequate military and naval strength.

American leadership--

as epitomized by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison--substituted
peaceable economic coercive practices for military force as a means
to exert pressure on the belligerents in order to secure concessions
from them.

In a world governed by force, these principles were

unrealistic.
From 1806 to 1810, the period emphasized in this thesis,
Armstrong's greatest concern by far was defending American neutral
rights being violated by Napoleon's Continental System, formally
inaugurated by the Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806.

Armstrong's

mission became one of protest and frustration as Napoleon's decrees
were brutally applied to American CODlllerce.
The picture that emerges of Armstrong from this study is one
of a determined, forceful, unintimidated, and outspoken defender
of American interests.

Fully cognizant of Napoleon's character,

he was under no illusion aa to hie prospects for diplomatic success.
Armstrong was-a realist who, having exhausted normal diplomatic
means, urged American leadership to employ force in order to acquire
desired territorial objectives, to force Napoleon to respect American
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rights, or to at least make a show of arms for the sake of National
honor.

Thia advice, however, was consiatently rejected by Jefferson

and Madiaon.
In the final analysis, Armstrong's mission vae a failure, in
the sense that he was unable to force Napoleon to respect American
neutral rights by repealing his offensive decrees.

Nor was he able

to convince American leadership to accept his suggestions on several
occasions when standard diplomatic practices were unproductive, to
use more forceful measures.

However, given the circumstances of the

times and Napoleon's character, Armstrong's performance was remarkable
indeed, and he did as well as anyone could have.

The United States

of the early 19th century would have had great difficulty finding
another person who could have done better.

There were certainly many

who would not have done aa well.
The unpublished records of the Department of State in the
National Archives, and the American State Papers are the moat important
sources for this thesis.

They have been augmented with published and

unpublished papers of such key f igurea as Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison.
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PREFACE

Although not well known to students of American history today,
General John Armstrong was, in his day, a prominent and colorful public
figure.

From 1804 to 1810, he had the dubious honor and difficult task

of serving aa United States Minister to France, at a time when the
world waa in upheaval resulting from the Napoleonic Ware.

As Great

Britain and France struggled for supremacy, the United States--the
foremost neutral commercial power--was slowly, but inevitably, drawn
into this struggle, becoming the victim of the hostile edicts of the
two major belligerents, as they wantonly violated established practices
of international law.
As the diplomatic representative of the American government in
France, General Armstrong was responsible for def ending the rights and
pursuing the interests of his government.

The difficulty of hie task

was compounded by the United States• military and naval weakness.
General Armstrong's position was further undermined by the philosophical belief a of American leadership, who shied away from confrontation,
and would have done so even had they posseaaed adequate military or
naval strength.

American leadership--as epitomized by Thomas Jefferson

and James Madison--substituted peaceable economic coercion practices
for military force as the means with which to exert pressure on the
belligerents.

In a world that was being governed by force, these prin-

ciples ware unrealistic.

The inability of the United States to take a

firm posture in its defense only encouraged the two great belligerents
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to persist in policies which were so detrimental to the welfare of the
United States.

The military posture of the United States and the

inclinations of its leaders, coupled with the amoral character of
Napoleon, made any mission to France by an American miniater almost
hopeless from the very beginning.
With the exception of Henry Adams• monumental work, A History of
the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-91), Armstrong'• career as a
minister to France has moat often been examined only superficially.

By

far the most important aspect of Armstrong's career, on which historians
have concentrated, is hia tenure as Secretary of War from 1813 to 1814.
Even in Adams, in which Armstrong is at least a central figure throughout a great portion of the narrative, Armstrong's diplomacy represents
only one part of his work devoted to the comprehensive examination of
two important presidencies.
Believing Armstrong's diplomatic career to be deserving of
greater attention, this study will examine and assess General
Armstrong's performance aa United States Minister to France.

Though

his mission involved many issues, the moat important aspect of his
mission was to def end American neutral rights that were violated by
Napoleon's Continental System, and this study will be moat concerned
with this issue, concentrating on the years from 1806, when Napoleon
formally inaugurated hie Continental System with the Berlin Decree of
November 21, 1806, until the end of General Armstrong's mission and
his departure from France in October, 1810.
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CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARIES
John Armstrong was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on November
25, 1758, the son of the elder John Armstrong, a major-general in the
Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War.

The younger

Armstrong also participated in the war, serving on the staffs of Generala Mercer and Gates, repectively.

He was involved in the Saratoga

campaign, and was present at the surrender of British General John Burgoyne.

At the conclusion of hostilities with Great Britain, Armstrong

had attained the rank of major, and waa aide-de-camp to General Gates.
While serving in this position, Armstrong authored what became known as
the "Newburgh Letters" in March, 1783, while the Continental Army was
encamped along the Hudson River. 1 Although written with good intentions, this act earned Armstrong a reputation as an intriguer, which he
was never able to completely shake, although the authorship of the letters was not irmnediately known.
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The letters "exhibited a facility in

caustic reasoning, mixed with akillfull emotional appeal," for which
Armstrong was noted. 3
After the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, Armstrong held
several important positions in Pennsylvania--Secretary of the Supreme
Executive Council, Adjutant-General, and elected delegate to Congress
in 1787.

His marriage in 1789 to Alida Livingston, aister of Chancellor

Robert R. Livingston of New York, placed him in one of America's most

2

prestigious and ariatocratic familiea, and guaranteed hie future as an
important political figure in New York State and national politica.

He

moved to Red Hook, Dutchess County, New York, where he devoted h11
energiea to the pursuit of agriculture for eleven years, and prepared
himself for the active and demanding public career that was to follow.
Although the Livingston clan had nominally been Federalists,
their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acta of the Adams Administra4
tion caused the family, including Armstrong, to join the Republicans.
Armstrong's literary talents greatly contributed to the standing of the
party with the succesaful publication of a "vitriolic" petition calling
for repeal of the acta. 5
The political alliance of the Livingston and Clinton f amiliea
helped to carry the state for the Republicans in the election of 1800.
Thia victory made George Clinton Governor of New York, and the two
families succeeded in destroying the patronage privileges of Clinton's
rival, Aaron Burr, the newly-elected Vice-President of the United
States.

Consequently, the Livingstone and Clintons reaped the politi-

cal apoila that came their way.

The Chancellor was appointed by Presi-

dent Jefferson as minister to France, and Armstrong, in November, 1800,
was chosen by the New York State Legislature to represent that state in
6
.
the United States Senate.
In February, 1802, Armstrong, resigned his
Senate seat to make way for DeWitt Clinton.

7

In November, 1803, when

DeWitt Clinton resigned to become Mayor of New York, Governor George
Clinton appointed General Armstrong to fill the vacancy in the Senate. 8
He aerved in thia capacity until June 30, 1804, when Armstrong again
resigned, thia time to accept President Jefferson's offer to become

3

Chancellor Livingaton'• aucceaaor aa minister to France.

9

APPOINniENT AND ARRIVAL IN FRANCE
In a letter of May 26, 1804, General Armstrong was informed by
President Jefferson that he wae the choice of the Administration to
succeed Robert Livingston as the American minister to France.

10

If

Armstrong accepted, he was to proceed to Washington as soon as possible
to familiarize himself with the diplomatic correspondence from Paris,
London, and Madrid, as the Chancellor was anxious to be relieved of
his duties in France. 11
In accepting the appointment to become the next minister to France,
Armstrong was certainly not motivated by the prospects of pecuniary rewards.

A deficient salary was not, in itself reason for Armstrong to

reject the appointment.

He had long ago learned to live within his

means and was not an extravagant man.

If he hesitated at all in ac-

cepting this call, it was due only to his desire to posses• the necessary ability to perform the duties required in such an important position.

12
Jefferson's motives in appointing Armstrong are questionable.

The most logical reason appears to be hia desire to maintain political
harmony with the Livingston-Clinton faction of the party in New York.
Another plausible motivation was hia friendship with Chancellor Livingaton.

Some historians have suggested that Jefferson may alao have

seen an opportunity to remove a far too independent Senator from the
Senate.

13 Armstrong'• independence is unquestionable.

In hia instructions from Secretary of State James Madison, Arm-

4

strong wae informed of possible changes in the form of the French
goveril!Xlent, since Livingston•a despatches had intimated the creation
of, or the intention to create, an empire with Napoleon

as emperor. If

this was indeed the case, Armstrong was to transmit this iIImediately to
the United States if the new government refused to receive him because
of his inappropriate credentials.

14

Further indications of changes in

the government were related to Armstrong just prior to his departure
for France, although no official notification of this event had as yet
been received.

Recognizing a potentially embarrassing position for the

United States, and not wanting to offend the sensitivities of Napoleon,
Madison informed Armstrong that, in order to reduce possible delays in
his reception at Paris, he would be furnished with a blank conunission
and letters of credence, to be filled in when he reached Paris and the
disposition of the French government was fully known. 15
On about September 7, 1804, General Armstrong and his family set
sail from New York.

They arrived in Nantes, France on about October 14,

1804. 16 From Nantes, the Armstrongs travelled to Paris, arriving there
October

Jo. 17

Armstrong immediately had an interview with Charles Maurice de
Talleyrand-Perigord, the French Minister of Foreign Relationa. 18

Li-

vingston requested fromTalleyrana that Armstrong be allowed to conduct
business at leaat informally before his preaentation to the emperor,
but this vaa deemed impossible.

In describing the changes that were

taking place aa the Republic was being transformed into the Empire,
Livingston made an obaervant comparison with former times:
Here everything that resemble the old Court is eagerly

5
aought after & imitated, & we are ao hedged in with aome forms
that are not yet we11 understood, that we are all somewhat at
a lose how to act--. 9
In a few daya, however, General Armstrong and Chancellor Living•
ston were admitted to a private audience with Napoleon, the man who
would make Armstrong's six years in France extremely frustrating and
difficult.

Livingston presented his letter of recall, and apologized

for its having been addressed to the First Consul.

He referred to

Armstrong for assurances that the Preaident had recognized that a
change in the form of the French government had indeed occurred.

20

Armstrong presented hie credentials to the Emperor, then delivered a
few complimentary remark• regarding the F.mperor'• recent elevation.

21

Having completed hia laat official diplomatic functions, Livingaton departed Paris for Italy, where he planned to pass the winter
before returning to the United States. 22

No doubt, Livingston was

anxious to extricate himself from the claims controversy, and was all
too willing to let his prother-in-law deal with it.

This controversy,

and negotiations for West Florida were more than enough to keep the
new minister occupied during the early stages of hia diplomatic
career.

23

Thia experience in dealing with Napoleon and other French

off iciala during thia early period, would prove to be invaluable when
he was called upon later to defend American neutral rights against the
Continental System.

To this i•eue we will now turn.

Notes
Chapter I
1wh11e the army was camped at Newburgh on the Hudson River,
discontent over the failure of Congress to meet arrears of pay was
widespread.

At the instigation of Horatio Gates, Armstrong composed

the "Newburgh Letters" which called a meeting of the field officers
and representatives of the off icera of each company to consider relief
measures.

They suggested that, aa petitions to Congress had not been

heeded, the army should take matters into its own hands if Congress
£ailed to fulfill its obligations.

For an examination of the "Newburgh

Letters" controversy, aee Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the
Newburgh Conspiracy:

America and the Coup d'Etat," William and Mary

Quarterly, 3rd aer., XXVII(l970), 187-213; Paul David Nelson with a
rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783:
Misunderstood

143-158;

c.

Rule,~

A

William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd aer., XX.IX (1972),

Edward Skeen with a rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "The

Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd aer.,

XXXI (1974), 272-298.
2
George Washington withdrew the harsh opinion he had held of the
letters and their author in a letter to Armstrong of February, 1793.
He stated that he had "since had auf f icient reason for believing, that
the object of the author was just, honorable, and friendly to the
country, though the means suggested by him was certainly liable to
much mieunderatandlng and abuse."

John

c.

Fitzpatrick, ed.,

!.!:!.!

7

Writings of George Waahington, 39 wola. (1940; rpt. Westport, Conn.,

xxxv,

1976),

397.

3

Al 1en Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American. Bio-

graphy, 22 vols. (New.York, 1946), I, 355; hereafter cited as Diet. of Am. Bio.
4see DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State
of New York, 3 vols. (New York, 1906), for an account of New York
political history.

Describes the intense partisan nature of New York

politics at this time.

Author is occasionally critical of Armstrong,

though.
5Alexander, I, 89.
6other members of the Livingston family were also appointed to
important offices:

Edward, a brother, was made Mayor of New York;

Thomas Tillotson, a brother-in-law, Secretary of State; Morgan Lewis,
another brother-in-law, Chief Justice; and Brockholat Livingston, a
cousin, justice of the Supreme Court.
7Annals of Congress:

Diet. of Am. Bio., I, 356.

Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of

the United States, 42 vols. (Washington,

D.c.,

1834-1856), 8th Cong.,

lat s_er., P• 185; hereafter cited as Annals.
8

Diet. of

Am.

Bio., I, 356.

Armstrong was known ae "General"

prior to and during his years as U.S. minister to France, although he
did not actually hold a commission aa a Brigadier-General until June,
1812, when he was appointed by Madiaon to take charge of the defenee of
New York City.

According to Beckles Willson, America'• Ambassadors to

France, 1777-1927;

A Narrative of Franco-American Relations (London,

1928), 93, as Armstrong roae in political favor, ao too did hie rank, a
cotmnon practice of the time.

He waa almost always referred to aa

8

"General."
9

Dict. of Am. Bio., I, 356.

10
Jefferson to Armstrong, May 26, 1804, Paul Leice1ter Ford, ed.,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferaon, 10 vols. (Nev York, 1892-99), VIII,

302-303; hereafter cited aa Writings of Jefferson.
11.rhe convention of 1803 which concluded the sale of Louisiana
also established a fund of $3,750,000 to liquidate legitimate American
claims against France.

Although Livingston thought that this amount

was more than adequate, it was far too little.

The shortage of funde,

plus the complicated procedures for diaperaing claims money, soon
embroiled Livingston in quarrels with the American Board of Commissionera.

Livingston waa charged with favoritism by hi• own associates, and

the situation was not improved when he in turn attacked the Board with
similar chargee.

These events, plua Livingston'• own political ambi-

tiona, made him anxious to return to the United States.

When Armstrong

arrived in Paris to take up hi• post, he was imnediately thrust into a
controversy not of his making, but exaacerbated due to his family
connection with Livingston.

For an account of the claims controversy,

see Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (1948-61, Indianapolis), IV,

213-229.
12
Armstrong

to

Jefferson, June 2, 1804, Thomae Jefferson Papers,

Manuscript Division, Library of Congreae, Washington, D.C., microfilm
copy, Reel 30; hereafter cited aa Jeffereon Papera LC, followed by
reel.

Jeff eraon was

~oncerned

that Armatrong might not accept the

poaition becauae of rumor• that had circulated regarding the inadequacy of salaries for American diplomata.

See Jefferson to Armstrong,

9

May 26, 1804, Writing• of Jeffer1on, VIII, 302-303.

William Pinkney,

American mlniater to London, waa one who was upaet about the amount of
his aalary and wrote that it vaa "dreadfully inadequate" and believed
that General Armstrong waa probably no better off in Parie.

Pinkney to.

Madison, Aug. 19, 1809, in Henry Wheaton, ed., Some Account of the Life,
Writings and Speeches of William Pinkney (New York, 1926), 96-97.

In

another letter to Madison of August 13, 1810, Pinkney requested permiseion from President Madison to end his mission aa the amount allotted
to repreaentativea abroad was a "pittance," and he was a "constant and
progressive loser, and at length ••• incapable of supplying the deficienciee of the public allowance."

105-107.

Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 13, 1810, ibid.,

Armstrong's salary was $9000 per year with one-fourth salary

earmarked for hia return trip.

13

Diet. of Am. Bio., I, 356. See also Henry Adams, A History of the Uni-

ted States of America Duripg the Administrations

of

Tbgmes Jefferaon

and

James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-91), II, 15 7; hereafter cited as Adame.

14

Madison to Armstrong, July 15, 1804, U.S. Department of State

Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Instructions, All Countries, Vol. VI, p. 247, microfilm copy; hereafter cited as NA Instructs.,
followed by volume and page.

15

Madiaon to Armstrong, Aug. 21, 1804, NA Instructs., VI, 253-254.
16
Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 14, 1804, U.S. Department of State

Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Despatches From United
States Miniatera to France, Vol. IX, microfilm copy; hereafter cited
as NA Despatches, followed by volume.

1 7Armstrong to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches,

10
18

Ibid.; Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War:

The Politics and

Diplomacy of the Undeclared War With France, 1797-1801 (New York, 1966),

41, refers to Talleyrand as "an unscrupulous, pleasure-loving aristocrat of elegant taste and loose morals

who had once been a biahop in

the Catholic Church and whose talent as a diplomat was known throughout
the world •••• 11
19 Livingston to Madison, Nov. 17, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX.
20

Livingston to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX.

21Armstrong to Madison, Dec. 24, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol.
22

x.

Livingston to Madison, Sept. 14, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX;

Livingston to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. DC.
23

Following the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, the acquisition of

the Floridas--especially West Florida--became Jefferson's overriding
desire.

In the negotiations which followed, Armstrong sought to solicit

French support in this endeavor.

He quickly learned that Napoleon was

a man of expediency whose promises were frivolous.

At one point, the

Emperor would seem to aide with the Americans, then he would quickly
reverse himself and aide with the Spaniards when it appeared to be to
his advantage.

As early as 1805, Armstrong, recognizing the precarious

position in which the United States found itself, advised the use of
force as a meana to acquire territorial objectivea--a course that he
would continue to advocate throughout his career in France whenever
standard diplomatic means had failed.
1805, NA Despatches, Vol. X.

Armstrong to Monroe, May 4,

When the Chesapeake incident of June,

1807 occurred, the negotiations for West Florida ended, for all practical purposes.

However, Napoleon still did not hesitate to dangle the

11
prospect of acquiring the Floridaa before Jefferson and Madison on
various occasion• when it worked to his advantage.

Although Armstrong'•

miaaion after 1807 became more concerned with the defense of American
commercial rights, he also continued to promote American interest in
the Floridaa.

For a detailed account of the West Florida negotiation•,

see Isaac Joslin Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813:
in American Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1918).

A Study

C}W)TER II
BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTlli
The British naval victory at the Battle of Trafalgar on October
21, 1805, for the most part guaranteed British control of the seaa, and
the ability to cut off French trade with France's colonies or her al.
lies' colonies, or with neutrale.

For the time being, the threat of an

invasion of Great Britain by France had been eliminated. 1

Unable to

defeat Great Britain at eea, Napoleon therefore tried to strike where
he thought that it would hurt moat--her ability to trade.

After Tra-

falgar, Napoleon decided that he would become the master of the land
if Great Britain were to be the miatreaa of the seas.

In his scheme,

not only would European port• be closed to British commerce, but also
the ports of colonies of European countries.

With no place to trade,

the financial basis of Britieh naval and military power would collapse.
The ensuing commercial warfare of the two belligerent• necessitated the United States being drawn into the middle of this great
struggle.

Both Great Britain and France resorted to retaliation, or

the pretext of retaliation in their atrugglea.

Exactly who was respon-

aible for the "original ain" which may have juatified the initial
retaliation, ia atill a point which haa yet to be determined.

Each

adversary, however, was more than happy for the pretext to use the
weapon of blockade.

2

Parallel to the French commercial blockade, a

systematic persecution of trade with enemy countries was taking place,
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primarily on the British aide.

Both of these developments were united
to form the characteristics of the Continental System. 3
In the system of maritime blockade, blockading an enemy's port•

and

coaa~e

System.

unquestionably formed the primary basis of the Continental

Characteristic of the system, however, was the practice

adopted by Great Britain of establishing a so-called "paper blockade,"
a declaring in a atate of blockade, long stretches of coast which she
could not, or would not, enforce effectively by providing the necessary
naval forces.

On the strength of this declaration, she would capture

neutral vessels bound for almost any enemy port. 4
The Continental System originated, therefore, on one side, in a
blockade that followed the general lines of mercantile trade policy,
and on the other aide, in a maritime blockade dominated by the same
ideas.

Owing to the British mastery of the seas, however, the practl-

cal effect of this plan in France was to produce a self-blockade.

To

complete the antecedent conditions of the Continental System, there was
only one feature lacking.

It waa the feature that has given the system

its name--that is, combining European countries to the exclusion of
Great Britain, creating a common self-blockade of the Continent against
Great Britain. 5
In a strictly technical aense, the responsibility for prompting
the chain of retaliation reata upon Great Britain.

It was ostensibly

her Order in Council of May 16, 1806, that triggered the aeries of
French decrees and British Orders in Council which ao harshly violated
American neutral rights.

6

To understand the aignif icance of the British

action of May, 1806, a brief outline recounting practices and events
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prior to the passage of these orders may be useful.

ANTECEDENTS FOR THE BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL OF MAY 16, 1806
After the truce of Amiena between Great Britain and France ended
in May, 1803, American• continued to enjoy a profitable commerce from
the war, just aa they had during the earlier years of the Anglo-French
conflict.

This rich trade led to the tremendous growth and development

of the American merchant marine, making the United States the world'•
moat important neutral carrier.

Americans were able to enjoy a trade

denied them during the years of peace, in carrying goods between French
ports and Spanish colonies.

Since this trade was a violation of the

British Rule of 1756, 7 Americans took their cargoes from French or
Spanish ports to an American port where they went through certain formalities, such as the payment of duties, which might later be refunded.
The cargoes were thus considered American property, making them "free
goods."

The ships with their "neutralized" cargoes might then proceed

to France or Spain.

England herself recognized the legality of this

trade in 1800, in a decision handed down by the High Court of Admiralty
in the case of the American ship, Polly.

Thia type of trade, which

circumvented the Rule of 1756, was known as "broken voyage."
however, this trade came to an end.

In 1805,

With increasina protest in England,

the Lorda Commiaaionera of Appeals in London reversed the Polly deciaion
in the caae of the American brig, Eaaex.
Good• could no longer be neutralized by bringing them into a
neutral country.

The •hipper had to pay a bonafide import duty.

To

refund the duty upon re-exporting the goods was considered subterfuge
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and constituted a "continuous voyage" from enemy homelands to an enemy
colony.

According to the British, "broken voyage" violat_ed the Rule of

1756, and under the "continuous voyage" doctrine, the7 would no longer
permit auch trade.

Without any advance warning, and before the Essex

decision had even been publicized, British cruiaers aeized acorea of
American ahipa carrying French or Spanish goods, especially those found
in the Caribbean.

Consequently, American ports were practically block-

aded.
With the defeat of the Spaniah and French fleets at Trafalgar,
England's maritime supremacy waa established, making it possible to
enforce even tighter control over neutral ahipping.

On the same day,

October 21, 1805, a pamphlet by Admiralty lawyer, James Stephen, entitled ''War in Disguise; Or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags", appeared in
London.

Stephen argued that neutral shipping should be regulated and

taxed for Britain's war effort.

Allowing neutrals, especially the

Americana, to trade unhampered with the enemy, helped to auatain French
ambitions, and prolonged Europe's miseries.

Scott further argued that

England denied herself the advantages of her coamand of the seas.
Since she, in effect, controlled the seas, neutrals had no rights.
These were popular ideas with the British people and •ubaequent Orders
in Council basically followed this argument.
Within one month, however, Napoleon won the Battle of Austerlitz,
and crushed the armies of Russia and Austria, destroying the third
coalition against France and strengthening his mastery in Europe.
Neither power, Great Britain nor France, could get at each other directly,
but in the squabble which followed, neutral righta, for all practical
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purposes, disappeared, and the United Statee suffered greatly.
In ita approach to the United Statee, Great Britain adopted a
policy deaigned to protect British shipping and coamerce, seen aa the
source of British greatnese.

These could be further encouraged by the

use of traditional remedies of trade restriction, regulation, and the
stifling of competition.

The fact that Americana appeared as weak,

uncouth, boasting, as well aa dependent upon Great Britain, greatly
encouraged the British to pursue their policies.

British policy toward

the United State• combined about equal parts of monopolistic mercantiliem, and a desire to strangle Napoleon.

8

With the death of Prime Minister William Pitt on January 23, 1806,
Charles James Fox was named Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of "All
The Talents."

Fox was pressured to devise a measure that would not

only satisfy preaaurea within Great Britain, but because of hie sympathy
for the Americana, would also aerve to mollify them.
Order in Council of May 16, 1806.

The result was the

In aubatance, this order declared a

blockade of the European coast from Brest to the Elbe, dividing that
stretch into two zones.

Between the Seine River and the port of Oatend,

the order would be strictly enforced.

In the remaining area, neutral

ships would be allowed to trade in non-contraband goods, provided they
did not come from a hostile port.

Thia meant that ships which broke

their voyage by neutralization at an American port, aa waa cOlllDOn
before the Essex decision, might be allowed to bring cargoes into enemy
porta like Rotterdam and Bremen in the outer zones, and to all nonblockaded enemy porta, auch aa those south of Brest. 9
Although an understanding that the order would not be enforced
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on this aection of the coast waa intended to mollify the Americana, the
order, nonetheless, did not receive a favorable response in the United
Statea.

It waa attacked aa an illegal paper blockade, and the United

Statee refused to repeal ita Non-Importation Act . of April 23, 1806,
'
10
which had been passed aa a protest against the Essex decision.
Since Great Britain had taken the first etep, the next was up to
Napoleon, who was only too anxious to formally introduce the system
he had been devising to defeat hie leading foe.
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CHAPTER III

INAUGURATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM:

BERLIN DECREE

The yeara 1803 to 1806 witnessed earth-shattering events, especially in military terms:

Napoleon's preparation in 1804-1805 for a

descent on England; the foundation of the French Empire (May-December,
1804); the formation of the Third Coalition against France and ita
defeat at Ulm and Austerlitz (October and December, 1805); as an inmediate sequel to thia, the Peace of Preasburg, with the extension of the
"coaat system" to the eastern shore of the Adriatic, but also the
defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (October
21, 1805); and finally the formation of the Fourth Coalition and the
defeat of Pruaaia at Jena and Auerstadt (October 14, 1806). 1
In the autumn of 1806, Napoleon'• victory on the Continent was as
complete aa wae his def eat at aea.

He could point to the Battle of

Jena aa the natural antecedent to the Continental System, inasmuch aa
that battle placed him in control of the Weser, Elbe, Trave, Oder, and
all the coastline as far aa the Viatula. 2 On October 27, 1806, the
victorious French troops made a triumphal entry into Berlin, the capital of the country which Napoleon had just thoroughly defeated.

On the

pretext of retaliation for Great Britain'• illegal blockade of May 16,
1806, the Emperor, on November 21, 1806, signed what became famous aa
hi• Berlin Decree.

3

Continental Syatem.

Thia aymbolized the formal inauguration of hia
Napoleon aurmiaed that if England were prevented from
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trading with Europe, she would soon be delivered a fatal blow.

The

Emperor saw the closing of all ports of the mainland to the British
aa a necesaary precondition for peace with the Continental powers.
Even before the decree 1 a actual promulgation, the Emperor demonatrated that he had,
continental blockade.

aom~

time beforehand, seen the necessity of a

The Berlin Decree was a culmination of earlier

thoughts and measures, but ita actual publication atill had the effect
of a bomb, thank.a to Napoleon's ability aa a atage manager.

4

The preamble of the decree opened with the charge that England was
disregarding the law of nationa.

She made non-combatants prisoners of

war, confiscated private property, blockaded unfortified harbors and
mouths of rivers, and considered places as blockaded though she did not
have a single ahip before them--even to the extent of blockading whole
coasts and empires.

According to the decree, the blatant abuse of the

right of blockade had no other purpose than to destroy trade and induatry ao as to build up her own on the ruins of trade and industry on the
Continent.

France, therefore, had a natural right to use the same wea.

pone and methods of warfare against her.

Therefore, until England re-

cognized and corrected these violations of law, it was decreed that:
(1) the British Isles were in a state of blockade; (2) all intercourse

with them waa prohib1ted;·(3) every Englishman found within French
authority was a prisoner of war; (4) all British property, private and
public, waa prize of war; (5) all merchandise coming from England waa
prize of war; (6) half the product of such confiscations should be

em~

ployed to indemnify merchant• whose property had been captured by British cruisers; (7) no ahip coming from England or her colonies should
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be admitted into any port; and (8) every vessel trying to elude this
rule by means of f alae paper• would be conf iacated.

s

In the meantime, General Armstrong had been observing military
and political movements, and assessing their consequences for the United States and its comnerce.

As early as March, 1806, more than eight

months before the publication of the Berlin Decree, Armstrong had suepected that moves were then being made to exclude Great Britain from
all intercourae with Northern Europe. 6 Armstrong observed that people
in Paris were convinced that a change of ministry in England would not
necessarily produce peace.

The French professed to know Mr. Fox's

true sentiments, thought to be more erroneous than those of Pitt.

Thia

belief had auppoeedly induced the Emperor to adopt and pursue, "with
his characteristical vigor, the system of shutting the ports of Europe
against the commerce of England." 7 England was to be insulated politically and commercially.

The risk to neutrals in "the ardor of this

experiment" were clearly recognized by the American minister.

"Between

the two principles the occlusion of the French and blockading of the
British our comnerce will be in a pretty situation." 8
On December S, 1806, the text of the Berlin Decree was published
in the Moniteur.

Almost simultaneously, news arrived that Hamburg, and

almost the entire northern coast of Germany along the North Sea and the
Baltic, had fallen to Napoleon--or were about to.

After Armstrong had

observed the aucceaa of French arms, and having received knowledge of
the Berlin Decree, he might well have felt that he had finally diacovered--af ter numerous attempts--a concrete idea of what the Emperor
had been scheming, partially explaining the problems that had plagued
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his diplomacy.

It at least gave him a vague idea of what waa to come. 9

Armatrong quickly forwarded a copy of the decree to the Secretary
of State, then directed hie efforts toward d11cerning the actual and
intended meanings of the decree--eapecially aa related to American
intereata. 10

Not one to aide-step an iaaue, Armstrong demonetrai,ed the

diligence with which he pursued hi• duties and forcefully demanded that
Deer~•,

French Miniater of Marine and Colonies, give him "the official

explanation which may be given to the Imperial Decree of the 2lat of
November, 1806, ao far aa that decree involve• the right• of neutral
nationa. 1111 More apecificallyt Armstrong wished to know whether
"Britiah Islands", mentioned in Article I, waa to be understood as all
ialanda in the possession of the King of England, or if the rule would
extend the blockade to the continental possessions also.

Additionally,

Armstrong wished to know if the decree would operate from its date, and
if seizures made under it, before notice was given, would be conaidered
legal.

Would American vesaels, navigating the high or narrow seas, be

liable to seizure, on evidence only, that they were going to, or returning from. a British port?

Finally, he wanted to know whether

Articles II and V would operate only as domestic regulations, or if
their injunctions would extend to citizens of foreign or independent
12
nationa.
Despite Armstrong's request for a rapid reply to hia inquiry, it
was not until December 24, 1806, that Decree finally answered the
question• posed, though not ae definitively aa Armstrong would have
preferred.

Decree opened by stating that he considered the decree of

November 21, 1806, aa conveying no modification of the regulations then
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being observed in France with regard to neutrals, nor of the Convention
of 1800 with the United State•• 13 With this, the four questions which
Armstrong had aaked were, according to Decree, resolved.

In concluding,

however, Decree qualified hi• remarks by stating that the anawera he had
provided could not have aa much authority as they would if received
from the Minister of Foreign lelationa.

Armstrong ought to address

himself to that minister for explanations, which Decrea had been happy
to provide because Armstrong had requested them from him, but upon
which Decrea did not posses• aa much information as the Prince of
Benevento did. 14
Decrea•anawerawere quickly despatched to .the Secretary of State
in Armstrong's letter of December 24, 1806. 15 The President then conveyed them to Congress. 16 General Turreau, French Minister to the
United States also led Americans to believe that the United States had
nothing to fear in the Berlin Decree.

He had received a despatch from

hia Court expressly declaring that the decree was not to affect the
United States, and that the Emperor was determined to respect American
interests and would observe the convention existing between the two
countries. 17 The Administration waa not only concerned, however,
about the Berlin Decree, but also about a Spanish decree modelled after
the French one, whose terms were even more vague and broad.

If it was

not recalled or modified, it would undoubtedly produce more spoliations
which had already begun in that region, and, of course, "thicken the
cloud that hangs over the amity of the two nationa. 1118
Meanwhile, Armstrong became increasingly impatient as the Emperor
remained away from Paria so long, winning one victory after another
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which brought him closer to achieving control of the Continent.
February 8, 1807, Napoleon fought the Battle of Eylau.

On

Following thia

battle, Armatrong became so impatient to teat the promiae of the Bllper•
or to help resolve America'• dispute with Spain, that in May, 1807, he
requested passport• to proceed to Napoleon'• headquarters. Thia request
waa denied. 19 If Arm8trong had been allowed to go, he probably would
have witneaaed the great Battle of Friedland, fought on June 14, and
would have witneaaed the Peace of Tilait, aigned on July 7, which
eliminated the laat obstacle to Napoleon'• achemea against Spain and
the United States.

20

After Tilait, Napoleon and Czar Alexander pri-

vately agreed that the remaining neutrals were left to Napoleon to be
dealt with aa he pleased.
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Except for Denmark and Portugal, every country on the coast of
Europe, from St. Petersburg to Trieste, was forced to recognize
Napoleon's domination.

England reaiated, and for the time being, could

not be reached by aea.

The next step in the Emperor'• system, then, was

to effect England'• ruin by closing the whole world to her trade.

Emperor began with Portugal.

The

From Dresden, on July 19, 1807, he

iaaued orders that the Portugueae ports should be closed by September 1
to English cOlllllerce, or the kingdom of Portugal would be occupied by a
combined French and Spanish army.
On July 29, Napoleon returned to Paris, and, on July 31, he
ordered Talleyrand to warn the Prince Royal of Denmark that he muat
choose between war with England and war with France. 22

The likelihood

that Napoleon would move ahortly against the neutrality atatua of the
United States muat have been in Armstrong'• thoughts when he related
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incidents to the Secretary of State that had occurred at Court.

Recog-

nizing that Napoleon had pretty much settled the buaineaa of the belligerent1 to hi• liking--with the exception of England--he waa then at
the point of aettling that of the neutrals in the same way.

Armatrong

reported that while at Court Napoleon had severely lectured the Portugueae Miniater aa a result of the conduct of that minister'• court.
Later, Mr. Dreyer, the Danish minister, took Armstrong aside and in•
quired of him if any application had been made toward Armstrong about
a projected union of coa.mercial atatea against Great Britain.

Not

having been approached as yet, no doubt Armatrong muat have felt a
certain amount of trepidation for the future when Dreyer remarked:
''You are much favored, but it will not last." 23

Thia waa after the

Danish minister had been apoken to threateningly by Napoleon.

To

Armstrong, these incident• aeemed to confirm the whiapera which had
begun to circulate that an army was organizing to the south for the
purpoae of taking poaaeaaion of Portugal, and another army to the
north for a aimilar purpoae with regard to Denmark. 24 Armatrong recognized that he too vaa expected to benefit from the Emperor's outburats
at Court.
A• the Daniah Minister had predicted, the goodwill of Napoleon
toward the Americana did not laat very long.

Under ordera from Napo-

leon, the King of Holland and the King of Denmark were instructed to
aeize neutral cOU111erce, and to cloae the Danish and Dutch porta.
Imnediately the question aroae whether United States ahips and property
were still exempt from the operation of the Berlin decree, in light of
the Convention of 1800.

The Emperor ruled against them.

He stated:

27
••• navigation offers all aorta of difficultiee. France
cannot regard aa neutral flags which enjoy no conaideration. That of America, however exposed it may be to the
inaulta of the English atill keep aome meaeure in regard
to it, and it impoaea on them.. That of Pottugal and that
of Denmark eziat no longer.25
Shortly thereafter, General Armstrong was informed that the Miniater of Marine and the Council of Prizes were about to receive new
order• in reference to the Berlin Decree.

Armstrong waa informed in a

note that there were to be no exceptions in the application of the
Berlin Decree, aince the decree itself contained none.

Armstrong

quickly related this information to the Secretary of State, recognizing
that it might be very important in light of the then-preaent crisis
with England.
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The American minister was not too optimiatic about

this latest turn of events.

He did not attempt to disguise the poten•

tial seriousness of the situation aa it pertained to the United States.
He told Madiaon that he could not flatter him with:
••• the prospect of any change for the better, with respect to it. It would appear that the two great rivals of
Europe were atriving, not only which should do us the moat
harm, but which should most injure itself, in the measures
persued [sic] in relation to ua.2 7
Armstrong wondered if the most appropriate action for the United
States to take would not be to withdraw from cOlllDerce for the time
being, until the current atorm had passed.

To him, an embargo,

earnestly observed, would, besides securing the present safety and
future strength of the country, aet an example for friends and enemies
alike.

It would teach belligerents how important a regular coanerce

waa to their wants, especially one that was honestly neutrai.28 Although Armstrong was quick to reverse hie position on the efficacy of an
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embargo when tried by the United Statea and •een a• a failure, Armatrong•a auggestion to consider it at this time reflects his concern
for the mounting difficultie1 confronting the United States as a
neutral, and illustrates his efforts to find solutions to the predicament.
Armstrong did not have to wait long for greater clarification of
the Berlin Decree with regard to the United

S~atea.

In a letter from

Champagny, 29 Talleyrand's successor as Minister of Foreign Relations,
to Armstrong, the Foreign Minister further confirmed that, contrary to
Decree•

earlier profesaione,

there were to be no exceptions to the

enforcement of the Berlin Decree.

The Emperor had determined that every

vessel going from English ports with cargoes of English merchandise,
or of English origin, was lawfully aeizeable by French armed vessels. 30
The fact that orders had been given to enforce the decree literally,
was duly transmitted to Madison.

Armstrong further acknowledged that

the November decree had been devised expressly for the purpose of
embroiling Great Britain with neutral nations.

Since the United States

remained the only country of that description, then it must be seen as
the last means for rendering impracticable an amicable arrangement
between Great Britain and the United States.

Armatrong had no doubts

as to Napoleon'• motive in this policy, or ita probable effects •
••• the moment France pretend• to blockade England--England
will in turn, pretend to blockade the whole continent of Europe, and thus our trade 1~ every direction, becomes liable to
aeizure and confiscation. 1
Lacking inatructiona aa to the course he should follow, Armstrong
tried to at least minimize the effect• of the decree on American cc:xm-

29

merce until relevant inatructiona were received.
that he hoped would impress the Emperor.

He offered arguments

In responding to Champagny•s

letter of October 7, 1807, Armstrong grasped the opportunity to

a1k

Champagny if a postponement of the execution of the decree until the
issue of the pending negotiation between the United States and Great
Britain was known might not indeed correepond with the Emperor's
wishes.
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Armstrong ahrewdly called attention to arguments which the

Emperor had used as the pretezt for issuing the decree in the first
place.

When the Emperor recalled hi• motives, according to Armstrong,

he would find among them one of compelling Great Britain to respect
the rights of neutr.al comnerce.

When, at the aame time, he aaw that

the United States was on the brink of war with Great Britain in defense
of those neutral rights, it would then be impossible that the Emperor-with wisdom and a sense of justice--would not refrain from interposing
and suspending the execution of a measure "which can have no ef f ec.t
but to lesson, at once, the motives and the means of the United States,
in the support of a cause, hitherto believed to be coumon to them, and
to the French Empire."
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In Armstrong's observations of a diplomatic audience on October
14, 1807, he reported that Napoleon had rebuked numerous foreign
representatives.

Napoleon threatened the ambassador from Portugal that

the House of Braganza would reign no more.

To the ambassador from

Etruria, the Emperor accused the Queenof Etruria of having secret
attachment• to Great Britain.
deputiee from the Hanse towna.

The same accusation waa directed to
Napoleon boasted that he possessed the

means of destroying Great Britain.

He had 300,000 men devoted to that
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object, aa well as 300,000 from Russia who were willing to support hi•
effort to do ao.

He further vowed that he would permit no nation to

receive a minister from Great Britain until ahe had renounced her
maritime tyranny.

Napoleon urged the diplomats to convey thie

to their respective sovereigns.

Under the circumstances, Armstrong

realistically calculated that the United States had little room to
hope for any substantial relaxation of the blockading decrees, which,
as far as they pertained to the United States, had remained unexecuted
ao far. 34 Thia good luck was about to change.
THE CASE OF THE HORIZON

Although in October, 1807, Armstrong had investigated reports that
the Berlin Decree was being applied to American shipping in such places
as Bremen and Hamburg, it was in November, in the judgment against the
American ship, Horizon, that the first actual "unfriendly" decision of
the Council of Prizes under the Berlin Decree occurred. 35 Thia decision
prompted the first of Armstrong's innumerable protests and remonstrances
to the French government regarding her hostile actions against American
maritime rights.

His reactions in this particular case are representa-

tive of the consistently firm approach which he employed in the defense
of American rights--a f irmneaa which demonstrated his lack of intimidation by French officials, including the Emperor himself.
The Horizon had been shipwrecked on May 21, 1807, near Morlaix
on the French coaat.

The Council of Prizes judged that the amount of

the sale legally made of the wreck, together with the cargo which was
acknowledged not to have proceeded either from English manufactures or
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from English territory, was, according to the 5th article of the Berlin
Decree, to be confiscated for the uee of the atate.

36 Armstrong'•

'on,ern over the detiaion of the Council of Prizes vaa clear. He told
Champagny that:
The reasons, upon which this decision is founded, are at
once ao new and so alarming to the present friendly relations
of the two powers, that I cannot but ~iacuaa them with a freedom of their novelty and importance.3
Armstrong argued that eince the neutrality of the ahip and cargo
had been aufficiently established by the Council, the whole ought to
be restored, agreeable to the provisions of the Convention of 1800.
Armstrong pointed out that this

was an open and unqualified admission

that the ship waa indeed found within the rulea prescribed by the
Convention of 1800, that according to these rules the cargo and the
ship ought to have been restored, and that such would have been the
fact, but for the operation of the Berlin Decree.
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One reason given by the Council of Prizea to justify its decision
was that, though one of the principle agents of the Emperor (Decr~s)
had given a contrary opinion--an opinion which the Council had not been
involved with--that opinion was one of an individual and could not offset the Emperor'• formal declaration.

If this opinion had apparently

seemed to permit American trade, it still did not prevent the Council
from conforming to the Berlin Decree. 39
Caustically, Armstrong stated to Champagny that:
It would appear from thia paragraph, that, not finding it
easy to untie the knot, the council had determined to cut it.
Pressed by the fact, that an interpretation of the decree had
been given by a minister of Hie Majesty, specially charged
with its execution, they would now escape from thi1 fact, and
from the conclusions to which it evidently leada.40
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Armstrong informed Champagny that he would submit to Champagny,
hie letter of December 29, 1806, requesting from Deer~• an official
interpretation of the decree, and hi• answer of D•cember 24, giving
Armstrong the interpretation he had demanded.

Armetrong further re-

called to Champagny that, aa late as August 21, 1806, it was understood
that Deer~• had been the natural organ of the Emperor's will, and it
waa to him that Champagny himaelf had applied for information relating
to the decree.

Sensing the strength of his position, Armstrona re-

f erred to the allegations of the Council of Prizes, and the reasoning
founded upon them, aa extraordinary.

Armstrong felt justified in

requesting that the Emperor aet aaide the decision of the Council. 41
The firmness with which Armstrong protested the actions of the
Council of Prizes in this case certainly was not calculated to endear
himself to French officialdom, nor to an Emperor more accustomed to
kow-towing representatives of foreign countriea--especially representativea from neutrals.

Armstrong had eatabli1hed himself quite early as

a man not easily intimidated.

Thie note of protest provoked the

Emperor to respond, through Champagny. Following the instructions of
the Emperor, Champagny, on November 24, 1807, wrote to General Arm.
strong.

Taking the position that it was the intention of the Emperor

that every abuse should be repreaeed, the United States could not complain about the measures taken under the Berlin Decree, especially
while that country:
••• allow that their veaaela may be visited by England, that
she may drag them into her port•, and turn them from their deetination; while they do not oblige England to respect their
flag, and the merchandise which it covers; while they permit
their power to apply to them the absurd rulea of blockade
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which it haa aet up with the view of injuring France; they
bind themaelvea by that tolerance tovarda England to allow
alao the application of the meaaurea of f!pri•al• which
France la obliged to employ againat her.

Champagny further related to Armstrong that the Emperor regretted
that he had to resort to auch meaaurea, while recognizing that the
ccmmercial classes may suffer aa a result, but it waa to England, rather
than to France, that protest• resulting from inconveniences to individuals should be addreaaed.

In order to force England to renounce her

actions, it had become neceaaary for the Baperor to confront that country with her own weapona.

The unjust pretensions of England would be

maintained as long aa thoae whoae right• ahe violated were silent.
Armstrong was informed that the difficulties would be removed if only
the government of the United States, after having complained in vain
about the injustice of England, would join with the whole Continent in
opposing British violations.
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Armstrong must certainly have had

difficulty in containing himself after reading this flimsy juatification for French actiona toward the United States.
ADVOCATE OF ACTION
Having been in France over two years, Armstrong had had ample
time to test Napoleon's aincerity and good faith.

He knew from practi-

cal experience that the Emperor waa a man of expediency, and one who
would resort to any means to accomplish his objectives, regardless of
previous promiaea or commitmenta.

In order to draw the United States

into Napoleon'• system against Great Britain, the Emperor shrewdly
dangled the prospect of the Floridaa--Jefferaon's overwhelming passion
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and the principle object of Armatrong'• diplomacy up until this

time~

before the President. 44 The catch, of course, was that the United States
muat join in the atruggle against England, and accept Napoleon's aeeurances of a maritime peace between the United States and the Continent
which would supposedly establish the principle of "free ships, free gooda."
Armatrong waa skeptical about any scheme appearing to involve the
United States for France's benefit..

Wf. th regard to the Flor idas,

Armstrong suggested that ia waa wiaer to act alone, even in the event of
war with England.

France had done all that could be expected from her,

and her promises lately had become quite sparing.
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Typical of Arm-

strong'& suggestions throughout hia career, he advised firmer action by
the United States in acquiring its.territorial objectives when diplomacy
had failed, and as a means of upholding international respect for the
country.

Having previously advocated action to acquire the Floridaa,

Armstrong posed possible action to American leadership, as he had done
in 1805 when he had urged the seizure of Texaa. 46

Recognizing the menace

confronting the United States from various corners, hequestioned if it
might not be wise not only to launch an attack against Canada to the
north, but also against the Floridaa to the south.

The imposition of

an embargo, plus the northern expedition would pass for measures ta.keri
strictly against Great Britain.

The attack on the Floridas would also

be seen as a preventive measure againat Great Britain.

Knowing that

the Secretary of State might see objections to these auggeations that
Armstrong did not, Ar1118trong nonetheless felt that they would greatly
increase the respect for the United States that was lacking.
eluded that:

He con-
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••• if executed with prompitude and spirit, they would do
more to preserve inviolate your peace and happiness than all
the parchment and diplomacy of both hemispheres put together.
One other trial of atrength with an European power puts down
all the ridiculoua calculations of their projection• forever. 47
Not a war monger, General Armstrong did recognize that when dlplomacy failed, resorting to arms to acquire American objectives might be
the only logical course.

But aa in hie previous bid for firmer action--

as he would in the many instances to come--the Administration, with
faith in peaceable coercion and an_ abhorrence for war, shied away from
confrontation, regardleaa of the relatively small risk involved, and
the prospects for aucceaa.

Armstrong's frustrations mounted aa he waa

forced to watch while American rights were violated by an insensitive
Emperor, and American leadership continued to refuse stronger action. 48
No one could know for sure what

Napoleon's intentions for the

United States actually were at this particular juncture, aa the Emperor
left Paris on November 14, 1807, to engage in further military campaigna. Armstrong clearly knew, however, that great changes were in
store for Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

He foresaw that Portugal was to

be taken from the Braganzaa, and that the Bourbons of Spain were at last
to make way for Lucien Bonaparte, who waa to marry the Queen Regent of

Etruria.
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That Armstrong was so well informed about projects that

were then ao carefully concealed, wa1 a credit to hie diplomacy.

It was

not until nearly a month later that Lucien, in his Italian banishment,
received notice of the plan that waa intended for him. 50
With event• of auch magnitude about to take place (the Battle of
Jena, the occupation of Spain and Portugal, among others) Napoleon
really had very little time for American concern• regarding the Florida
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negotiations or the enforcement of the Berlin Decree.51

Armstrong'•

f eara for the royal houaea of Spain and Portugal were confirmed. 52 By
the time Napoleon reached Milan on December 15, 1807, Lisbon waa under
the control of Junot, and French garri•ona held every atrategical
point between Lisbon and Bayonne.

The Prince Regent of Portugal,

powerless to resiat Napoleon'• army, aailed for South America to found
a new empire at Rio de Janeiro.

Spain waa alao in Napoleon's hands.

When he reached Milan, Napol.eon'• thought• were about Spain and her
colonies, with which the questions of English and American trade were
closely connected.

Spencer Perceval'• Orders in Council had appeared

in the London Gazette of November 14, and had also followed the Emperor
to

Italy.

Ruaala.
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A few weeks later, war was declared between England and

No neutral then remained except Sweden, soon to be crushed by

Ruaaia, and the United States, with which Napoleon would deal severely.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM ENFORCED
On January 7, 1807, Great Britain had issued an Order in Council,
nominally in retaliation for the Berlin Decree.

Thie applied a new

interpretation of the Rule of 1756 to the subject states of France.
It prohibited neutral trade between all enemy ports, for example, between Spanish and French ports (such trade had been definitel7open
before the outbreak of the war) and other ports from which Britiah
goods had been excluded by the Berlin Decree.

On November 11, 1807,

another group of Orders in Council were i••ued.
limentarye~ctmenta,

were

·to

They, and other Par-

declared that enemy countries and their coloniea

be conaidered blockaded in the atricteat manner.

All goods

coming from those countries, aa well aa any vessel trading with them
without a special British license--together with its cargo--waa to be
fair prize.

The effect of this order vaa to leave American trade with

the West Indies unmolested, but to compel all exports from parts of
the United States to Europe to be aubject to British control, license,
and toll. 1 These measures were considered justifiable because the
neutral state• had acquiesced in the provisions of the Berlin Decree.
2
Thie was erroneoua.
In a letter of Nov. 27, 1807 from Pinkney in
London to Madison, the Minister stated:
The Britiah orders annihilate the whole public law of &urope
relative to maritime prize, and substitute a sweeping system
of condemnation and penalty in its place. The French decree
produces no auch change at all in that law. The last was no
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more than a legitimate, though possibly an ungracious, exerciae of the right of local sovereignty; while the former can
be ref erred only to for!e, and look for the acene of their
operation to the ocean.
So long as the Berlin Decree was enforced only as a local or
municipal law, the United States did not really remonstrate against it
becauae it had not adversely affected her trade.

Prior to November,

1807, there had been relatively little exhange of notes between France
and the United States on the subject.

Then word waa received that the

decree would be actively enforced without exceptions.

4

MILAN DECREE
Knowledge of events which led to Napoleon'• decree from Milan,
on December 17, 1807, is somewhat vague.

It has been asserted that the

retaliatory preamble of the decree was an after-thought, that there is
evidence that the Milan Decree may not have been in Napoleon's original
program, although it does seem consonant enough that he need not have
based it upon British action. s It may very well be that the Emperor had
not even learned of the exact wording or even the actual promulgation
of the November 11 Order in Council before issuing his first decree of
Milan on November 23.

He certainly had clear enough information of

ita likely character from various allusions in British newspapers,
carefully excerpted by the Moniteur, and other French newspapers.

On

November 23, the very day of Napoleon's arrival at Milan, he issued
hi• first decree of Milan.

6

The fundamental measure in the new legi-

elation of the extended Continental System waa, however, Napoleon'•
aecond decree of Milan, issued fromth•royal palace on December 17,
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1807.

Although thia decree waa ostensibly in response to the British

Order in Council of November 11, 1807, it waa aa much directed toward

neutral• •• 1t wa1 toward the Driti1h.

7

Like the Berlin Decree, the preamble of this second decree of
Milan, was a justification for its issuance.

The British Order• of

November compelled the ahipa of neutral• and friends of England not
only to submit to visits by British cruieere,but also to touch at Britiah port• and to pay a tax levied upon their cargoes.

According to the

Milan Decree, the Britieh Ordera would have the effect of denationaltz.
ing the vessels of all nation• of Europe, affecting the sovereignty of
the atatea themaelvea.

All vessels which submitted to aearch or entered

into British ports, became denationalized and, hence, were English property and subject to capture.

Vessels either going to or coming from

English ports, colonies or any country in the possession of Engliah
troops, were lawful prizes.

The decree would not apply to such coun-

tries which forced England to reepect their flags, and the decree
should, by the very nature of it, be void as aoon as the English
Government would abide by the principle of the law of nations. 8
Armstrong quickly forwarded a copy of this second extraordinary
9
decree to the Secretary of State.
Whether the decree was meant to
stimulate Great Britain to comnit new outrages, or to encourage the
United States to denounce those ahe had already committed, the policy
waa so unwise that Arm8trong reported he did not know a person who
approved of it.

Nevertheleaa, Armstrong waa observant enough to know

that it waa equally aa difficult to find a man who would dare hazard an
objection to thia Napoleonic measure.

Even Talleyrand, who had been
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allowed to go farther than any other peraon, dared not give hie opinion
of it.

Bad aa he thought it vaa, he would not do more than to atate

that lt would appear to require aome modifications.

10

In the postscript to hi• despatch, Armatrong reported that he had
aeen a letter from the Miniater of Marine, atating that the veaaela of
friendly and allied powera, then in the port• of the Empire, would not
be permitted to depart until given further ordera.

Thia waa auppoaedly

to prevent their falling into the handa of the enemy.

Armstrong clearly

recognized the real object of thia action--to induce the British to
aeize auch veaaela of the United State• aa may be within their reach.
"Thu•

t~e

tvo rivala are to go on endeavoring which can most outrage

lava and juatice."

11

Armstrong did not waste time in protesting this decree, which he
realized posed obvious danger• to his country'• interests.

At the same

time, he saw an opportunity presented by Spain's impending doom to
presa France for help in the settlement of the Florida issue.

On

December 23, Napoleon, in orders iaaued from Milan, ordered his Minister
of War to concentrate armies to occupy the whole Iberian Peninsula, and
to establish the magazine• for their support.

He was almost ready to

act against Spain, and his return to Paris on January 3, 1808, announced
to those in on the secret, that the subjugation of Spain was about to
begin.

12
Armstrong was one of the most interested in Paris.

He had longed

since 1805 for the chance to challenge the Emperor by employing similar
preHure tactica.

Armstrong believed that Napoleon'• schemes to defeat Eng-

land required either control of or the acquiescence of North and South America
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in his plana.

This factor would give President Jefferson the ability

to demand rather than receive, terms for Florida.

Whatever these terms

might be, Napoleon would have to agree to them, or yield the Americas
to England's naval supremacy.
safe and sure.

As Armstrong saw it, the plan was both

Napoleon made no secret of his wants.

Whatever finesse

he may have used in the earlier stages of his diplomacy was thrown

13 The Emperor wanted the
14 He did not hesitate
United States to go to war against Great Britain.
aside after his return to Paris on January 3.

to threaten, cajole, or bribe.

In response to Armstrong's remonstrances

against the Milan Decree, the Emperor ordered Champagny to take a
commanding and declarative position.

He instructed Champagny to answer

that:
••• I am ashamed to discuss points which the injustice is so
evident; but that in the position which England has put the
Continent, I do not doubt of the United States declaring war
against her, especially on account of her decree of November
11; that however great may be the evil resulting to America
from war, every man of sense will prefer it to a recognition
of the monatroua principles and of the anarchy which that
Government wants to establish on the seas; that in my mind I
regard war as declared between England and America from the
day when England published her decrees; that, for the rest,
I have ordered that the American vessels should remain sequestered, to be disposed of as shall be necessary according
to circumstances.15
Champagny followed the instruction• of his master and wrote a
note to Armstrong, dated January 15, 1807.

He condemned the practices

employed by Great Britain aa so contrary to the rules of nations that,
therefore, it had become necessary to turn against her the arms which she
made use of herself.

If inconveniences resulted then it was to Eng-

land that the United States should direct complaints.

The United

States, more than any other power, had legitimate complaints against
16
Great Britain.
No doubt this waa correct. Believing that the
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United States was ready to associate with all other powers who had
defended themselves against Great Britain, the Emperor had not taken

any definitive measures against American ve11el1 which may have been
brought into French ports.

He had ordered that they should remain

sequestered until a decision was made, according to the dispositions
expressed by the government of the United States.

17

Re•ponding to Champagny'• letter of January 15, 1808, Armstrong,
in a note of January 27, 1808, concurred with the French assessment of
Anglo-American relations.

If these two powers were not in a state of

open war, they were at least close to it.

Armstrong further informed

Champagny that he wae cognizant that England was strengthening herself
in Canada, Nova Scotia, and her West India islands, and that she contemplated the seizure of the two Florid••·

Under the circumstances,

Armstrong felt the Emperor should be apprized of the intentions of the
British, and at the same time that the United States would not be indifferent to the two province• paaaing into the possession of a power
on the point of becoming an enemy.

The United States would repel

every attempt made by Great Britain to possess these provinces.

Arm-

strong reminded Champagny that in 1806 the United States had been on
the point of settling ita differences with Spain by force, and was only
restrained by the desire, repeatedly expressed by the Emperor, that a
good understanding might be preserved between the two powers, and that
the point• in the controveray between them would be amicably discussed
and terminated.

Armstrong stated that he waa for the last time in-

atructed to present the subject to the Emperor and to solicit his
efforts at mediation in order to bring the parties into an iumediate
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negotiation.

Thia meaaure alone would prevent force. 18

Armstrong'• actions at this time were extremely ahrewd and adept.
He was aware that the Emperor was, at that very moment, concentrating
hie effort• on Spain.

Napoleon, ever expedient, alao aought to achieve

hia objective•, trying to lure the United States into hie scheme.

On

January 28, 1808, the Emperor gave the order to occupy Barcelona and
the Spanish frontier aa far as the Ebro, and to march a division from
Burgoa to Aranda on the direct road to Madrid.

These orders were not

disguised; they announced the annexation of Spain to France.

A few

daya later, Napoleon began to diapoae of Spanish territory aa if it
were his own.

19

On February 2, 1808, the Emperor instructed Champagny to inform
Armstrong that whenever war should be declared between the United States
and England, and when, in consequence of thia war Americana should aend
troops into the Florida• to repulse the English, the Emperor would
approve.

Champagny was also to inform Armstrong that, should the

United State• enter into a treaty of alliance the Emperor would be
willing to intervene with the Court of Spain to obtain the Floridas
for the Americana. 20
On the following day, Champagny aent

f~r

Armstrong and gave him

this verbal message, and the Emperor's offer to intercede to settle the
western boundary of Louisiana, on condition that the United States
enter into an alliance with France. 21
Armstrong deaervea credit for not merely accepting verbal aeaurancea of the Emperor.

Armstrong waa determined to make sure that the

French government waa aware of what it needed to do to revive American
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friendship.

He alao wanted to place on record any official or unofficial

overture• which had been made to him.

Armatrong•s correspondence clear-

ly demonstrates that he waa not eaail7 duped by profeetion1 of Freneh
friendship, and did not hesitate to impresa the French government with
hie disgust and extreme displeasure for their paat actions.
was certainly not intimidated by French officialdom.

Armstrong

He bluntly ac-

cuaed France of violating certain neutral rights, and comnented to
Champagny that it was indeed difficult to differentiate between the
hostile actions of Great Britain and those of France.

His irritation

was clearly evident in the following:
I should little deserve, and still less reciprocate the
frankness of this declaration, were I to withhold from your
Excellency my belief, that the present conduct of France
towards the comnerce of the u.s., so far from promoting the
views of his Majesty, are directly calculated to contravene
them.
That the u.s. are at this moment on the eve of war with
Great Britain on account of certain outrages conmitted against
their rights as a neutral nation is a fact abundantly and even
generally known. Another fact scarcely leaa known ia, that,
under these circumstances, France also has proceeded, in
many instances and by various means, to violate these very
rights. In both cases all the injunctions of public law
have been equally forgotten; but between the two, we cannot
fail to remark a conspicuous difference: with Great Britain
the U.S. could invoke no particular treaty providing rights
supplementary to these injunctions.--But such was not their
aituation with France: with her a. treaty did exist;--a
treaty strengthened by time and confirmed by experience; a
treaty stipulating the broad principle, that free ships make
free goods;--a treaty sanctioned with the name and guaranteed
by the promise of the Emperor himself "that all its obligations
should be inviolably observed."
I will not press the comparison farther, nor will I do more
than auggeat, that an open and unprovoked violation of existing engagements, cannot, in itself, but operate as a strong
diauaaive from new and more intimate connexiona.22
Armstrong perspicaciously suggested further that the professed
views of the Emperor would be moat certainly promoted were all
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American property captured and held contrary to the proviaiona of
exiating treatiea releaaed, if any future outrage of theae proviaiona
forbidden, and if meana for_ complying with the requeat made 1n hie
letter of January 28, 1808 adopted.

23

The tone and language of General Armstrong's correspondence with
Champagny were certainly not what the Emperor expected, nor what he
cared to hear, another example of the firmness which Armstrong maintained, when necessary, in his effort• to adequately represent the
beat interests of the United States.
lar fashion.

The Emperor responded in a simi-

He instructed Champagny to write to the American minister

that the treaty with the United States was founded on the principle
that the flag covers the goods.

If the United States submitted to the

British Order in Council of November, then she would have renounced
the protection of her flag.

However, if Americans regarded this act

as one of hostility, the Emperor was ready to
respect.

d~

justice in every
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CHOICE OF ENEMIES
The documents in this exchange between Armstrong and the French
government were forwarded to the Secretary

o!

State.

If American

leaders were under any illusion• about Napoleon'• character, theae
ahould have been ahattered when they read the despatches from Armstrong.
He candidly expreaaed

his opinion• of Napoleon and Champagny, and did

not hide the frustration• he had felt for quite some time.
warned hie •uperiora to be cautious.
Armstrong described French actions:

He bluntly

Critically, but accurately,
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With one hand they offer ua the bleaainga of equal alliance
against Great Britain; with the other they menace us with var
if we do not accept this kindnesa; and with both they pick
our pocket! with all imaginable diligence, dexterity, and

lmpudcn,c. 5

Characteristic of Armstrong, he advised firmer action on the part
of the United States.

He encouraged the United States to make a choice

between one enemy or the other--either France or England; "but in either
case do not suspend a moment the seizure of the Floridaa.u
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The

United States waa eventually to puraue this course of action, but not
before many more cases of national abuse.

In hie despatch of February

17, 1808, Armstrong expressed the hope that American policy, while
being more temperate, would nonetheless be firm.

Thia followed hia

explanation that the King of Holland had closed his ports to American
commerce except during a storm, and that while the storm lasted,
Americana were to be regarded aa priaonera of war.

To a man of Arm-

strong'• sense of pride and justice, this behavior was "outrageous."
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On February 22, 1808, Armstrong once again informed Madison about
the enforcement of the French decrees against the United States.

He

believed that the two facts he mentioned would "sufficiently ahow the
decided character of the Emperor's policy with regard to ua."
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First,

Armstrong informed Madison that, in a Council of Administration meeting
it was proposed to modify the operation of the decrees, a proposition
aupported by the whole weight of the Council.

The Emperor, however,

"became highly indignant and declared that these decrees should suffer
no change, and that the Americana should be compelled to take the positive character, either of alliea or of enemiee.n 29
Second, on January 27, 1808, twelve day• after Champagny'•
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written ae1urancea that these decree• would not alter the 1tatua of any
aequestered property until diecuasiona with England were brought to a
close, and eeven da7• before he repeated to Armstrong these assurancea,
the Emperor had, by a special decision, confiscated two American ahipa
and their cargoes merely because they did not possess a document not
required by any law or usage of the commerce in which they had been
engaged.

This was done on the basis of a report of aequestered cases,

totalling up to 160.

At the then current prices, that would amount to

100 million francs, a sum whose magnitude alone made all attempts at
saving it hopeless.

The principle sufferers from such action, as

Armstrong recognized, would be the Danes, Portuguese and the Americana.
Although Armstrong once more advised that the United States stand its
ground, Jefferson and

Madison were preparing to respond more in line
30
with their desire to avoid unpleasant confrontation.
EMBARGO ACT
While events were rapidly transpiring in Europe, news arrived
from the United States that Congress had passed the Embargo Act on
December 22, 1807. 31 Thie measure, along with simultaneous measures
32
for defense which placed great reliance on gunboats,
actually hindered
Armstrong's diplomatic efforts.

In hie instructions of February 8,

1808, Armstrong was officially informed of the passage of the Embargo
on American ships, a reeult of the illegal and hostile actions of
France and Great Britain against American COIIIJlerce and navigation.

The

Administration sawtheEmbargo as the means beat suited for the crisis.
It was thought to be effective •ecurity for American mercantile policy
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and for mariners then at home, and those who were daily arriving.

At

the same time, it vaa not a measure of, nor a juat cause for war.

Hav-

ing been informed of the paaaage of thi•
it known to the French government.

•~t,

Armstrong officially made

In describing the act, the Secre-

tary of State had written that it waa:
••• strictly a measure of precaution required by the dangers
incident to external coanerce, and being indiscriminate in
its terms and operation toward all nations, can give no just
offence to any. The duration of the act is not fixed by itself; its causes in a degree sufficient in the judgment of
the Legislature to induce or forbid its repeal. It may be
hoped that the inconveniences felt from it by the belligerent nations may lead to a change of jhe conduct which imposed
the inconveniences of it on itaelf.3
For Jeff eraon and the Republicans the Embargo Act waa the alternative to war, indicative of their faith in the principle of peaceable
economic coercion.

Despising war and large standing armies and navies,

advocates of peaceable coercion believed that they could achieve their
objectives without the need to riak one's country in costly and bloody
wars.
The President resorted to the use of the Embargo as a last alternative when diplomacy appeared to have failed.

The Chesapeake incident

of June, 1807, the failure of the Monroe-Pinkney talks to resolve

.

serious matters of commerce, the Britieh announcement of their Order•
in Council of November, 1806, and January, 1807, and other British
outragea, plua news of France'• retaliatory decrees, forced the
Administration to use means just ahort of war in hopes that the
belligerent• could be encouraged to deaiat from their violations of
international law.
If Jefferson had wanted, he could have had a war against England,
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as the country vae in an inflammatory mood.

However, without an adequate

navy, and with an exposed coastline, war seemed foolhardy to him, as well
as contrary to his beliefe

and general abhorrence for war. 34 Instead,

Jefferson tried to use the Chesapeake affair as a weapon of peaceable
economic coercion.

Jefferson thought the measures employed by the

Adminiatration in the form of economic coercion would bring about the
desired changes in Great Britain's conduct.

On July 2, 1807, he had

iasued a proclamation forbidding the British to uae American territorial
waters and ports for provisioning. 35

On December 14, 1807, the previoua-

ly auapended Non-Importation Act vaa finally allowed to go into effect,
although it was not strong enough to force concessions from the belligerents. 36
Having received news of the British Orders in Council and of the
French decrees, it waa necessary for the President to act.

Jefferson

honestly believed that the Embargo was, in itself, a form of
ance.

reeiat~

37 Although considered an alternative to war, it entailed most of

the miseries of war, without any of its compensations.

38

The Embargo as a means of coercion obviously failed.

39

Perhaps

the most important consequence of the Embargo waa the divisive spirit
1 t created in Americana.

It gave rise to smuggling and produced out-

right condemnation from many of the country•a leading politicians-especially those from New England where the effect was felt the
hardest.

40

The opposition toVarda the Embargo became increasingly loud,

until the Embargo waa repealed in the final daya of the Jeff ereon
Administration.
In theory, the Embargo and itasubsequent Supplementary Acta
were impartial, but in practice, it waa directed mainly toward• Great
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Britain.

Jefferson had always been euapicioua of British aims.

De-

1pite the harm the French decrees caused Americans, Jefferaon never
really believed the contest in Europe waa between tvo countries of equal
strength, eapecially after Louisiana had been ceded to the United
Statea, and after France had lost it• fleet at Trafalgar.

After

theae events, France appeared to Jefferson as much lea1 threatening
than did Great Britain.

After all, Great Britain had control of the

seas, ahe had the means through her American bases to insult, plunder,
or attack the United States, and she had the motive of revenge to .
encourage her hostility.

Jefferson'• suspicions of British motives

should not, then, be underestimated.

Her insolent behavior was an

important factor in inducing Jefferson to choose a weapon that accODID0dated the war aims of Napoleon. 41

Despite Jefferson's efforts to

discount this, the Embargo Act was viewed as a pro-French measure by
many in and out of Congrese.

In the Embargo Message, the President

tried to emphasize the new construction of the Berlin Decree as if the
Embargowere intended to be directed against France.
ately misleading.
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This was deliber-

The President knew that one of the first eff ecta

of the act would be to give some teeth to the Non-Importation Act which
had gone into effect on December 14, 1807.

The President believed that

if Great Britain were deprived not only of food imports, but also of
raw materials for industry, powerful British manufacturers would force
the government to yield to American demand1.

One of the President'•

objective• waa to strike a blow at Britain without co11111itting the
United States to war, and without acquiring the label of being a French
agent. 43
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Jefferson, however, waa not succeaaful in hiding hia intentions
from the Federalists.

Many of them knew from the beginning the true

significance of the Embargo.

On the very day of its passage, Repre-

aentative Samuel Taggart expressed hia apprehensions about the effects
of the Embargos
Last night precisely at eleven o'clock we closed a session
which had been held for three days in secret. Should I say
that the die la cast, that my country la no longer independent;
we have been legislating under an imperial decree of the Emperor of France and sanctioning a plan matured in Paris it
would be saying no more than I fear will be realized.44
Jefferson, then, was fully aware that the Embargo constituted a
service to Napoleon, and aa much as admitted that it would not hurt
France.

The President reassured the French minister, Turreau, of the

Embargo's effect.

"The Embargo which appears to hit France and Britain

equally," Jefferson said to Turreau, "is for a fact more prejudicial to
the latter than the other by reason of a greater number of coloniea
which England possesses and their inferiority in local resources."

45

Unlike Great Britain, France was reasonably self-sufficient and could
get most of the supplies which she needed from her continental satellites. 46
Because Jefferson viewed France aa not posing an inmediate threat
to American security, he saw the Embargo as an offensive as well as a
defensive weapon.

47

In his resistance to England, Jefferson undoubted-

ly hoped that Napoleon would favor .American ambitions to the south,
especially the Floridaa,

48

a hope based on the Emperor's promise to

General Armstrong that if the United States made an alliance with France
against Great Britain, Jefferaon would be free to intervene in Spanish
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America. 49
In this dangerous game of diplomacy, Jefferson was outplayed by
Napoleon.

The Embargo Act, intended as a fair

trade for the Floridaa,

in effect made the United States an ally in the Continental System,
without help in acquiring one square foot of Florida in return.

The

Emperor'• price for his cooperation kept rising, despite Jefferson's
objections to the treatment accorded him.

so

Although the Embargo Act actually favored Napoleon's Continental
System, this should not be interpreted to mean that Jefferson or the
Administration cared for Napoleon.

In fact, just the opposite waa true.

Jeff eraon wrote of Napoleon:
••• Bonaparte was a lion in the field only. In civil life
a cold-blooded, calculated, unprincipled usurper, without a
virtue: no statesman, knowing nothing of commerce, political
economy, or civil government, and supplying ignorance by bold
presumption. I had supposed him a great man until his entrance
into the Aasembly •••• From that date, however, I set him down
as a great 1coundre1.Sl
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CHAPTER V

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM INTENSIFIED
While President Jefferson struggled with Congress over the
Embargo Act and defense measure•, Napoleon occupied himself with
dismantling Spain. 1 Lacking specific instructions as to the course
he should follow, Armstrong persisted in his protests to Champagny by
using the argument that the decree• themselves were being violated.
In a note of March 1, 1808, he protested the violation of articles
76, 79, and 80, in the case of the brig, Mercury, captured by a French
privateer.

Hie firmness cannot be missed in hi• notes to the French

Minister of Foreign Relations.

He boldly warned Champagny:

I cannot close this detail without the moat serious remonstrance• againat abuses so revolting--ao multiplied and 10 injurious to the rights of American commerce ••• their perpetration and continuance cannot fail to interrupt that good understanding which haa •o long subsisted between the two powers
which has been productive of nothing but advantage to both and
which of course would be moat unw~aely exchanged for the
pillage of a few trading vessels.
Arm•trong'a diligence in the pursuit of American interests is
demonstrated by the fact that, prior to his receipt of official inatructiona, dated February 8, 1808, ordering him to formally protest
the Berlin and Milan Decrees,

3

Armstrong had already written at least

twenty notes of protest and inquiry pertaining to cases which had
ariaen under the Berlin and Milan Decree••

After receiving hia

inatructlona, Armstrong further denounced these decrees as violation•
of the treaty exiating between the United Statea and France. 4 He did
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not waate time in preaenting a note to the French government which he
hoped would obtain either a recall of the illegal meaaurea, or at least
leave in force the ri5hta which accrued to tho Unlttd St&te11

HI did

not inmediately receive an answer to .this note, nor did he expect one,
as the Emperor had left for Spain.

At no time before his departure

had Napoleon indicated any change in the views which had originally
produced the Berlin and Milan Decrees.

s

Armstrong understood all too

well that with Napoleon'• activities in Spain, as well aa his apparent
success throughout the Continent, the United States must necessarily
be brought more strictly into Napoleon'• fold.

Armstrong did not have

much optimism at this point in his efforts to alter Napoleon's decrees
as they affected American commerce.

General Armstrong's protests and

effectiveness were further undermined by the American Embargo Act.

It

was difficult to protest the capture of American ships when they were
not legally in French waters in the first place.

Thia predicament was

exploited by Napoleon as he calculated hie next move.
BAYONNE DECREE
During the two or three months following the abdication·of
Spain'• Charles IV, Napoleon was at the summit of his ambitions.

The

Emperor waa further engaged in gradiose plans that he hoped would
secure England's destruction and achieve hia world empire.

The English

navy and English comnerce were to be driven from the Mediterranean
Sea, the Indian Ocean, and American vatera.

Order• were quickly

iHued for the ncon•uuction of the naviea of France, Spain, and
Portugal.

Great expedition• were to occupy Ceuta, Egypt, Syria,
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Buenos Airea, and the Iale de France.

6

To obtain these objectives, the Empire needed not only the subm111ion of Spain, but also the support of Spanish America and the
United States.

Napoleon saw hie opportunity to use the American

E:mbargo as a means to accomplish hie own purpoaes.

7 On April 17, 1808,

he issued an order that all American vessels entering the ports of
France, Italy, and the Hanae towns, be seized.
as the Bayonne Decree.

Thia order was known

The ostensible reason for its issuance was that

because of the American Embargo Act, ships that violated this law were,
in reality, English ships that pretended to be American.
termed Napoleon's reasoning as "very ingenious."

8

Even Armstrong

His protests against

this type of reasoning were futile. 9 After a glimmer of hope that the
system with regard to the United States might be ameliorated,
Armstrong's despatch of June 6, 1808, announced to Madison that several
American ships had been condemned by the French Council of Prizes.

10

Despite the rapid pace of events in Europe, it was not until
May 2, 1808, that Madison finally sent instructions to Armstrong that
were intended to guide him through the dangers of Napoleonic diplomacy.

11 Madison informed Armstrong that the Administration did not

appreciate Napoleon's efforts to coerce the United States into joining
France in a coumon effort.

He stated that the notion that France had

presumed to declare war against Great Britain for the United States
had created quite a stir.

He further added that:

To present to the United States the alternative of bending
to the views of France against her enemy, or of incurring a
confiscation of all the property of their citizens carried
into French prize courts, implied that they were susceptible
Of impression• by which no independent and honorable nation
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can be guided; and to prejudice and pronounce for them the
effect which the conduct of another nation ought to have on
their Councils and coura' ot proceeding, had the air at least
of an aasumed authority, not leas irritating to the public
feelings.12
Madison replied that the United States, while acknowledging the
inducement offered by France in the event of war with Great Britain to
interpose with Spain to obtain the Floridaa, had chosen, nonetheless,
to pursue a policy of neutrality.

However, in what waa obviously

designed to appease the Emperor, the Secretary of State atated that,
in the event such a crisis demanded that the United States take a
precautionary occupation of the Florida& against the hostile designs
of Great Britain, "it will be recollected with satisfaction that the
measure had been contemplated with

appro~ation

by His Imperial

Majesty.n 13
Included in the despatch of May 2, 1808--received in Paris on
June 8--was information relating the passage of the act which gave the
President the authority to suspend, whole or part of the Embargo
laws.

14 The conditions on which the auspending authority was given

to the President claimedArmatrong•aparticular attention.

The

American government waa appealing equally to the justice and the policy
of both belligerents.

Madison informed Armstrong that the President

counted upon him to apply his beat ef forta to make this appeal ae
impressive to the French government aa posaible. 15

According to the

Administration, it was only aound policy for France to rescind at
least that part of her decrees which violated neutral rights, and to
be the first one of the two belligerents to take that atep.

It was

also reasonable to expect that this atep would be iDlnediately taken,
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although the total repeal of her decree• waa to be more reasonably
expected, especially if Great Britain repealed or vaa likely to repeal
heri.

16 The Administration continued to believe that Napoleon could he

brought to reason.

Thia vaa an error Jefferson and Madison consistently

made.
The Emperor and Champagny were atill in Bayonne when Armstrong
received a note from the latter, dated June 13, 1808, from which
Armstrong inf erred that the Emperor had taken the American refusal of
an alliance with relatively good humor, further evidenced by an order
to the Council of Prizes to suspend their proceedings against American
caaea.

17 Being somewhat encouraged by this, and at the same time seeing:

an opportunity to press American objectives with regards to Florida and
the western boundary, Armstrong took the occasion to address a letter
to Pierre de Cevallos, Joseph Bonaparte's Minister of Foreign Rela18
tions.
In ao doing, Armstrong pursued an avenue which had previously
been closed by the obstinancy of Godoy and the former king, Charles IV.
Thia was a shrewd move on the part of the American minister, who also
forwarded a copy of his full authority to negotiate with Spain. 19
In the short time following Champagny•a letter of June 18, 1808,
however, Napoleon appears to have had a change of heart, having had time
to reflect more carefully on coming eventa--which looked rosier now
that his brother, Joseph, was on the throne of Spain.

There no longer

appeared to be a reason to appeaae the United States.

The Emperor,

therefore, instructed Champagny to inform Armstrong that:
••• you do not know what he means about the occupation of
the Floridas; and that the Americana, being at peace with
the Spaniards, cannot occupy the Floridaa without the per-
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mission or the request of the King of Spain.20
Champagny, obligingly, wrote a note to Armstrong, dated June 22,
1808, reflecting a marked change in temper from his previoue note gf
June 18. 21

That Armstrong was somewhat dumbfounded by such a denial,

ia stating it mildly, although Armstrong had experienced Napoleon'•
duplicity before.

No

wonder Armstrong had demanded that official or

unofficial overtures from the Emperor be put ln writing.
wisely prepared for this possibility.

He had

The letter of June 22 not only

retracted the promise of approving the cautionary occupation of the
Floridas by the United States, but it alao asserted that the Emperor's
message of February 3, 1808, had been misunderstood. 22
Champagny found himself in an embarrassing situation not unlike
that of his predecessor.

23

Armstrong immediately reminded Champagny

of the written explanation Champagny had given himself on this very
subject, in which the only stipulated condition for auch an occupation
was an attack or demonstration of attack by Great Britain.

There

was not a single syllable mentioned about either the privity or the
consent of the King of Spain, both of which were now deemed necessary. 24
The general would have been completely justified in calling both
Champagny and the Emperor liars, and he must surely have held this
opinion of them.

Armstrong's perspicaciousness in analyzing the effects

of military and political events on French policy with regard to the
United States was clearly evident when he ascertained that the ideas
expressed by Champagny had no doubt resulted from the new relationship
which the Florida• represented to the-French government.

The abdica-

tion of Charles IV and the assumption of the throne by the Emperor's
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brother, Joseph, clearly had changed the situation. 25
On July 4, 1808, General Armstrong, as instructed, again pro-

teated the position in which the Emperor had placed the United States.
Choosing between an acquiescence to the views of France against Great
Britain, and a confiscation of all American property sequestered by
order of the Emperor, was equally offensive to both governments.

26

The Bayonne Decree was, in effect, a declaration of war against American
commerce.

It increased seizures of American vessels, and contributed

to other outrageous behavior, such as actually burning American ships,
which Armstrong protested vehemently.
Writing to the Secretary of

27

S~ate

on July 26, 1808, Armstrong

informed Madison that his orders of May 2, 1808, with regard to the
Emperor's propositionof February 3, and the other related in Champagny's
letter of January 15, had been executed.

Although it would have given

him the greatest pleasure to have received from the French government
explanations on the subject of the differences between them that would
have satisfied the viewa of the United States, he could not report that
this had occurred •
••• I owe it as well to you as to myself to declare that
every attampt for that purpose, hitherto made, has failed,
and under circwnstances which by no mean! indicate any
change, in this respect, for the better. 8
The same spirit was reflected in a letter to President Jefferson
two days later, in which Armstrong stressed again that France did not
seem disposed to change her system.

Indeed, Armstrong correctly

assessed that she was much attached to it.

Calling French logic

''madness," Armstrong reported that the Emperor had decided to identify
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American coumerce with that of England.

29

RETREAT TO BOURBON d' ARCHAMBAULT
General Armatrong was pessimiatic that any satlafactoryreaponse
from the French government would be forthcoming.

Hi• fruatration waa

further compounded by the fact that the .American government had conaistently disregarded his advice to employ firmer action to acquire
American territorial objective• or to uphold American honor.

Once

again, Armstrong called for more forceful measures in light of continued French and Spanish abuses.

If the time had not yet come to seize

Cuba, aa the President had once advocated, then it would never come.
A set of circumstances so favorable to that object were not likely to
occur again.
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In this assessment, Armstrong waa no doubt correct.

Frustrated that hia advice was not followed, and poaaessing
little hope for a change in the Emperor's ayatem,· Armatrong, suffering
with a bad case of rheumatism, decided to leave Paris for the baths of
Bourbon d' Archambault, 150 miles from Paris, where he stayed until
31
fall.
The Court had left Bayonne on July 20 and 21. The Emperor was
expected at Nantes on August 7 and at Rambouillet on August 13, and it
was doubtful he would even touch at Paris.

If he should, then Armstrong

would endeavor to draw from himananswer to the remonstrances which he
had made at various times since November, 1807.

He then retired to

await further lnatructions from Madison. 32
As Armstrong left Paris for Bourbon d' Archambault, he left notes
with his secretary for Champagny, in which he desperately tried to
impress upon the French the many disadvantages of bad relations between
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the United States and France.

Armstrong instructed hia secretary to

express Armstrong'• regrets to Champagny that Franco-American relations
were far leas than what they should be.

He believed that the

~peror

certainly had a right to make any municipal regulations he deemed
proper.

For example, it was within his right to deny entry into the

ports of France to American ships which had touched in England, or
were destined for that country, and he could either sequester or confiscate such vessels of the United States as should infract those laws,
after due promulgation and notice.

Beyond this, however, the United
33
States hoped and believed that the Emperor would not go.
While Armstrong was at Bourbon d' Archambault, he received

Madison's instructions of July 21, 1808. 34

In this set of instructions

Madison: referred to the caaea of the burned American vessels which
Armstrong had reported in his letter to Champagny of April 2, 1808.
According to theSecretary of State, if ample reparation should not
have been made, the President thought it proper that Armstrong should
remonstrate "in terms which may awaken the French government to the
nature of the injury and the demands of justice."35

Armstrong had

already addressed this question and had failed to receive a aatisf actory
response.

Armstrong exercized his independence as a Minister Plenipo-

tentiary, and declined to press the French government further on this
point by going to Paris to renew discussions with Champagny as suggeated by Madison in his instructions. 36

In not fulfilling this

portion of his ·1natructions, Armstrong was completely justified.

It

would have been useless and possibly even injurious to the American
position.

37
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Armstrong also informed the Secretary of State that the!!:.
Michael had returned from England and brought with her account• which
left no confidence in a change in the system on that aide of the
Channel either.

To keep this fact a secret from the French government

was an impossibility.

Knowledge that England and the United States

were at odds almost excluded the possibility of an adjustment between
France and the United States, since this fact would tend to cause the
38
French to extend their policy.
Although Armstrong had earlier thought that an Embargo might have
been appropriate against the belligerents, ·by the end of summer he
clearly recognized that the Embargo was a failure, as it had not
achieved its objectives in Europe.

Thia assessment must have been

unsettling to Jefferson and Madison who were experiencing rapidly
increasing domestic opposition to it, and were burdened with the
problems of trying to enforce a measure so blatantly ignored by
American shippers, despite the risks of capture, forfeiture, and even
burnings.

Armstrong stated:

We have somewhat over-rated our means of coercing the two
great belligerents to a course of justice. The embargo is a
measure calculated, above any other, to keep us whole and
keep us in peace--but beyond this you must not count upon it.
Here it is not felt, and in England [in the midst of the more
recent & interesting events of the day] it is forgotten. By
the way--the Emperor would prefer it, a war on our part with
G.B.; but woul~ prefer it, to any state of things, except
that of a war. 9
Armstrong recognized that the Emperor--although hostile to the
~bargo

originally--had concluded that it was indeed a hostile act
toward Great Britain which aided his Continental System, 40 in spite of
the fact that the Embargo did 'adversely effect some French colonial
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trade, especially in the West Indiea. 41
Emperor gave his approval to the Embargo.

In the Fall of 1808, the
He waa, in fact, upset when

the Embargo was eventually repealed at the end of the Jefferson
Adm1niatration.

The official report, largely in the Emperor'• worda,

atated:
The Americana, a people who owe their fortune, prosperity,
and almost their existence to commerce, have given the example
of a great and coui:ageoua sacrifice. They have forbidden •••
all cotrtnerce ••• rather than shamefully submit to the tribute
which the En!~iah attempt to impoae upon the navigators of
all nations.
Armstrong once again urged the United States to take firmer
action.

Unless France did the United States justice, the Embargo

ahould be raised and coumercial vessels ahould be armed.

His remarks

were almost pleaa for action, if only to show the world that the United
States would not allow itself to be pushed around without at least
making a symbolic gesture of resistance.

He further argued that:

Should she adhere to her wicked & foolish measures, we
ought to content ourselves with doing this. There is much,
very much besides, that we can do, and we ought not to omit
doing all we can;--because it is believed here, that we cannot
do much, and even, that we will not do, what ve have the
power of doing. For God'• sake let your meaauree be auch, aa
will correct 3hia erroneous estimate of both your power and
your spirit. Z.
.
The Administration again shied away from taking a firm stand,
convinced the arming of merchant ships would inevitably lead to var
with one belligerent or the other.

44

Despite rapidly growing domestic

opposition in the United States to the Embargo, the Administration,
lacking what it saw aa alternatives, clung to the Embargo.

The only

other alternative appeared to be war, and Madison abhorred the
thought.

45
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Having spent almost four years in France by this time, Armstrong
had experienced the difficulties of conducting diplomacy with Napoleon's
government, and his poai tion wa1 ma.de even le11 desirable by the
Administration's refusal to accept his advice.

Additionally, Armstrong

learned that many of his confidential letters to Madison had been
published by Congress,

This damaged his position, since the French

government was allowed to know his confidential opinions regarding
Franco-American relations.

Some of his French sources, fearful of being

exposed, dried up, thereby depriving Armstrong of valuable inside
information.

46

Failing to see a prospect for change in France's

conduct, and becoming increasingly disillusioned with his mission,
General Armstrong began to believe there was no reason to continue
keeping a minister in France.

His despatches more frequently ex-

pressed his desire to return to the United States, at the President's
approval--delayed on several occasions in order to pursue some new
possible break-through.

47

At the time he wrote his despatch to Madison of August 30, 1808,
stating that the United States had over-rated its ability to pressure
France to alter her policies, Armstrong was not aware that his last
note to Champagny, plus certain effects of the Embargo, actually
helped to produce a reconsideration of French policy. 48

On September

11, 1808, Collins de Suasy, the Director General of the Customs, preaented a report to Napoleon on the neutral situation, especially that
of the Americans.

In this report Collins held that:

(1) it would be

useful to hold in French ports the American vessels which arrive in
ballast, then load with goods useful to England, and (2) it was desirable
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to cause the arrest of all Americana who navigated in Europe.

Direct

evidence ia lacking as to the· preciee circumstances which produced this
letter, but it1 connections with the Bordeaux petition and
note of early August are obvious.

Armstrong's

49

On September 15, 1808, Napoleon referred this report to Decree
for his opinions.

Deer~•

took ieaue with Colline for reasons which are

an interesting application of Armstrong's views.

He stated that there

was no doubt the Americans arrived in France only under a license of
the King of England.

It was a requirement of the Order in Council of

November, 1807, which could not be evaded by the Americana unless the
Order was a dead letter.

That they were still in force was shown by

the strictness of the blockade and by the arrival, on September 13, of
the ship, Junot, with a British license.
advantages to the state.

Decree recognized possible

Since the said vessels came in ballast, France

received payment for her goods without any French money being paid out
in return--certainly the most advantageous arrangement a commercial
state could desire.

He urged ignoring the actions toward the neutrals

who came in ballast into French ports.

It waa only necessary to

enforce measures on those who should be convicted for violating the
decree of blockade by trading in English goods.

However, it would be

important to authorize not only the Americans, but all those who wished,
to export French surplus of wines, grains, brandy, and the products of
manufacturing.

The dignity of the decree would, therefore, not be

violated in the least, since it would be executed in all its forms.
Not only would there be more money brought into France, but French
farmers and producera would also benefit •

•
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Decr~s also disagreed with Collins that Congress would thank

Napoleon for the "competition" in enforcing the American Embargo.

He

believed that it waa not in the interests of the Emperor to seize
Americana on the open seas.

He further argued against the new rigors

of the blockade which would deprive the allies of the Empire of the
only outlet for their products, and the only source for their supplies.
Yet he did hold that just reciprocity demanded the application of the
Berlin and Milan Decrees to those neutrals who went to the ports
of the enemy or the enemy's allies.

On this last point, which Decres

was inclined to adopt, Napoleon aaked for a further report, which
appears not to have been presented when he departed for Germany on
September 22.

51

Armstrong, in a private letter of October 20, 1808, wrote to
Madison that Napoleon seemed to be seriously re-considering FrancoAmerican relations.

"His Majesty was disposed to remove all difficul-

ties between the U.S. and France but that time was wanting at the
52
moment to enter upon the business."
However, when Napoleon returned
from Erfurt, it was when he waa deeply involved with the business of
Spain, and establishing greater vigilence in enforcing the Continental
System toward neutrals.

Yet, like all the other quickly abandoned

experiments of 1808 by which Napoleon sought to alleviate the pernicioua eff ecte of the strict interpretation of his system in France,
the freer trade policy urged by

Decr~e

marked the certain trend toward

a eyatem 9f exceptions--a trade by special licenaea. 53
dence that Napoleon had not achieved his alms.

There is evi-

He had failed to secure

effectual co-operation in enforcing hie interpretation of the system. 54
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Shifting to the license trade was an undeniable break with the
Continental System.

SS Armstrong, therefore, had come closer to

achieving greater aucceaa than even he had imagined.

Had it not been

for the peculiar military circumstances of the moment, it is quite
possible that the position of American commerce might have appreciably
improved.
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THE COUNT ROMANZOFF INITIATIVE
Although discouraged by his apparent lack of diplomatic success,
Armstrong tried alternative measures, even if they were long shota.

One

of his initiatives was to seek the support and aid of the Russian
Foreign Minister, Count Romanzoff, who was in Paris to arrange with
Champagny the details of joint Russian and French diplomacy.
previously been a

diaposi~ion

There had

on the part of the.Russians to promote and

maintain the rights of commerce generally.

Russia was more than likely

encouraged by Denmark, Prussia, and the smaller Baltic powers ''who are
literally starving under the rigid prosecution of the present anticommercial system."
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This fact was another reason to believe that the

modification of the Continental System was indeed being contemplated.
Since Napoleon's allies and those powers which he controlled were balking at their predicaments, the Emperor could not have been totally deaf
to their plight.
Armstrong speculated that Count Romanzoff just might possibly
influence the French Cabinet to mitigate ita position with regard to
American commerce.

Though doubtful, Armstrong figured that the experi-

ment was at least worth a try, since Napoleon was away in Spain.
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Armstrong recognized that it would be supported by American complaints,
as well aa by those of the whole manufacturing interests of France and
her dependencies.

58

In November, 1808, William Short had arrived in Paris.

He had

been appointed American Minister to Russia, although he still awaited
Senate confimation.

The fact that an American minister would soon be

going to St. Petersburg seemed to please Romanzoff, and he promised to
replace Andre Daschoff, the charge at Washington, with a full mini~
59
ster.
The Russian minister told Armstrong that ever since he had
come into office, he had been desirous of producing this effect.

For

in dissolving their comnercial connections with Great Britain, it had
become necessary to seek some other power as a substitute, and the
United States would do nicely.

60

Encouraged, Armstrong sought to use the Count to get the Emperor
to alter his position with the United States and return to France's
previous position with regard to rights of neutral commerce.
ately, Armstrong's initiative proved hopeless.

Unfortun-

The Count had already

tried approaching the Emperor for the Danes, who wanted compensation
for their plundered co1111terce.

61 The Emperor's response was to tell the

Danes that he would examine the claim, however, he had no intention of
making good on it.
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Once more, the prospects for any sort of relief in the Emperor's
system were shattered.

On January 2, 1809, Armstrong reported to

Madison that no change was to be expected, as he had received no
encouragement from the Russians.

In fact, far from being mollified,

the French system was being even more greatly enforced.

Armstrong
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confirmed that:
••• their anti-neutral system is more rigidly observed;
the embargo on ships of the United State• found here (before
the Imperial Decrees were issued) 11 continued; every ship of
ours coming into a port of France, or of her allies, is irmnediately seized and sequestered; cargoes, regularly admitted
to entry by the custom houses, are witheld from their owners;
ships most obviously exceptions to the operations of the decrees, have been recently condemned, and, what in my view of
the subject does not admit aggravatlon;--the burning of the
ship Brutus on the high seas, ao far from being disavowed,
is substantially justified.63
Armstrong had already predicted this renewed hostility against
American commerce when he judged that the failure of the French peace
initiative with England would only newly irritate the Emperor, resulting
in a greater adherence to his decrees.

64

No tea
Chapter V
1on Feb. 21, 1808, Napoleon gave orders to secure the Spanish
royal family.

On March 19, Charles IV abdicated the throne in favor of

his son Ferdinand.

The French army entered Madrid, and Napoleon lef.t

Paris for Bordeaux and Bayonne on April 2.
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Napoleon's number of battleships

increased, numbering 80 as compared to 99 for Britain by the end of the
war--a number dangerously close to Britain's.

Napoleon was also making

use of new harbors as well as those aood ones gained through hia

co~·

quests.
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Perkins, 166, states that Napoleon at f irat objected to the

Embargo because it fell short of var.

Napoleon was also initially

concerned about the effect of the Embargo on French colonies in the
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West Indies, but he eventually was little interested in these colonies.
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Napol•on had sent agents to England with proposals for the establishment of peace.

The British Cabinet, with little hesitation, rejected

the terms aa unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER VI
MOUNTING FRUSTRATIONS
From the end of 1808, until hia return to the Uniteq.Statea in the
Fall of 1810, Armstrong became increaaingly frustrated with his diplomatic position, understanding that the chance• of accomplishing his objectiveswereslight
American comnerce.

in light of Napoleon'• actions and attitudes toward
As his frustrations increased, so did his temper.

He did not fail to express hie anger to his superior• in Washington, nor
did he fail to offer them very candid assessments of his position as
it pertained to Franco-American relations.

No doubt such honesty was

received with mixed feelings aa the Administration reluctantly became
aware of the failure of peaceable coercion in which they had placed so
much stake.
Armstrong' a temper, bad in the winter of 1808-1809, became worse
in the spring. 1

Hia anger waa certainly justified by the French atti-

tude toward the United States, as epitomized in Champagny•s instructions
to Turreau.

The French Minister of Foreign Relations informed Turreau

that he should not hesitate to stress the legitimate grievances the
Americans had against England.

This approach was certainly not de-

signed to lessen Madison's irritation.

Champagny further remarked

to Turreau that:
The Americans would like France to make them commercial
privileges which no nation at present enjoys ••• But ••• hitherto
it has not seemed proper, in the execution of general measures,
to introduce exceptions which would have really destroyed
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their effect. If the rules adopted against English conmerce
had not been made conmon, that commerce would preserve the same
resources as before for supporting the war. A system of exception for one people would turn the rule into an injustice
toward all others; all would have right to complain of a privilege Aranted to the Federal government which themselves
would not enjoy.2
It would have behooved Napoleon to have at least softened the
harshness of his conmercial policy toward the United States by offering
the President some compensation elsewhere, such as Florida.

Such a

move would have had the effect of concentrating American hostility
toward Great Britain, thereby favoring France.

In December, 1808,

Napoleon could not have retained the hope of controlling the Spanish
colonies by force, yet he ordered the American government to leave them
alone, aa he ordered it to adopt the French system of commercial
restraint.

Thus the President found himself, because of Napoleon's

attitude, in an extremely difficult and precarious position, especially
as to why he should not go to war with France as well aa with England.
Turreau'a attitude, coupled with the information contained in
Armstrong'• despatches, should have convinced Jefferson and Madison
to believe sooner than they did that neither favor nor justice could
be expected from Napoleon.

Thia suspicion should have been supported

further by many private reports and observations received from France
during the winter of 1808-1809.

Although American attitudes may have

been growing more hostile toward France, subsequent bulletins of the
Emperor'• successes in Spain were influential with the refusal of
Congress to declare a double war. 4
On January 22, 1809, Napoleon returned suddenly to Paris from
Spain, ostensibly for the purpose of preparing for the impending

3
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clash between France and Austria.

5

Although Napoleon was able to

dipose of Austria, there were many signs of growing discontent among
his allies and satellite countries, as well as increasing domestic pressure of cormnercial and agricultural interests, over the enforcement of
the Continental System. 6

Sensing that there was a definite need to

alter his Continental System, Napoleon decided on the license system,
a

ay~tem

borrowed from the British, on February 14, 1809.

7

In so

doing, he offered, on February 16, to release American vessels from
the embargo.

This was in the form of a decree issued simultaneously

with· the decision in favor of licenses.

8

Although evils were inherent

in it, Napoleon knew it to be a relatively effective system which would
serve simply as a temporary expedient to relieve pressure. 9
Armstrong informed the Secretary of State about Napoleon's offer
to release American vessels.

Armstrong, however, perceived that there

was no real change in the disposition of either belligerent toward the
United States.

Armstrong was skeptical of Napoleon's promise that

embargoed American ships in French ports and those of her dependencies
would be released, on condition of their direct return to the United
10
States.
Proving Armstrong'• skepticism justified, afev days after February 16, 1809, Napoleon attached various conditions to the release of
the American ships, conditions which Armstrong strongly opposed.
him, these conditions

r~presented

To

open discrimination against the

United States, the equivalent to issuing French licenses for American
ships to even sail the high aeaa.

11

The moat probabl' reason

influencing Napoleon to attach conditions was the news from the United
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State• of the probable adoption of a non-intercourse act affecting
trade with England and France.

12

Armstrong's belief that the.Embargo had failed m11erably to
accomplish its objective• was confirmed.

He foresaw no good reason to

continue it in force, and as he was accustomed, bluntly said so to his
superiors.

It had obviously not produced the desired political effect

abroad, and it had produced some effects at home less desirable that
they could have wished.

The American minister called for throwing open

commerce to all but France and England, and to let those who still
wished to trade with those two countries, despite the risks, suffer the
consequences if need be.

13

Armstrong, as uaual, forcefully expressed his disapproval of the
conditions being imposed by the Emperor in his decree of February 25,
1809, in addition to the terms atated in Champagny's letter of February
20.

Having received this letter, Armstrong iamediately ordered that

the owners and consignees of the American ahipa being held in French
ports, should, after securing bond, proceed to the United States.

They

should avoid touching at any port or place which would ezpoae them to
future detention by either belligerent.

Believing that this rule ful-

filled all the intentions of the two governments, Armstrong was surprised to learn fromtheAmerican consul at Marseilles that a new regulation on this subject had been imposed, and that bonds were required
by the Imperial custom house which amounted to twice the value of the
ship and cargoes.

They were conditional for the direct return of the

ahipa to the United States.

In lodging his complaints over this re-

quirement, Armstrong referred to it aa a "discriminating and unfavorable
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policy with regard to the flag of the ·uni.tad Statea. 1114
Thoroughly disgusted with this latest action of the French govern•
ment, and angered by the difficult position in which both Great Britain
and France had placed the United States, Armstrong once more advised
the United States to take a firmer stand, this time against both Great
Britain and France.

Armstrong knew that war was unavoidable.

Even

Madison ultimately had to accept the same conclusion, though he procrastinated until the United States was aeriouely divided and England was
on the verge of defeating Napoleon, thus being able to direct greater attention to the United State• than she would have been able to do if the Administration had accepted Armetrong 'a advice for war sooner. Al though the
Administration felt that war against one belligerent, let alone both,
was unthinkable, Armstrong believed that unity of purpose wae the most
important factor to

conai~er.

He argued that a war with only one of _

the belligerents would paralyze half of the American effort. He reasoned:
••• whereas a war with both, will put into motion every drop
of American blood, and will be followed by many other useful
consequences, among which I consider as most important, the
giving to our people some new views of interest, and some
new principles of action; and the turning from a perilous foreign commerce (which cannot be maintained but by a navy and
which is, besides, always touching and tainting your politics)
into the leas profitable, but more secure and independent
channels of useful manufacture.
It is true there may be something appalllngin the idea of
waging war with the two great champions of the universe, at
the same time and single handed, and it may even require condiderable firmness to get over the apprehension arising from the
possible union of their forces against us, but besides their
mutual hatred and discord, our guarantee, on this head, will be
found in the obvious circumstance, that the war with France,
would but be nominal (a mere war of words and paper) while with
England, it would take a character of most seriousness and activity. To illustrate thia distinction by an example--As
things are going in the Spanish colonies, France can feel no
great interest in saving the Floridaa, and would (no doubt)
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be more gratified at seeing the British army routed from Canada
and Nova Scotia, than mortified at learning that i§nsacola,
Mobile, and St. Augustine were in our possession.

EMBARGO llEPEALED, NON-INTERCOURSE, A NEW AIJ1INISTRATION
Recognizing that, aa a measure of peaceable coercion, the Embargo
had clearly failed to force Great Britain and France to rescind their
illegal measures, Armstrong urged that it be repealed.

After much

resistance, the Administration waa forced to reach the same conclusion.
The repeal of the Embargo Act coincided with the expiration of Jefferson's second term aa president.

Although the Embargo may have delayed

the outbreak of war, Jefferson's moat ambitious foreign policy initiative only had the effect of delaying the war until a less favorable
time in 1812.

16

The difficulty waa not neceaaarily in the Embargo's

composition or in its general purpose, but in the special reasons
Jefferson had for adopting it.
power.

He overestimated America's coercive

Designed in part as a means to punish Britain, the Embargo's

failure led directly to the War of 1812, and pointed up the flaws in
Jefferson's understanding of the balance of power in Europe.

17

At the end of February, 1809, the Non-Intercourse Act was passed,
not because it was popular, but because it contained the repeal of the
Embargo.

Although not wanting to go to war, some Congressmen at least

wanted to appear to be making a sacrifice in light of the abuses of
national honor, therefore, compromise occurred.
"scraps" of various plans. 18

The new act contained

Besidea repealing the Embargo laws, this

act excluded ahipa from French and British porta, and closed American
ports to both countriea after May 20, 1809.

It forbade, under the
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threat of severe penalties, the importation of British or French goods,
and it gave the President authority to reopen by proclamation the trade
with France or England in case
to violate neutral rights.

19

either of the1e countries should ceaae
In effect the law did three things.

It

invited concessions from England and France while continuing pressure
on them.

It allowed trade with the few remaining neutrals.
20
it gave a backdoor entry to belligerent marketa.

And thus

If the Embargo did not convince Great Britain or France to alter
their systems, no one seriously believed thia act would be able to do
so either.

Although intended to be impartial, the act, unlike the

Embargo, actually favored Britain over France.

The French had fewer

alternatives for export markets or points of shelter for their ships.
Champagny complained to Hauterive that this decision was:
••• unfavorable to France against which the United States
can have no complaint that ahe has attempted to invade their
sovereignty nor to have committed acts of violence against
their coasts and their veseels.21
The Royal Navy would make sure that relatively few American ships
slipped into enemy ports, whereas the French could hope to intercept
only a small proportion of those ships that chose to violate the law
by sailing to England.

David M. Erskine, British minister to the

United States, was indeed pleaaed about the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act, which he recognized would benefit England.

He expressed

this viewpoint in a letter to British Foreign Secretary, George Canning,
on February 10, 1809.

22

When the final atruggle took place in Congress over the repeal
of the Embargo, no small share of the Administration's willingness to
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pass the repeal was due to their realization that doing ao would relieve
them of appearing to obey the dictates of the Emperor.

No doubt the

pessimistic letters from Armstrong and Turreau'a attitude had aleo
convinced them that a favorable alteration in the Emperor's system
could not be expected.

Turreau recognized the significance of the Embargo

repeal, and was irritated to see his influence decline.

Men who had

given him pledges that the Embargo would be withdrawn only when war
against England should be declared, could offer no better excuse for
failing to honor their promise than that Napoleon had forfeited hie
claim to their support.

23 On March 19, 1809, two weeks after Congress

adjourned, Turreau wrote to Champagny from Baltimore:
You will have judged from my last despatches that the Embargo Law would be repealed. It has been so, in fact, despite
my efforts to maintain it, and notwithstanding the promise of
quite a large number of influential Representatives, especially
among the aenatora who had guaranteed to me its continuance
till the next Congreee, and who have voted against their political conscience. I had informed your Excellency of the disavowed opposition to the continuance of the embargo, and their
threats to resist its execution, terrified Congress to such
a degree that the dominant party became divided, and the
Feebleness (faiblesse) of Mr. Jefferson sanctioned the last and
the most shamefur act of his Administration •••• !say it with
regret,--and perhaps I have said it too late 1 --I am convinced
there is nothing to hope from these people.2~
On March 4, 1809, Madison assumed the office of President and
Jefferson retired to Monticello.

Out of office for only two days,

Jefferson wrote a friendly letter to Armstrong in Paris, dated March 6,
1809, in which the former president explained the reasons for the repeal
of the Embargo.

He etated that if the decrees and orders were not re-

voked before the next meeting of Congreee in May, war would eurely follow.
Referring to Armstrong's advice to seize the Floridas, Jefferson told
Armstrong that they would indeed become America's the first moment that
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any war waa forced upon the United States, or when the Floridas were
threatened by any other power.

25

Out of office, Jefferson seems to

have reached a point at which he was more willing to accede to the
advice which he had previously tried to avoid.

Although Jefferson and

Armstrong were not the closest of friends, their correspondence indicates that they possessed respect for each other.
Like his predecessor, Madison was an advocate of peaceable
coercion, and shied away from confrontation and war.

Therefore, it is

not surprising that he, too, as president, preferred to avoid
Armstrong's advice whenever he called upon the Administration to take
a firmer stand in defense of neutral rights or in support of national
honor.

Like his predecessor, Madieon sought alternatives to war to

achieve his objectives.
In Armstrong's first set of instructions from the new Secretary
of State, Robert Smith, dated March 15, 1809, he was officially informed of the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act prohibiting commercial
trade of the United States with Great Britain and France.

Although

this measure was not intended as a hostile act, it waa, nonetheless, a
determination not to merely acquiesce to the edicts of the belligerents.
At the same time, it was clear that the Administration had deemed it
expedient to repress any desire for use of force to preserve American
rights.

Nevertheless, when Congress was to meet again on May 4, 1809,

had the belligerents still not demonstrated a similar conciliatory
spirit other measures would doubtless be adopted as the.honor of the
United States might require.

Secretary Smith informed Armstrong that

the latter was authorized to state that if the edicts of either of the
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belligerents were entirely revoked, or even modified so as not to
infract American neutral rights, it was the opinion of the President
that Congress would, at the ensuing special session, authorize acta of
hostility against the other belligerent.

Armstrong waa instructed to

refer to this opinion in conversation, but not to state it in writing
because of the peculiar delicacy of its character, unless he received
satisfactory assurances that its intended purpose would be fully
accomplished.

26

In urging revocation of the French decrees Armstrong was to stress
the equitableness of American claims, and was to be guided by the
arguments that:

(1) they violated maritime rights, which the United

States, as a neutral power, claimed under the law of nations; (2) they
violated American rights under the existing Treaty of 1800; and (3) they
created a pretext for the British continuing their Orders in Council in
force, extensively affecting the commercial relations of the United
States.

27

Meanwhile, the Emperor had left Paris on April 13, 1809, for the
Danube to fight Austria once again.
began the war.

28

On April 19, he crossed the Inn and

During the next three months, his hands were full.

The time was not ideally suited for diplomatic business pertaining to
American af f aira aa Armstrong had been ordered, especially as Napoleon
had left Paris a few days after Smith'•
Paris.

~natructions

were received in

However, in acknowledging receipt of these instructions,

Armstrong indicated that he would make another attempt to obtain the
repeal or modification of the Emperor'• decrees.

Armstrong recognized,

however, that there wa1 little hope of success, especially since the
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Emperor wa1 preoccupied with military mattera.

Armstrong correctly

estimated that this latest military adventure would engage the Emperor
for two or three months.

29

Obeying his instructions, though, Armstrong went to see Champagny,
only to discover that the latter had joined the Emperor in Germany.

To

pursue him there was not permissable, as the Emperor did not see miniaters of foreign countries during a campaign.

Armstrong, therefore,

wrote a letter to Champagny, enclosing a copy of the Non-Intercourse
Act, and a general assurance of the act's pacific character.

30

He also

informed Champagny that:
••• the undersigned is instructed to add, that any interpretation of the Imperial decrees of the 21 Nov. 1806, and 17 Dec.
1807 which shall have the effect of leaving unimpaired the maritime rights of the Union, will be instantaneously followed by a
revocation of the present act, and a re-establishment of th!
ordinary commercial intercourse between the two countries.3
Armstrong debated whether he should wait until he could personally
meet with Champagny before informing him of the other part of Armstrong's
instructions.

He soon decided that he would relate that portion of the

Secretary's message to Champagny in writing after all.

The letter to

Champagny stated that if France were to exempt American ships from
future vexation and capture, and if Great Britain would not do the same,
then the President would advise an immediate rupture with the latter. 32
Just how the Emperor would view this proposition was uncertain.

Arm-

strong speculated that, since the proposition made to England was
exactly the aame ae the one made to France, the Emperor would probably
postpone hla decision until he aaw what England was likely to do.

If,

for any reaaon, England did modify her policy according to American
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Yi•hes, the Emperor would then probably follow auit in order to preserve
some degree of consistency between hia practices and his preaching, and
to prevent England from having the benefit of American arms and coamerce
at once.

If, on the other hand, England continued in her tenacious

manner toward the United States, Napoleon would no doubt peraevere in
33
hia.
Champagny, from Augsburg, merely acknowledged receipt of
Amrstrong's letter of April 28, 1809, containing notice of the passage
of the Non-Intercourse Act, without making any further coumentsor
observations. 34

In fact, mere acknowledgement was all that Armstrong

had received from the French Minister in response to any correspondence
35
since Champagny had left Paris to join the Emperor.
Wishing to
receive more definitive answers from Champagny, Armstrong, sincerely
desirous of returning to the United States, tried to use this as a
meana of prompting a greater response from the French government.

The

General informed Champagny that he wished to return to the United
States for a few months in order to deal with private business matters.
Since the American ship, Mentor, was nearby at L'Orient, he wished to
take advantage of it.
and hia family.

He therefore requested passports for himself

In preparing to depart, Armstrong decided to leave

Mr. Ridgway, Consul for the port and district of Antwerp, in charge of
the legation at Paris until hia return.

Armstrong told Champagny how

much he wished to aee friendship restored between the two countries.
He atated:

''The satisfaction that such an arrangement would give to my

Government would be second only to the regret it would feel, were the
.
36
aubaiatlng differences either to continue or to increase."
Armstrong informed Champagny that he did not want to return to the
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United States without first receiving the consent of the Emperor.

It

was entirely with the view of obtaining that consent that hia application~for

paaaporta waa made in writing and forwarded to the Emperor'•

headquarters. 37 Although serious about returning to the United Statea,
Armstrong nonetheleaaalao uaed thia as a ploy designed to prompt a
positive response from the Emperor.
NEWS FROM ENGLAND

Compounding Armstrong's already difficult diplomatic position was
hie lack of official correspondence from Pinkney, American minister in
London.

An examination of Armatrong'•diplomatic correspondence clearly

reveals that he was

i~ritated

by Pinkney'• failure to keep him posted

aa to what was transpiring in Great Britain that might have a direct
effect on Armstrong's poaition with the French government.

Since

Pinkney had instructions similar to Armstrong's, he was to communicate
to Armstrong any British advances made toward the adjustment of. Anglo38
American differences.
Armstrong became all the more anxious when
journal reports started to appear in France which suggested that the
United States and Great Britain had settled several points of controversy.

The British government supposedly rescinded certain parts of

its Orders in Council that had imposed a tribute on American commerce.
No doubt Armstrong tried to exploit these rumors to his advantage,
while playing coy by stating that any such rumors were not to be
credited aa official since he had not heard from the .American minister
in London.

The possibility of an adjustment in London allowed Armstrong

to preea the French government for an adjustment of Franco-American
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differences on equitable terms reapecting American rights.

39

Still not having heard anything official, Armstrong received
accounts from England which indicated that the British Orders in Council had indeed been revoked, and that the United States had also revoked.its Non-Intercourse Act.

Recognizing that these revelations were

at variance with hie letter to Champagny of May 26, 1809, Armstrong was
compelled to protect his official position, and honestly disavowed
having any official knowledge of arrangements which may have transpired;
he reiterated once more that Pinkney still had not informed him of any
changes.

40

In the meantime, French abuses continued and Armstrong directed
his energies toward protesting them.

On June 4, 1809, Armstrong wrote

a letter of protest to Champagny concerning the American ship, Jefferson,
which had fallen into the .hands of French ships of war on April 25.
After the ship had been visited and the crew removed, the vessel was
burned.

As Armstrong emphatically pointed out, this waa the seventh

instance in which such an outrage had been cOU1Ditted on American
vessels by the Emperor'• ships of war--outrages which had no parallel
in the history of modern abuaea.
extreme concern to Champagny&

Armstrong demonstrated his disgust and

"It la accordingly within the letter of

my instructions to say, that unless full and iJI111ediate reparation be

made, the United States cannot but regard thia new outrage as one of
premeditated host1lity.n41
Not having heard anything aignif icant from the French government,
Armstrong, in light of the above-mentioned incident, wrote to Secretary
Smith on June 6, 1809 that such a delay under the circumstances might
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very well be interpreted as a refusal to the American proposition, and
aa such, a justification for a rupture between the two countries.

Armstrong ascertained, however, that the Battle of Easling had temporarily placed the Emperor in a most critical position, conmanding the
Emperor's attention.

Armstrong recognized that Napoleon was propably

not fighting for glory or empire at that moment, but more likely for
existence itself.
outcomes.

Armstrong offered three possible explanations or

(l)That nothing of a nature merely political had yet been

submitted to the Emperor, and that nothing of that character would be
submitted until the fate of the campaign had been decided.

(2)That if·

defeated and driven from Germany, Napoleon's policy, with respect to
the United States andothera.,would necessarily undergo great changes.
(3)!£ successful, the consideration that the United States had not
chosen that moment to put themselves on the list of his enemies might
render a reconciliation eaeier.

Whether or not theee

considerations

justified deferring until the next session of Congress, the adoption
of any new measure with regard to France was a question, according to
Armstrong, that Congress itself had to decide.

42

Having waited for months for official confirmation of changes
in Great Britain's relationship to the United States, Armstrong finally
was informed by Pinkney of the British Order in Council of April 26,
1809, and of the Erskine Agreement, reached between that minister and
the United States.

The consequence of that agreement had been a procla-

mation by President Madison on April 19, 1809, which renewed American
trade with Great Britain on June 10, the date the British Orders in
Council were to be withdrawn. 43
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The instructions from Secretary Smith, dated April 21, 1809,
included printed copies of the correapondence between Smith and Erskine
over the Chesapeake affair, the revocation of the British Orders in
Council, the British proposal to aend a special envoy to conclude a
treaty, and a copy of the President'• proclamation.

Armstrong was

urged to seek the earliest opportunity to assure the French government
that there was not, in this adjustment with Great Britain, nor would
there be in the proposed treaty, anything to any degree inconsistent
with the friendly adjuatment of American differences with France.

On

the contrary, there waa a reasonable expectation that the revocation
of the British Orders in Council would remove every motive for the
continuance of the illegal parts of the French decrees.

~

A week later,

bolstered by his apparent diplomatic victory, reflecting the Adminiatration'a newly-acquired confidence, the Secretary of State wrote that, as
no pretext remained for the peraeverence of the French government in its
decrees, Armstrong waa to:
••• let it be understood that their immediate revocation is
confidently expected, and the more eo, aa the President indulges
the persuasion that the Emperor ia sincerely disposed to reestablish the suspended relations between the two countriea.45
If the Emperor was disposed to withdraw his decrees, he was, it
was presumed, aware of the propriety of doing it so aa to take effect
i11111ediately.

In thi• case, Armstrong waa authorized to assure the

French government that the President would not fail to issue his proclamation in accordance with the eleventh aection of the act of Congreaa, as aoon aa the revocation of the decree• waa known to him.46
Thia set of inatructiona did not reach Armstrong until the night
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of June 11.

Just when it appeared the American

miniat~

had acquired

additional diplomatic leverage, thia advantage waa eraaed.
increaaingly aware

~hat

He became

the Erakine Agreement waa apparently disavowed

by the British Government.

Armstrong waa placed in a difficult poai-

tion, aeeing iDlllediately that the French would be able to use the
disavowal to their advantage.

Armstrong knew that the French would aay

that only when Great Britain had actually sanctioned the Erskine Agreement would the appeal to the Emperor be made.

To escape the embarrass-

ment that such an answer might have produced, Armstrong decided to
barely mention the arrangement, and referred to it as a new proof that
there was no disposition on the part of the American government to
enter into engagements which would not preserve inviolate all the rights
of American maritime independence.

47

In his note to Champagny of June

12, 1809, Armstrong quickly moved to lessen the effects of a possible
disavowal of the Erskine Agreement, by stating that, although the
British king might indeed eventually refuse to sanction the arrangement,
he could neither combat the justness, nor diminish the force of the
48
conclusion.
Soon thereafter, Armstrong received official word from Pinkney
confirming his suspicions as to the reason for that minister's si~
49
lence.
In a letter dated June 3, 1809, Pinkney enclosed copies of
British newspapers which showed exactly what had transpired in Great
Britain aa related to American affairs, and what was likely to happen.
Pinkney expressed hia apprehension, aa he did not know how news of the
diaavoval of the·Erakine Agreement would be received in the United
States.

Pinkney further informed Armstrong of the latest Order in

102
Council, which waa undoubtedly a measure to conciliate the United
States, although he, Pinkney, had not chosen to be a party to it.

It

vaa to be considered a Britiah measure, binding the United State• to
nothing, and looking for no atep to be taken on the part of America.
Finally, Armstrong waa told that a vessel had sailed to America with
Erskine'• recall.

Ria aucceesor, Francia Jackson, would proceed on his

mission in two or three weeks.

50

Madison and Smith's diplomatic vie-

tory had been short-lived1 and Armstrong had no doubts as to the consequences for his position with Napoleon and Champagny.
INTERVIEWS WITH HAUTERIVE
Having received no correspondence from Champagny in many weeks,
other than brief acknowledgements of hie letters, Armstrong reasoned
that the Emperor had been too preoccupied with military matters to
contemplate American affairs.

However, Napoleon had been paying far

more attention to American affairs than the General could have known.

51

Never in hia career had the Emperor been busier than when Armstrong had
written his note to Champagny of April 29, 1809, but it caught Napoleon's
attention at once.

He had fought battle after battle, and on May 10,

1809, he entered Vienna and took up headquarters at Schonbrunn, the
favorite palace of the Austrian emperor.

He waa still in an extremely

precarious military position when he learned, through despatches from
Paris, that the United States, on March 1, had repealed the Embargo
Act, and that the British Ordera in Council of November, 1807, had
been withdrawn on April 26, 1809, leaving only a blockade of Holland,
France, and Italy.

The effect of theae two events was greatly magni-

103
fied because of their simultaneous nature. 52
Napoleon, at first, aaw no reason to alter his direction.

After

reading Arm1trong'1 letter. he dictated a reply that was almost the
same as the Milan Decree itself.
nation.

Ships were floating colonies of a

When American vessels were violated by British searches and

taxes, they could only be considered as denationalized and, therefore,
.
sub Ject
to se i zure. 53

Napoleon sent these remarks to Champagny, and

four days later, on May 22, 1809, Napoleon fought the Battle of Essling,
and sustained a loss of 15,000-20,000 men--a serious setback which
temporarily at least, opened the Emperor's mind to a possible reconsi54
deration of his position regarding the United States.
On May 26,
1809, Champagny made a report to the Emperor about American affairs.
After recalling the history of the various orders, decrees, blockades,
embargoes, and non-intercourse measures, Champagny urged the Emperor
to recognize the value of American trade to a country impoverished by
the British blockade.

He stated as candidly as was possible to the

Emperor:
The fact cannot be disguised; the interruption of neutral
commerce which has done much harm to England has been also
a cause of loss to France. The staple products of our territory have ceased to be sold. Those that were formerly exported
are lost or are stored away, leaving impoverished both the
owner who produced them and the dealer who put them on the market. One of our chief sources of prosperity is dried up. Our
interest therefore leads us toward America, whose conmerce
would bring us either materials of prime necessity for our
manufactures, or produce the use of which has become almost ~
necessity, and which we would rather not owe to our enemies. 5
Champagny advised Napoleon to cease punishing America.

He ad-

viaed Hauterive; the acting Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris, to
discuss with General Armstrong the details for an arrangement between
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the two countries.

Thia move waa supported by the argument that

England had made advances to America and, in April, had revoked her

Ordera in Council of November, 1807. Thia move waa further supported
when news of the Erskine Agreement settling the commercial dispute
between Great Britain and the United States reached the Emperor.

56

Consequently, Napoleon drew up the draft for a new decree, which proclaimed that the United States, by it• firm resistance, had brought
about the revocation of the British Orders of 1807.

The Eblperor was,

therefore, exempting the United Statea from the Milan Decree and leaving
only the Berlin Decree (a blockade of the British Ialea) to off set
England's modified blockade of French-occupied Europe.

57

On June 13,

1809, Champagny forwarded instructions to Hauterive, directing him to
58
begin negotiations with Armstrong.
Consistent with the train of
American fortune, knowledge of the disavowal of the Erskine Agreement
reached the Emperor at about the same time that Hauterive•s instructions
were drawn up.

Although allowed to continue his talks, Hauterive was

informed that the extreme uncertainty of the situation prevented a
decision. 59
In writing to Smith on June 30, 1809, Armstrong was at last able
to report that he had received, aince June 12, two notes from Champagny,
one of June 7, and the other of June 13.

With the latter note, Haute-

rive also delivered a verbal message, stating.that he had been instructed to acquaint himself with American business generally, to discuss
with Armstrong the subjects of hia late notes, and to report from time
to time to the Emperor.

60

Although Hauterlve requested an interview with Armstrong, the
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American minister was confined to bed for two weeka, and it was not
until June 30 that he met with Hauterive in Armstrong'• apartment.
Counsellor apologized for Champagny'• 1ilence, from May

The

12 until June 7,

assuring Armetrong that the Emperor'• occupations between those dates
had prevented him from attending to anything foreign or political.
Hauterive then referred to the measures about which Armstrong had so
of ten complained.

He declared that, as they had been forced upon the

Emperor by the abuse of Great Britain, so they would be i.IIlnediately
renounced by him, on evidence that Great Britain had adopted a system
more liberal and just. 61
Hauterive then inquired of Armstrong what, after all the recent
activity between the United States and Great Britain, was the actual
standing of the United States with that country, and what were the
modifications of the decrees that Armstrong desired.

Armstrong told

1

Hauterive what he had already written to Champagny.

With the exception

of a single letter juet received from Pinkney, Armstrong could honestly
state that that was all he knew of what had tranapiredbetween Great
Britain and the United Statee.

Pinkney'• letter clearly established

that, as late as June 3, nothing had been done in England of a charac-.
ter that authorized or required Pinkney 1 s participation, and that the
only act mentioned by Pinkney at all, was that of the British Council of
April 26, 1809.

As to Hauterive 1 a second question, Armstrong reminded

him that the demands of the United States government had long since
been before the Emperor in the form of the Non-lntercouree Act, and in
Armstrong'• diplomatic correspondence.

Somewhat aarcaatically,

Armstrong stated that if there·wereanything difficult to understand in
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either, Armstrong would be pleased to explain it.

The difficulty,

replied Hauterlve, was in finding what •ort of modification of the
decrees would ••tiafy Armstrong •• well
questions:
go?

a1 the Emperor. He posed

the
the~

Should they be made municipal only, and how far should

Should they forbid the entry of a ship coming from England?

Should

they forbid the entry of a ship which had submitted to a British visit?
Armstrong replied:
••• any exercise of authority within their own ports, in opening or shutting these to neutral commerce would be an act
against which we could not reaaonably object; that between the
two cases he had stated, there waa some distinction; that to
exclude a ship because ahe had traded with England, would be
to punish her for her own act--but to exclude her because she
had been viaited--would be to puniah her because her force
waa inferior to that of the visiting vessel. After all, it
was a question for them, rather than for us to decide, whe•
ther this distinction was or was not of sufficient clearness
and magnitude, to make any change in their general policy.62
In closing the conversation with Armstrong, Hauterive spoke of the
advantages to both parties that would result from a better understanding.

He strongly and repeatedly declared the, general good will of the

Emperor toward the people and government of the United States. 63
Armstrong, of course, had heard those same affections expressed numerous
times.
In assessing this interview with Hauterive, Armstrong, although
cautious, vaa neverthele•• somewhat encouraged.

He recognized from the

temper and character of thia interview that an important change in the
Emperor'• attitude toward the United States had taken place, although
Armstrong waa unaware of the order which Napoleon had issued earlier
similar to the wording in the Milan Decree.

If Armstrong'• impreaaiona

were correct, that change waa the result of pressures which had for some
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time been trying to influence the Emperor, then there could be no doubt
about ita durability; it would at leaat laat long enough to produce the
experimentwhichHauterive hinted at in hie closing remarks.

If, how-

ever, thia change waa meant only to tranquilize the United States for
the moment and to take its ultimate form from the fortunes of the military campaign, then leas was to be expected from it.

Armstrong'•

suggestion to the Secretary of State was, remarkably, that in any case,
the event warranted a little more patience on the part of the United
States. 64
In subsequent converaations with Hauterive, he implied that, in
the present state of Spain, the Emperor might be willing to give the
United States advantages in the co111Derce of its colonies.

Armstrong

reported that Hauterive repeated the idea several times, and although
he felt Hauterive probably expected aome aort of answer, Armstrong
believed that the ground waa "thorny," and he avoided dealing with
such a probing question, especially one that had long interested the
United States.

65

Although Armstrong had expressed a certain amount of optimism
over the interviews with Hauterive, he was, nevertheless, a realist.
He had negotiated with Napoleon far too long to simply swallow any
bait which he might dangle.

Believing that the French government

would convey ita answer fairlyaoon, Armstrong prepared for a possible
negative response.

Anticipating the poaaibility of a rupture,

Armstrong suggested to the Secretary of State that some competent
individual ought to be in Paria to take charge of American business,
juat in caae it would be proper for Armstrong to leave, without having
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to take with him all traces of the legation.

Quite matter of factly,

Armstrong informed Smith that qualified ruptures occurred quite often,

and they were no doubt better than more ab1olute onea: they left the
two nations both having made displays of disagreement, but were still

adequate for leading to reconciliation.

66

Aa Armstrong had learned from experience in dealing with Napoleon,
military victories would have an effect on America's relations with the
Emperor, to the disadvantage of the United States.

On July 6, 1809,

Napoleon fought the Battle of Wagram, and on July 12, Austria was
forced into submiaaion. The Battle of Wagram, in Napoleon 1 a way of thinking, placed him in a much stronger position, and made him leas inclined to

tolerate American resistance to his Continental System.

This victory,

following shortly the knowledge of the British government's repudiation
of the Erskine Agreement, coupled with Napoleon's discovery from a
decree of the King of Holland that the Non-Intercourse Act seemed to
discriminate against France in favor of the rest of the Continent,
compelled him to order the Hauterive negotiations stopped.
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Armstrong instinctively knew that, for better or for worse, the
state created by Napoleon'• victory over Austria furnished an opportune
moment for discovering the aentiments of the atiperor with regard to
American commerce.
Hauterive.

Armstrong, therefore, sought another interview with

No doubt Armatrong appreciated Hauterive•a frankness, though

he probably was not permitted to relate that a change had taken place
in the Emperor'• views and in particular that a decree which would have
been a positive step towards accoanodation, prepared by Napoleon'•
orders as a •ubstitute for those of Berlin and Milan had been laid
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aside.

Armstrong related that Hauterive atated that the Emperor:

•••will not recede from his present ayatem, until he be
aaaured, what is your actual standing with England ? with· what
temper your government haa received the modified order of the
British council and the rejection of the arrangement entered
into at Waahington ? and above all, whether your views and feelings, with regard to the British doctrines of search and blockade, have auf f ered any change ? 68
Armstrong had absolutely no doubts as to Napoleon's intentions.
If there had been any doubts, they were done away with in thats (l)capturee

of American vessels by Franch cruisers continued to be made on the
coasts of France, Holland, Italy, and Naples; {2)American cotton,
imported through whatever channel, and all cargoes brought by American
vessels into the ports of Holland, were excluded by name from the
markets of France; (3)American commerce with Holland was subject to a
great deal of embarrassment; and (4)in the ports of Naples and Spain,
American ships and cargoes were, aa in France itself, actually aequestered.

The renewed vigor of French actions against American commerce

gave Armstrong aerioua doubts as to whether his letter would even make
69
it to Axnerica.
Writing two days later, Armstrong further assessed the intentions
of the Emperor.

He ascertained that when Hauterive's answers in a

conversation with Armstrong were translated into plain English, they
meant that unless the United States resisted the British doctrines of
search and blockade, America was not to expect any relaxation on the
part of the Emperor.

The Emperor did promiae--for what it was worth--

that until he knew the President'• intentions on theae points, he
would take no step to make matters worse between the two countries than
they already were.

Armstrong put little stock in these promises.
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The recent change in the Emperor'• language in regard to American
commerce waa a change in language only.

Clrcumatancea preacribed it

for the moment, but when those came to an end, Napoleon came out with
the intent of adhering to hia old of fenaive ayatem, qualified only by
a promise of changing condition• to which he knew the United State•
could not, or would not, conaent.

It was probable, Armstrong stated,

that if pressed on this matter, attempts would be made to cover up the
real motives, by suggesting doubts about the present American standing
with Great Britain, and offering aa evidence for these, Canning's letter
of instructions to Mr. Erakine.
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SECRET VIENNA DECREE
Armstrong'• persistent lack of confidence in the Emperor's promises was certainly justified.

Quick to yield before evident disaster,

Napoleon waa just aa quick to exhaust the fruits of an evident victory
and the advantage he had obtained over the United States waa just as
decided, if not as extensive, as that which he had gained over Auatria.
The United States would pay for her defiance by the usual means of
seizing her coIImerce. 71
This can be best illustrated in the case of an American vessel
loaded with a cargo of colonial produce which had arrived at San
Sebastian on May 20 after the Non-Intercourse Act had opened trade to
Spanish ports.

On June 7, 1809, while the Emperor was still hesitating,

possibly leaning toward concesaion with the United States, Decrls asked
the Emperor what ahould be done about this and other such ahips.
was a particularly difficult case.

This

The French decree had denationalized

111
every vessel that had gone to England, wished to go there, been visited
by an Engliah cruiser, violated the laws of the United States, or had
been

suspe~ted

of fraud. The achooner in question, however, was not

under suspicion of fraud; she had not been to England, nor had she ever
thought of going there; she had not been stopped by a British cruiser;
ahe was in a Spanish port, nominally outside French jurisdiction, and
she was authorized to go there by United States law.
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Decrls' letter reached Vienna about June 13, 1809.

The subject

was referred to the Minister of Finance, but no decision appears to
have been reached until August.

Maret, the Secretary of State in

personal attendance to the Emperor gave Champagny, on April 4, the
draft of a new decree.

Although this decree was never published, it

offers a clue to moat of the Emperor's detailed movements for the
following year.

13

In consideration of the American Congress's act of

March 1, 1809, forbidding entry of all French vessels into its ports
under penalty of confiscation of both ships and cargoes, Napoleon had,
on the report of the Minister of Finance, decreed that:
Art. 1. The American schooner loaded with colonial produce
and entered at San Sebastian the 20th May, 1809, will be seized
and conf iecated.
Art. 2. The Merchandise composing the cargo of the vessel
will be conveyed to Bayonne, there to be sold, and the produce
of the eale paid into the caisse de l'amortisaement (sinking
fund).
·
Art. 3. Every American ship which shall enter the ports of
France, Spain, or Italy will be equally seized and conf iscated, aa long aa the same measure ahall continue to be executed in regard to French vesaela in the harbors of the United
Statea.74
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CHAPTER VII
DIPLOMATIC GAMBLES
JOURNEY TO HOLLAND
Napoleon, while giving the appearance he intended to alter his
system, had only reverted to hla old policies toward American cOlllllerce,
and pursued them with a renewed vigor that made the American position
increasingly desperate.

Almost at his wits' end, Armstrong sought any

means that would off er hope to relieve the statue of American commerce.
Clearly demonatrating his knowledge and awareness of European events and
personalities, Armstrong devised a plan that would hopefully enlist the
support of the Emperor's own brother in seeking the relaxation of Napoleon's decrees.

In a bold diplomatic gamble, Armstrong decided to pro-

ceed to Holland and confer with Louis, the king of that country.
Holland waa nominally independent, and its trade was an object
of interest.

While England shaped her policy to favor the licensed or

smuggled trade with Dutch porta, the United States risked relations
with England and France by treating Holland as an independent neutral.
The nominal independence of Holland was due only to the circwnstancea
which had made Louis her king, as Joseph had been made King of Spain.
Of all Napoleon's brothers, Louia was the one who offended the Emperor
the moat.

From the very moment he went to Holland, Louis assumed the

position of an independent monarch, and devoted himself to winning the
popularity of his subjects.

He did not execute the Berlin Decree until
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Napoleon actually threatened war; he connived to evade it and he issued
licenaea and admitted cargoea juat aa he pleased.
with euch

~on1ciou1

He did the•e things

disregard of the Emperor'• wishes, that Napoleon

became angry. 1 Obviously aware of the independent role that Louis was
pursuing, knowing that the old aystem waa about to be rigorously enforced against the United States, 2 and having been advised by several
commercial houses in that country that his personal application to the
King just might produce eome useful effect, Armstrong decided to aet
out for Holland to pursue this avenue.

3

On August 15, 1809, Armstrong arrived in Amsterdam.

On August 18,

during an interview with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Relations,
Armstrong firmly remonstrated against the frequent and lawless depredations of French cruisers along the coast• of Holland, and particularly
against French seizures of American vesaela within the baya and harbors
of the King of Holland.

In reply, the Dutch Foreign Minister informed

Armstrong that the French government had established the doctrine of
"common sovereignty" between allied nations in each other's bays and
harbors.

It waa a doctrine, however, that the Dutch Foreign Minister

could not subscribe to in terma of its reasonableness and authority.
The Minister further informed Armstrong that the King, after returning
to Amsterdam and being informed that Armstrong was in the city, would
probably wish to aee him.

In that case, Armstrong was urged to bring

up the aubject to the King peraonally. 4
On August 19, having dined with the Foreign Minister, Armstrong
received a note informing him that the King would aee him at 7:00 p.m.
that evening.

Armstrong waa admitted into the King'• private apartment
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and found him alone, except for a chamberlain.
a long and free conversation enaued.

Armstrong reported that

The King expreaaed hia diaappro-

val of the comnercial policies of the Continental System, calling them
injustice•, and cited hia efforts, along with other nations, to oppose
Napoleon'• ayatem.

Louis conveyed hia deep concern for the current

state of commerce.

He called the United States and Holland both

great commercial states, yet weak in naval force in a world that waa
governed by force.

The King gave assurances of hia most friendly

dispositions toward the American government and people, pledged to
Armstrong that, in any event, even war, American citizens and their
property within his kingdom, would be safe.
relationship to the

~peror

According to Louis, his

could not induce him to forget the pro-

tection which he owed to those who engaged in a regular and fair
5
commerce.
Armstrong used thia pledge to introduce the aubject of reports
that American ahipa had been aeized by French cruieer1 within the
territorial jurisdiction of the King.

Louis' response was that the

shipa had been retaken after the cruisers were beaten off by Dutch
gunboats, and the American ahipa were then returned to their owners or
their conaigneea. On this point, the King had quarreled with the
6
Emperor himself.
Louis referred to the system aa "bad--so bad that
it cannot last--but in the meantime we are the sufferera." 7
In responding to Armatrong•a remark that the King had placed an
embargo on the vessels in hie ports, the King replied it had been done
merely on account of the Britiah invaeion of Walcheren. 8 When Armatrong
requeated a relaxation of the rule to enable him to aend despatches to

121
his government, the King vaa extremely agreeable and indicated that one
of the American veaaela could aail innediately for the United States,
if Armstrong ao wiahed.

9

In writing to President Madison on August 20, 1809, Armstrong
informed him that among the facts not mentioned in hia public despatch
of the same day to the Secretary of State, there was one that the President should know about in particular--King Louie would instruct his
ambassador in Paris to join with Armstrong in denouncing the current
depradationa, and in endeavoring to bring about a change in Napoleon'•
conduct.
Armstrong left Amsterdam for Paris on the following day, and when
he arrived there he was going to attempt a private audience with the
Emperor.

This suggestion had come from a minister, much in his confi-

dence, who had called upon Armstrong the night before he had left Paris
to suggest an experiment, and had offered his services to bring it
about.

Since the move for a private audience had to come from the

Emperor himaelf--and as he vae not always disposed to grant such indulgences--the plan was to convince his own counsellors of its usefulness.
The demand for

Armstrong~•

passports would be the means most likely to

produce the desired effect, and Armstrong would try this.
On September 6, 1809, Armstrong returned to Paris.

10
Alghough King

Louis had been aincere in promoting friendehip and trade with the
United States, plana that were contrary to the Emperor's desires did not
have much chance for aucce••·

Sub•equent event• and the peculiar

nature of Napoleonic Europe, guaranteed that Armstrong'• diplomatic
gamble would fail to produce the aought-af ter ef f ecta. 11 Despite the
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outcome, Armatrong deaervea credit for exploring additional avenues in
the intereata of hie country.

THE ALTENBURG LETTER
TWo letter• from Champagny awaited Armatrong on hia return to
Paris.

One, known aa the Altenburg letter, was poorly designed to

appeal to Armstrong.

In eaaence, the Altenburg letter was nothing more

than a definitive statement of the principles which had and would continue to govern, the Emperor'• conduct toward neutral commerce.

To

thia letter, offered aa an answer to the American propositions, _
Armstrong believed that any reply before receiving further instruction•
from the President, would have been premature. 12 Although France admitted the principle that the flag covera the merchandise in the letter,
other demand• were imposaible for neutrals to accept.

It waa only

because of the arbitrary acts of the British government that France
waa forced to adopt measures of reprisal, though very reluctantly.

13

The note alao presented the facade that France was willing to come to
terma with Great Britain.

However, Napoleon had no thought of making

demands that England would accept.

He had been, after all, in pursuit

of the destruction of English naval power since 1805.

As an answer to

the American Non-Intercourse Act, Cbampagny•a letter of August 22,
1809, waa final.

It closed by stating that the port• of Holland, the

Elbe and the Weser, Italy, and Spain, would not be allowed to enjoy
privilege• of which French ports were deprived.

Whenever England

revoked her blockades and Orders in Council, France would revoke her
retaliatory decreea. 14
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The other despatch from Champagny expressed a civil hope, hardly
felt by the lm.peror, that Armstrong would not for the present carry out

hia plans for returning to the United States. No doubt Champagny
wanted to placate the American minister aa much aa possible, in light
of the Emperor's hostile actions toward American co111I1erce, as well aa
fear about the possible consequences of the accredited American minister
to France leaving with negative impressions.

In agreeing to stay until

the next spring, Armstrong had to consider his honor, as well as that
of his country, especially in light of the Altenburg letter's offensive
tone.

His conduct on this occasion was certainly not governed by

personal motives.

He clearly realized his departure might have in-

creased the danger of exposing a great amount of American property in
France, Holland, Italy and Naples.

15 He opted to try once more "to

open and to smooth the road between the two powers to an amicable
adjustment of their differences."

16

Considering the years of frustra-

tion he had already experienced, Armstrong'• commitment to his duty was
truly commendable.
THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION

Shortly after Armstrong responded to the Altenburg letter, he
received official word from the Secretary fo State that the recentlyconcluded Erskine Agreement had been disavowed by the British government,
and the Preeident had signed, on Auguat 9, 1809, a proclamation reviving
the Non-Intercourse Act against Great Britain. 17
Secretary'• despatches waa a

~opy

of the

Enclosed in the

pro~lamation,

which Armstrong

could present to the French government aa another example of the
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United States' determination to observe the principles of neutrality,
ao long aa she should conaider it proper to be neutral.

Smith informed

Arm1trong he was not hopeful that any adjustments between Great Britain
and the United

S~atee

would take place, especially as a result of the

British government'• conditions specified in the published letter of
instructions from Canning to Erskine, or of the pretensions as avowed
to Pinkney and subsequently communicated by him to the United States,
or as a result of the diecusaione with the new British minister, Jackson.

18
Armstrong comnunicated this to Champagny in a note of September

16, 1809.

He confirmed that the President'• proclamation of August 9,

1809, was a consequence of official information that the Britiah Orders
in Council of January and November, 1808, had not been repealed in
compliance to the agreement entered into by the United States and
Erskine.

Armstrong stated that he was authorized to assure Champagny

that if--aa there waa reason to believe--the British government would
adhere to the conditions specified in a letter from Canning to Erskine
of January, 1807, no amicable adjustment of the differences then
existing between the two powers would take place.

Further, the

conversations ascribed by the letter to the Secretary in Washington
and to Pinkney in London, had been either much mistaken, or grossly
misrepresented.

Armstrong concluded that he hoped the Emperor would

now find reaaon to believe that one of two effect• might be produced.

Either the United States would be made a party to the war against
Great Britain, or Great Britain would be compelled to respect the
right• of neutral coamerce.19 -

125
Having written to Champagny according to hi• in•tructiona,
Armstrong proceeded to air hie fruatrationa in lettera to both
Jeff eraon and Madiaon.

He waa none too optimi1tlc, and did not expect

any aignificant modification or relief in Napoleon's system.

Fresh

from new victories, Armstrong understood that thia would have an effect
on Napoleon'• thinking and hence on the United States.

From-all past

experiences he felt the effecta would not be "propitious." He clearly
saw that the "danger is that an adherence to the present system will
be both quickened and increased by an additional power to enforce it."

20

Armstrong once more aav that taking a firmer posture against both
Great Britain and France waa the only practical alternative left.
usual, though, hia cry for firmer action vent unheeded.

As

He expressed

his frustration and views to Jefferson by stating:
If we submit much longer, we shall aettle this controversy,
but we shall certainly not be gainers by doing ao ••• Before you
left the presidency, I anticipated this state of things, and
offered it as my humble opinion, that you should declare war
against France and England. Every hour assures me of it'• [sic]
correctnesa ••• With thia country you will have reconciliation
and redress, the moment you take this step. I feel as certain of it as I do of my existence. And if England will go to
the Devil, whI should we prevent it? She has no claim on our
benevolence.2
The principle of the Vienna Decree had required confiscating
American connerce in retaliation for penalties imposed on French ships
that knowingly violated the Non-Intercourae Act.

Although this rule

and the Bayonne Decree aeemed to cover all ordinary objects of confiacation, the Emperor adopted a supplementary rule that American merchandiae waa really Engli•h property in disguise.

In writing to Secretary

Smith on November 18, 1809, Armatrong related the incident of a cotton
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apinner near Paria and the head of a very large establishment who
petitioned the Emperor for leave to introduce about 600 bales of
American cotton.

The petition vaa rejected and the following words

were written upon it: "Rejected, aa the cotton belongs to American
comnerce."

Armstrong, not disguising his anger, stated that this

severity toward American coamerce waa all the more extraordinary as it
was a well known fact that Portuguese cotton--which was none other
than English property--was allowed into France with little difficulty.
As American cotton waa banished from the market, both the sale and the
price of cotton belonging to England were increased proportionately.

22

Having decided to seize all American property that arrived in
'France on private account, and having taken into his own hands the
business of selling this property, as well as of achnitting other
merchandise through licensee, Napoleon protected his own interests by
closing the door to competition.

To his credit, Armstrong was able to
23
discern a bit of this strategy before it had taken its final form.
He realized that what he had feared with regard to American cormnerce,
had taken place in the North.
would take place in Spain.

He predicted that something similar

He was privately informed that General

Lotson had left Paris, charged with the purpose of seizing British
property, or property suspected of being British, in the ports of
Bilbao, St. Sebaatian, Passages, among others.

The ramifications were

quite clear to Armstrong:
The latter part of the rule is no doubt expressly intended
to reach American property. With the General goes a mercantile
man, who will be known in the market ae hi• friend and prot€gt,
and who, of course, will be the excluaive purchaser of the merchandise which shall be aeized and aold as British. This ia a

127
specimen
into the
business
men lend

at once of the violence and corruption which enter
present ayatem--and of a piece with this, is the whole
of licenses, to which (I am sor24 to add) our countrythemselves with great facility.

Caught between Great Britain and France, American coamerce waa
violated mercilessly.

One prohibition crowded upon another.

Through-

out the rest of the year, Armstrong'• correspondence was replete with
instances of French seizures and blatant violations of American neutral
rights.

American consuls and private businessmen

throughout Europe

frequently requested his intervention, as Napoleon forced his satellites throughout the Empire to implement his system.
Having done all that he could, Armstrong felt he had exhausted all
possibilities. for peaceably resolving American complaints against
France.

Hia call for firmer action, even if it had involved war, would

have been the most logical step in forcing the Eiqperor to make conces•
aions. American leadership, with Madison as President, still avoided
that inevitable course, and in so doing, subjected America's diplomats
to additional abuse and humiliation.

The firmest measure of resistance

on the part of the United States was simply what Armstrong was able to
convey in his persistent protest&.
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CHAPTER VIII
CABINET REBELLION
The latter part of 1809 and the early part of 1810 produced preseures within France due to the difficulties associated with commercial
restriction--particularly a shortage of revenue, as well as the sheer
difficulties in the enforcement of the Continental System.

Threatened

by financial difficulties, Napoleon also found himself confronted with
what amounted to Cabinet opposition.

As was his habit, he temporarily

yielded to the advice he disliked, and promised to do something for
French industry.

The three principle

,

ministers were Champagny, Fouche,

and Montalivet--newly appointed Minister of the Interior.

These three

lost no opportunity to advise the Emperor to encourage neutral trade.
This advise found further support from Mollien, Minister of the Trea~

sury and from Decree.

1

That Armstrong was aware of a struggle among

the Cabinet to alter the Continental System, is evident in his correspondence.

In a despatch to Secretary Smith of December 22, 1809,

Armstrong revealed he had been privy to the fact that on the previous

,

day Fouche had declared to the Governor of the Bank that the Imperial
Decrees with regard to the United States were on the verge of modification.

Armstrong was careful to caution the Secretary of State not to

raise hia hopes too much, as past experience had been that encouraging
2

signs were deceiving.
Nevertheleae, by January 6, 1810, Armstrong
could report to hia auperior:
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The veil, which for aome weeks past covered the proceedings
of the Cabinet with regard to neutral comnerce, ie now so far
withdrawn, as to enable ua to see with sufficient distinctness,
both the actors and the acting. The Ministers of Police and
Interior (Fouch' and Montalivet) have come out openly and vigorously against the present anti-commercial system, and have
denounced it as "one originating in error and productive only
of evil, and particularly calculated to impoverish France and
enrich her enemy." While they have held this language in
the Cabinet, they have held one of nearly the same tenor out
of it, and have added (we may suppose on sufficient authority)·
the most solemn assurances that the Emperor never meant "to
do more than prevent the commerce of the United States from
becoming tributary to Great Britain; that a new decision
would soon be taken by him, on this subject, and that from
this, the happiest results were to be expected."3
Exactly what change• would take place Armstrong could not say for
sure, although he had aome ideas.

He was forever cautious, recognizing

that any new propositions might be considered too liberal by some
French officials and would, therefore, receive serious opposition.
Armstrong was encouraged, however, by the fact that events in Holland
and the needs of Naples might combine to demand at least a modification
of the present system.

Even at that, Armstrong recognized that he

might easily have over-rated the influence of these circumstances:
The ~peror sees things in a way almost peculiar to himself,
and it may be that he is at this moment determined on a course
which will have the effect of converting a nation of friends
into one of enemies;--of expelling from Holland her money, her
industry and 4 intell1gence, and of dethroning a brother of his
own raising.
Once again, Armstrong tried to dampen any unfounded or over-anxioua optimism produced by knowledge of Cabinet opposition to Napoleon'•
enforcement of hie system.

Having received Smith's despatches of Decem-

ber 1, 1809, informing Armstrong of the rupture with the new British
minister, Jackson,

s Armstrong

knew that to those who did not understand

the tortuous policy of France of the time, the rupture with Jackson
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might appear to favor the prospects of American business in France.
However, Armstrong clearly realized that the exact opposite was more
likely.

A• long aa France thought the United States and Great Britain

might reach an agreement with each other, France apoke of altering her
system, and even issued public and ministerial declarations supporting
this proposal.

However, on December 18, 1809, the day the news of the

rupture reached Paris, military orders were given to seize and confiacate all American vessels and their cargoes which had arrived, or which
would arrive, in the ports of Spain.

The King of Naples also ordered

that all American property captured and brought into his territories
should be sold.

Armstrong demanded from Champagny the grounds on which

this new outrage was baaed.

Armstrong reported that a person in high

office had stated this latest outrage was largely political.

Looking

beyond this explanation, Armstrong deduced that the deficit of over
fifteen million francs in revenue the previous year had to be compensated.

The obvious course of action, then, was to sap the Americana.

Since the United States continued to be at odds with Great Britain,
the French could do this with impunity. 6
In the mean time, the renewed confiscation of American ships was

,

contrary to the promise received by Montalivet and Fouche from Napoleon
to alter his system ao aa to aid their objectives in improving France's
commercial poaition.

At a loss to invent a theory in which neutrals

could be plundered and encouraged at the aame time, the Emperor referred
the subject to Champagny on January 10.

Napoleon requested a complete

history of French relations with the United States since the Treaty of
Mortefontaine, and otdered the recall of General Turreau, in whom he had
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little confidence, and who he felt should be replaced by a more adept
representative.

7

He remarked to Champagny:

All the measures I have taken, as I have said several times,
are only measures of reprisal ••• It was only to the new extension
given to the right of blockade that I opposed the Decree of
Berlin; and even the Decree of Berlin ought to be considered
as a Continental, not as a maritime blockade, for it had been
carried out in that form. I regard it, in some sort, only as
a protest, and a violence opposed to a violence ••• Down to this
point there was little harm. Neutrals still entered our ports;
but the British Orders in Council necessitated my Milan Decree,
and from that time there were no neutrals•••• ! am now assured
that the English have given way; that they no longer levy taxes
on ships. Let me know if there ia an authentic act which announces it, and if there is none, let me know if the fact is
true; for once I shall be assured that a tax on navigation will
not be established by England, I shall be able to give way
on many points.a
As Adams observes, Napoleon's ministers must have been aware that
the Emperor's remarks and the assertions of hia commercial policy were
invented only for momentary expediency.

The Einperor himself had often

declared, and caused his ministers to declare, that the Continental
System, established by the Berlin Decree, had a broad military purpose
quite independent of retaliation--that it was aimed at the destruction
of England's commerce and resources.

Regarding Napoleon's profession

of ignorance that England had abandoned her transit duties on neutral
merchandise, every minister had to have been aware that only six months
earlier, the Emperor had discussed with them measures to be taken in
consequence of that abandonment.
decree founded upon it.

He had sent them the draft of a new

And he had finally decided to do nothing only

because England had again quarrelled with America over Erskine's arrangement.

These pretexts certainly could not have been accepted by any of

Napoleon's miniaters.

9
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THE ''MOROSE" MINISTER
In keeping with the Emperor'• pretext, Champagny--recently created
Duke of Cadore--requested from Armstrong the information regarding the
history of Franco-American relations.

M. Petry called upon Armstrong

with a message from Cadore stating that the order which had been sent
to Spain to seize American ships was not intended to do anything more
than to put them in sequestration, that he had declined answering any
letter on the subject because he had hoped that means might have been
found to adjust all the points in the controversy between the two
countries, that the Emperor was sincerely disposed to be on friendly
terms with the United States, and that he (Cadore) wished to know
whether Armstrong was, or was not, authorized to conclude a treaty.
Armstrong informed Petry that in addition to his plenipotentiary powers,
he also had the authority to conditionally revive the Treaty of 1800.
When asked on what grounds Armstrong would act under this authority,
the American minister responded in his candid manner by stressing, in
writing, the need to restore any sequestered American property.

He did

agree that any ship which had paid tribute to a foreign power should be
liable to confiscation, but aside from this exception, colllllerce should
be free.

10

Thia note was carried to Cadore who forwarded it to the Emperor.
Within a few hours, the Emperor responded, clearly illustrating his
irritation with the American minister's latest display of firmness, and
his failure to be intimidated.

Since Armstrong had written the note in

French, the Emperor took the opportunity to attack Armstrong's writing
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ability, condemning his lack of proficiency in French.

Napoleon in-

formed Cadore that he preferred Armstrong to write in English, "but
fully in a manner that we can understand."

11

Furthermore, Cadore was

instructed to send, by special courier, a cipher despatch to the United
States requesting General Armstrong's recall.

The American government

was to be informed that it:
••• is not represented here; that its minister does not know
French; i• a morose man with whom one cannot treat; that all
obstacles wo~ld be raised if they had here an envoy to be
talked with.
No doubt this latest display of Napoleon's anger was the result
of his growing irritation with theAmericanminister who was not easily
intimidated by the Emperor or his Court.

During the latter part of

Armstrong's tenure in France, he became increasingly unpopular with
.

.

.

the Emperor and the French Court.

The reasons are obvious.

As French

outrages toward American commerce became more frequent and more vicious,
General Armstrong's protests were correspondingly frequent and forceful.
Although the vast majority of foreign representatives were easily intimidated by the power and presence of the Emperor, Armstrong was not
noticeably impressed by the pomp and circumstance surrounding the
Emperor.

Thia lack of deference became quite evident to those who

attended Court.
~lter

13 Having been unsuccessful in forcing the Emperor to

his system for the benefit of American commerce, having often

experienced the Bnperor'a failure to keep hia promises, and being cognizant of the Bnperor'a way of responding to the exigencies of the
moment, Armstrong saw little to be gained by partaking of the frivolities
of Court--a routine which he did not particularly enjoy anyway.

Arm-
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strong was, after all, like Jefferson, the product of American republic•
anism, and, in some ways, not naturally well-suited to engage in Court
etiquette.

Of Armstrong,

William Lee atated:

Hia conversation ia instructive and entertaining; his pen
unequalled; and with all this, he has a rudeness of character, a stiff republican frankness about him that ia not
agreeable to st;angers, and ia the worst cot11llodity a man can
bring to Paris.14
Many around Napoleon interpreted Armstrong'• increasing absence
from Court appearances as an affront to the Emperor--which it certainly
was.

It was one way that Armstrong, having exhausted all normal diplo-

matic channels, demonstrated his contempt for the French violations of
American neutral rights.

Though in French society attention to detail

and etiquette were extremely important, Armstrong was not much inclined
to indulge in the "little attentions which please •••• "

15

Napoleon was

not at all accustomed to such bold protests, especially from a representative of a mere republic.

Finally, Napoleon 'reached his limit and

explo.ded, using Armstrong's "moroseness" and inadequacy as pretexts to
rid himself of such an independent and persistent minister who refused
to demonstrate the desired deference.

In order to try to expedite

Armstrong's recall, the aid of John Quincy Adams, American minister to
Russia, was sought.
In the August 17, 1810 entry in his memoirs, Adams recorded a
conversation with a Mr. Six.

Six had hinted to Adams that he could

state with certainty that much of the difficulty in American relationa
with France was due to the French government's dis like of General
Armstrong.

Six believed Adams was the only one who could communicate

this information to the United States government.

Although the French
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government did not doubt Armstrong'• character, they did feel that he
was ''morose, captious, and petulant."

16

Adams, possessing no love for

Armstrong, did, nonetheless, understand and sympathize with him.

Adams

stated:
Now, I am afraid that under the circumstances in which the
General has been there, the last three years, they would have
had quite as much reason to be disastisfied on such ground with
me as they can have with him. And I am sure I should think it
very ill treatment from him if, upon such vague and loose pretences, he should transmit to the Government a complaint that
I was thought morose, captious, or petulant, with suggestions
that he himself was the fittest man to take my place. I do not
suspect Mr. Six of any ill design in this affair, for I believe
him sincerely and cordially my friend and that of America. Neither do I incline to suspect the Ambassador. I suppose him to
be indifferent on the subject, and rather to have fallen in
with Mr. Six's opinions than to have spoken from any particular
instructions from himself. My own course upon this occasion is
plain--to be silent.17
While attending Court some time later, the French Ambassador to
Russia re-affirmed that relations between France and the United States
might be settled were someone other than General Armstrong in the
American diplomatic post.

18

During the following month, Adams, having

dined at the French Ambassador's country home, was once more encouraged
to approach the American government with the complaints regarding
Armstrong.

The French Ambassador, in referring to the complaints,

assured Adams they were nothing that would injure Armstrong's credit at
home.

He was being criticized because he scarcely ever saw Cadore,

never went to Court, and when anything was done by the French government of which he disapproved, he presented "testy" notes, which necessitated answering in similar style.

Adams wrote thatz " ••• I now see the

whole front of Armstrong's offence is omitting to go to Court, and
presenting notes too full of truth and energy for the taste of the
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Emperor."

19

Under normal circumstances, a representative of a foreign country

who was not well liked by the
his country's interests.

host government, would be a handicap to

That the United States was a weak maritime

power subjected to the unscrupulous actions of the EuWeror of France
justified Armstrong's conduct.
chance of success.

Standard diplomatic protocol had no

In presenting "testy" notes to the Emperor, and in

refusing to attend Court as often as was deemed appropriate, General
Armstrong was def ending the interests and the honor of the United
States by the only means available to him.

That the &mperor resented

Armstrong's forcefulness and requested his recall, may be taken as a
distinct compliment to Armstrong's effectiveness under very difficult
circumstances.
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CHAPTER IX
NAPOLEON REJECTS CABINET ADVICE:

ABUSES CONTINUE

On January 25, 1810, Armstrong received an invitation to meet
with Cadore.

The two discussed three subjects:

(1) the means for

amicably adjusting the differences between the two countries; (2) the
motives for the seizure of American vessels and cargoes in Spain; and
(3) the condition on which (as offered in Cadore's letter of August 22,
1809) the Emperor would consent to repeal his Berlin Decree.

1

With regard to the first topic, Armstrong observed that the points
which most engaged Cadore's attention were abuses to which an irmnediate
repeal of the decrees might expose France and the measures first calculated to correct these.

As to admitting colonial produce, Cadore

informed Armstrong that the Emperor had determined nothing.

Armstrong

used this occasion to mention that the United States produced one of
the articles under that general category in great quantity (cotton),
and that they had also begun to produce another (sugar).

That many

articles not calculated for the markets of Europe--the products of the
middle and northern states--were carried to the West Indies and exchanged
for sugar, coffee, rum, and molaases--waa a trade of basics.

The

cheapness with which it enabled the United States to supply these articles, should, on the grounds of economy alone, give Americana preference
over British emugglers, who would supply them if the United States did
not.

Cadore responded that the question was no doubt worth considering. 2
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On the second point, Cadore remarked that the orders which had
been given with regard to American ships in Spain were a regular consequenceof the ayatem declared in the letter of August 22, 1809.

He

stated it was obvious the Emperor could not permit to her allies a
commerce which he had denied to France.

This would def eat his system

and oppress his subjects by demanding from them great and useless
sacrifices.

If the system were not strictly enforced everywhere, it

would not produce the desired effects.

Cadore reminded Armstrong that

the property seized had only been sequestered, and as such, was a eubj

ect of the current negotiation.

As American remonstrances had already

been sufficiently frequent, and as this meeting was intended for conciliation only, Armstrong thought it more prudent to suppress the
obvious answer which he might have given on this point.

3

Under the third topic, and in conformity to Armstrong's instructions of December 1, 1809, Armstrong asked if the :Emperor would revoke
the Berlin Decree if Great Britain revoked her blockades.

Cadore

replied that the only condition required for the revocation would be a
previous revocation by the British government of her blockade of France-or part of France--such as from the Elbe to Brest.

If the British

government would then recall the Orders in Council which had occasioned
the Milan Decree, that decree would also be annulled. 4
The proposed Vienna Decree, the draft of which was sent to Paris
in August, 1809, confiscating all American ships in reprisal for the
seizure of French ships supposedly threatened by the enforcement of the
American Non-IntercouraeAct 1 was not even alluded to during the discuaaions with Armstrong, or in discussions among Cabinet ministers.
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It waa not until January 25, after Cadore•s interview with Armstrong had
been reported to the Emperor, that Napoleon at laat resorted to the

ideaa contained in the Vienna Decree. Thia long period of hesitation
demonstrated how unfounded Napoleon's plea of retaliation was.

How-

ever, no other explanation was made for this measure which Napoleon
insisted upon implementing, and which Cadore had no alternative but to
obey.

5

The Emperor dictated the draft of a note in which the principles

of confiscation were laid down:
If American ships have been sequestered in France, France
only imitates the example given her by the American government; and the undersigned recalls to Mr. Armstrong the Act of
Congress of March 1, 1809, which orders in certain cases the
sequestration and confiscation of French ships, excludes them
from American ports, and interdicts France to the . .Americana.
It is in reprisal of this last provision that the American
ships have been seized in Spain and Naples. The league against
England, which has the cause of neutrals for its object, embraces now all the Continental peoples, and permits none of
them to enjoy commercial advantages of which France is deprived. France will permit it in no place where her influence extends; but she is ready to grant every favor to the
ships of a neutral power which shall have subjected themselves
to a tribute, and shall recognize only the laws of their own
country, not those of a foreign government •••• !£ the Minister
of the United States has the power to conclude a convention
proper to attain the object indicated, the undersigned is
ordered to give all his care to it, and to occupy himself upon
it without interruptions.6
This note was quite remarkable.

The proposed Vienna Decree

confiscated American ships because French ships were forbidden under
threat of confiscation to enter America.n ports.
suggested a variation from this idea.

The note of January 25

American ships were to be con-

f iaca ted in France because they were forbidden to leave America.

7

Despite the almost united preaaure within Napoleon's Cabinet to
relax restrictions against American commerce, Napoleon clung to the
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objectives of his Continental System.

Having tactfully resisted the

Emperor's will and reasoning regarding American commerce as long as

possible, on February 14, 1810,

Cadore finally sent a note to Armstrong

as had been ordered by the Emperor.

8

Aware and fearful of Armstrong'•

responses to the note, Cadore took it upon himself to deviate from the
Emperor's precise instructions, and proceeded to alter the text of the
note somewhat.

In part, Cadore stated:

His Majesty could place no reliance on the proceedings of
the United States, who, having no ground of complaint against
France, comprised her in their acts of exclusion, and, since
the month of May, have forbidden the entrance of their ports
to French vessels, under the penalty of confiscation. As soon
as Hia Majesty was informed of this measure, he considered
himself bound to order reprisals on American vessels, not only
in his territory, but likewise in the countries which are under his influence. In the ports of Holland, of Spain, of
Italy, and of Naples, American vessels have been seized, because the Americana have seized French vessels. The Americans
cannot hesitate as to the part which they are to take; they
ought either to tear to pieces the act of their independence,
and to become again, aa before the revolution, the subjects
of England, or to take such measures as that their commerce
and industry should not be tariffed (tarlf,s) by the English,
which renders them more dependent than Jamaica •••• 9
Adams states that Napoleon had become noticeably reckless when
he allowed Cadore to send this note.
or a misstatement of the truth.

Every line was either an error,

Apart from these obvious faults, the

note tried to cover too large an area of complaint against the United
States.

In the projected Vienna Decree, Napoleon had ordered retalia-

tion everywhere for the confiscation threatened by the American NonIntercourse Act.

Realizing the impossibility of maintaining that

position, he continued to confiscate American ships in France under the
old Bayonne Decree, and ordered the aequeatration of American ships
throughout Europe on the baaie that other countriea should not enjoy
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the conmerce that waa denied to France.

Cadore'• note abandoned this

position again, in order to return to the doctrine of the projected
Vienna Decree.

In order to

make 1t appear rea1onable, he claimed that

Americana had seized French vessels.

10

Neither the errors nor misstatements nor their purposes escaped
General Armstrong.

His first inclination was to overlook the obvious

discrepancies, and enter at once into a discussion for renewing the
Convention of 1800.

Armstrong believed this approach would test the

sincerity of the overtures being made to him, and perhaps have the
effect of drawing from Cadore the precise terms on which the Emperor
would acquiesce to American demands.

11

In a note to Cadore of February

18, 1810, Armstrong presented a plan for renewing the Convention of
1800.

He assured Cadore, however, that the United States was then no

more disposed to part with her rights than she had been at the time of
the Revolution.

12

Armstrong was called on by Petry on behalf of Cadore, and was
informed that Champagny had prepared a contre proj~t for renewing the
Convention of 1800 and submitted it to the Emperor.
municated to Armstrong in a few days.

It would be com-

Without placing more optimism

upon this declaration than he should, Armstrong took the opportunity to
reaffirm the American position to Petry.

Any treaty, in any form,

which did not provide reparation for the past, as well aa security for
the future, would neither be accepted by Armstrong, nor ratified by the
Preaident or the Senate. 13
However, on March 10, 1810, whatever hesitancy Armstrong may have
had about illuminating the obvioua error• and miaatatement• in Cadore•a
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note vanished.

Armstrong resorted to speaking in the "moroae" manner

which the Emperor had resented and about which he had complained.

The

most reasonable explanat1on for this 1udden change in approach was
probably contained in a verbal answer to Armstrong's note of February

21.

He was informed that the Emperor had decided to sell the American

property seized in Spain. 14 This information came almost simultaneously with a report from the American consul in Copenhagen, who complained
about the sorry state of American conmerce, and who was greatly alarmed
by the approach of a large French force, as well aa a royal order
announcing that privateering would immediately comnence.

The consul

had stated: "This may be termed the funeral eulogy of our rights in
t hi s country--•••• .. is
Armstrong, in true form, again responded to Cadore's note of
February 14.

He assailed the many errors and misstatements that related

to the history of American relations with France.

Armstrong did not

deny that since May 20, 1809, the United States had forbidden entry of
French vessels into her harbors, nor that confiscation was the penalty
attached to violation of this law.
should offend France.

He did question, however, why this

He argued that the right to exclude foreign

commerce was a right common to all nations.

Could this, then, be re-

garded as a legitimate excuse for reprisal by a power who argued that
the first duty of nations was to defend their sovereignty, and who even
denationalized ships of those countries who would not subscribe to that
opinion?

16

Cadore had maintained in hia letter of February 14, that the
United States had nothing to complain about to France.

On this point,
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Armstrong was additionally contentious.

He posed the following ques-

tions to Cadore: Waa the capture and condemnation of a ship driven on
the shores

of FrAn'e be,1uae of bad weather, nothing? Wai the eeizure

and sequestration of many cargoes brought to France in ships violating
no law and admitted to the imperial custom houses nothing?

Waa the

violation of American maritime rights according to existing treaty
nothing?

There was no mistaking Armstrong's meaning when he stated:

In a word, was it nothing that our ships were burnt on the
high seas without other offence than that of belonging to the
United States, or other apology than was to be found in the
enhanced safety of the perpetrator? Surely, if it be the duty
of the United States to resent the theoretical usurpations of
the British orders of Hovember, 1807, it cannot be less their
duty to complain of the daily and practical outrages on th~
part of France.17
Armstrong clearly left the impression that the United States
did have legitimate complaints against France, especially since

ther~

were no less than 100 American ships within the Emperor's possessions,
or those of his allies.

18

Armstrong systematically refuted the assertion that it was only
after the Emperor had been informed of the passage of the American NonIntercourse Act that Napoleon felt it necessary to retaliate on American vessels, not only within his own territories, but also within the
countries he controlled.

Accurately, Armstrong informed Cadore that no

French vessels had actually been seized by American ships.

The law was

only a defensive measure and was restricted to the territory of the
United States.

A measure of reprisal could not possibly be justified

by such a law. 19

Armstrong related that when the Non-Intercourse Act

was first cormnunicated to the Emperor in June or July, 1809, it did
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not excite any unfriendly· feeling toward the United States.

Far from

it, this waa immediately followed by overtures of accommodation, which,
although they did not produce any poaitive results, did not make matters worse.

20

In his final remarks to Cadore, Armstrong coyly professed not to
know what circumstances had arisen that had prompted the Emperor to
change his opinion.

In a cynical manner designed to embarrass Cadore,

Armstrong ended by stating that the " ••• confidence I feel in the open
and loyal policy of his majesty, altogether excludes the idea, that the
rule was merely found for the occasion, and made to justify seizures,
not otherwise justifiable."

21

In March, 1810, Napoleon had not only convinced himself that the
Non-Intercourse Act had just come to his knowledge, producing an outburst in defense of French national spirit, but he also forced Cadore-who knew otherwise--to vouch for the accuracy of the Emperor's memory
by his signature.

22

The other logical explanation for the E)nperor'a conduct could very
well have been his need for money.

Napoleon's financial needs made him

open to every source which might have helped relieve them. 23
Having firmly lectured Cadore in his note, Armstrong was more
convinced than ever that hia mission to France could no longer be useful.

Intending to return to the United States during the spring, and

not having received as yet a firm promise of a ship from the President,
Armstrong applied to the Emperor for one to carry his family home.

Were

thia request granted, he wished to leave France around the first part
of June.

By that time, he would have, hopefully, heard from the Secre-
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tary of State, and, though doubtful, have reached a conclusion of some
kind to the long and protracted business in France.
State must have been none

The Secretary of

too encouraged when Armstrong concluded a

letter to him stating that there was "no hole or corner of Europe under
French influence, whither the Emperor'• confiscating orders have not
reached. 1124

Before he could return to the United States, Armstrong

would still have to confront several more turns in the· Emperor's policy
toward the United States.
IWIBOUILLET DECREE
On March 23, 1810, Napoleon signed his name to what became known
aa the Rambouillet Decree.

Thia decree was a paraphrase of the pro-

jected Vienna Decree of August 4, 1809.

It demonstrated the tenacity

with which the Emperor, while seeming to yield to the opposition within
his Cabinet, held to his purpose.

In order to produce the effect of the

Vienna Decree in the Rambouillet Decree, Napoleon had not only to expel
his brother, Louis, from Holland, and to annex that country to France,
but he had also to force Fouch~, his ablest minister, fr~ the Cabinet.

25

The Rambouillet Decree was ostensibly a response to the Ameri-

can Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809.

It stated that, since May 20,

1809, vessels navigating under the flag of the United States, or owned
in whole or in part, by any citizen of that power, which had or would
enter the ports of the Empire, or of French colonies, or of the countries occupied by French arms, would be seized, and the money received
from their sale would be deposited in the Emperor's surplus fund
(caisae d'amotisaement).

Vessels charged with despatches or with com-
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missions of the government of the Unites States, which did not have
either cargoes or merchandise aboard would be excepted. 26

Following the 1igning of thi1 decree, not

published until May

14,

1810, and after Louis had been forced into the treaty of March 16, 1810,
any business not directly related to Napoleon'• second marriage preparations came to a halt.

During this interlude, Armstrong informed

Secretary Smith on April 7, 1810, that he had been promised a ship from
the Emperor to transport himself and his family to the United States.
Cadore, however, recommended that Armstrong not pin down his departure
to any particular day.

28

Although the ports of Prussia were supposedly opened to American
commerce, Armstrong advised Smith to avoid ports of Prussia and Denmark
until further assurances had been given.

29

On April 16, 1810, Armstrong

warned Smith of the Rambouillet Decree by informing the Secretary of
State that the Emperor had directed the sale of American vessels taken
.in ports of Spain.

The money arising fromthem was to be placed in the

Emperor's caisse priv~e.
ship,

~'

The Emperor had also refused to give up the

and ordered that it be brought before the Council of Prizes,

where the ship's condemnation was almost assured.

30

The current pre-

carious state of American commerce, compounded by King Louis' position,
were reported to Armstrong by Mr. Bourne, the American consul in Amsterdam, in a letter of April 27, 1810.

In a private interview Bourne had

had with King Louis on April 26, the King informed him that he deeply
regretted the measures he had been forced to adopt, relative to American
merchandise in the public stores, due to the recent treaty of March 16,
1810.

King Louis had resisted until this was no longer possible, and
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hoped to assure the American government of his cordial friendship.
Nothing could have given Louis greater satisfaction than to have had
the opportunity of cultivating amity and 'ommerce which had for so
long exiatedbetween the two countries.

Louis assured Bourne that he

was using every means within his power to obtain the release of the
Hero's cargo.

31

For all practical effects, Napoleon treated the United States as
if he were at war with her.

Thia antipathy was confirmed when the

Ra.mbouillet Decree was published in the·official journals of ?-larch 14,

1!10, though the law had been in effect since it had been signed by the
Emperor.

Armstrong made the official promulgation of the decree known

to Smith in a despatch of Hay 24, 1810.

He informed Smith that four

commissioners had been sent to Amsterdam with orders to take possession
of American property found there, in accordance with Article 10 of the
treaty between Holland and France.

Further illustrating the futility

of the American position, Armstrong reported that several American

ships and cargoes for which compromise had been previously worked out
under the sanction of the Council of Prizes were again seized to satis32
fy the provisions of the new decree.
THE NON-INTERCOURSE

ACT REPEALED, AND

MACON'S

BILL NO. 2

PASSED

News of Napoleon'• most recent seizures and confiscations greatly
upset Madison and the American government.

In a letter to Jeff eraon of

May 25, 1810, the President expressed his feelings about this:

"The

late confiscation by Bonaparte comprise robbery, theft, and breach of
trust, and exceed in turpitude any of hia enormities not wasting human

152
33

blood."

The Non-Intercourae Act, like the Embargo Act, had obviously

failed to bring about the desired response from either France or Great
Britain.

Like the Embargo, Non-Intercourse had placed a great strain on

American commerce.

As it was scheduled to expire naturally on May 1,

1810, the eleventh Congress allowed it to do so, replacing it with
Macon'• Bill No. 2.

34

Macon'• Bill No. 2 was the last Congressional measure intended to
counteract, through coimnercial interest, the encroachments of France
and Great Britain.
1806.

The first had been the Non-Importation Act of April,

The second was the Embargo Act with ita aupplementa dating from

December, 1807.

The third waa the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809.

The fourth was Macon's Bill No. 2.

Each year had witnessed a new ex--

periment in peaceable coercion, as the philosophy of Jefferson and
Madison was put into effect.

After the climax of the Embargo Act,

however, each subsequent act merely represented a weakening faith in
the policy, until Macon's Bill No. 2 marked the last atep toward the
admitted failure of commercial restrictions aa a substitute for war. 35
This latest law re-opened American trade with all the world,
though it excluded French and British warships from American waters.
The moat important feature of the bill, however, atated that if either
England or France agreed to reapect American rights, either by revoking
or by modifying their edicts before March 3, 1811, the Preaident could
again apply Non-Intercourae to the nation that had not revoked it•
edicts.

Thia would be done after an interval of three months had

elapsed, allowing the violating nation an opportunity to follow the
36
example aet by its rival.
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Armstrong was informed of the passage of the new law and in•
atructed to tell the French government that the Non-Intercourse Act,

the pretext given for the seizing and confiacating of so many American
vessels and cargoes, no longer existed.

The Administration hoped that

its prospects might be improved with this repeal, and felt that France
might be encouraged by the President's willingness to revive Non-Intercourse against Great Britain if France would only revoke her offending
decrees.

37

Following this set of instructions, another set was drafted
telling Armstrong that 1£ Pinkney' a efforts in London to secure the
revocation of the British blockades should fail, Armstrong was to
formally relate to the Duke of Cadore that the Non-Intercourse Act no
longer existed.

If, as Cadore had stated in his letter of February 14,

1810, France was ready to do justice to the United States in exchange
for a pledge on the part of the United States not to submit to the
British edicts, then the President was ready to revive the Non-Intercourse Act against Great Britain.

However, it would not be enough for

France to agree only to atop molesting American commerce.

Repeal of

the French edicts would have to coincide with "a satisfactory provision
for restoring the property lately aurpriaed and seized." 38
The likelihood of Armstrong effecting revocation of the French
decrees was extremely slim.

Even more unlikely was the possibility

of securing reparations for past injuries.

Thia was wishful thinking

on the part of the Administration.
When the text of the Rambouillet Decree arrived in the United
States in mid-July, a week after the last set of instructions had been
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aent to Armstrong, criea for war were
citizens.

h~ard

from numerous American

It was probably a lack of adequate military and naval prepa-

ration that restrained the government from taking this step. 39 (England had not offered any reasons to endear herself to the United States
either.)
This last measure of peaceable coercion passed by Congress was
also the weakest of all the measures.

Ironically, it was the only

piece of American economic legislation which really had any effect on
Napoleon.

40

Although theoretically impartial, Napoleon saw Macon's Bill

No. 2 as a virtual surrender to British maritime policy.

Since the

British Navy dominated the seas, whatever trade the new law allowed
would in fact be aubjecttoBritish controi.

41

It threw open to British

trade a market in the United States which alone would compensate England
for her loss of trade with France and Holland.
Milan Decree useless.

42

Macon's Act made the

The evidence indicates that Napoleon did not

decide upon a radical reconstruction of his Continental System until
his hand had been forced by this unexpected turn in American policy.
The reconstruction first entailed "permits" for American ships, and then
a conditional repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees.

43

Notes
Chapter IX
1Armstrong to Smith, Jan. 28, 1810, with enclosures, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

In Smith's instructions to Armstrong of Dec. 1,

1809, Armstrong was instructed to inquire about the third point.
Smith to Armstrong Dec. l, 1809,

NA

See

Instructs., VII, 79-81.

2

Armstrong to Smith, Jan. 28, 1810, with enclosures, NA Dea-

patches, Vol. XI.
3

4

rbid.
Ibid.

5
Adams,

v,

230.

6Projet de Note, Jan. 25, 1810, as quoted in Adams, V, 230-231.
7

Adams,

8

Adams,

v,
v,

231.
232.

Armstrong to Smith, Feb. 17, 1810, with enclo-

sures, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.
9nuke of Cadore to Armstrong, Feb. 14, 1810, ASPFR, III, 380-381.
lOAdams,

v,

232-233.

11Armstrong to Smith, Feb. 18, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.
12
Armstrong to Cadore, Feb. 18, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

13Armstrong to Smith, Feb. 25, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.
14

Armstrong to Smith, March 10, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

15Forbea to Armstrong, March 3, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.
16
Armstrong to Cadore, March 10, 1810, ASPFR, III, 381-382.

156
17
18

19

Ibid., 382.
Ibid.
Ibid.

ZOibid.

21 rbid.

Madison was indignant as a result of the violence and

outrages perpetrated on American property.

He approved of the language

used by Armstrong in hie note to Cadore of March 10, 1810.

Smith to

Armstrong, June 5, 1810, NA Instructs., VII, 97-98.

22

Adams,

v,

235-236.

23 Ibid., 236.

Mahan, I, 145, states that Napoleon was always

poverty-stricken.
24Armstrong to Smith, March 24, 1810, with enclosures, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

25 Adams,

v,

236.

Louis had refused to seize American ships at

Amsterdam, thus forcing Napoleon to the conclusion that Holland must be
annexed to France.

Threatened with war, Louis was obliged to journey to

Paris where he was coerced into signing a treaty on March 16, 1810, in
which a secret provision called for the seizure of American property.
Fouch: opposed the annexation of Holland, and tried to prevent it.

He

believed that nothing but peace with England could put an end to the
Emperor's experiments with the welfare of France.

In a scheme with

which he approached England through an agent named Fagan, he suggested
that if Great Britain would abandon Spain, France would join in creating,
from the Spanish-American colonies, a monarchy for Ferdinand VII, and from
Louisiana, a kingdom for the Bourbons of France.
;

Almost simultaneous

to Fouche's advances, Napoleon was secretly working advances of his own

157

toward England.

Armstrong's note to Smith of Jan. 10, 1810, reveals

that Armstrong waa knowledgeable about Fouche'• scheme.

to Smith, Jan. 10, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

See Armstrong

Both Fagan and

Napoleon's agent went to England and held interviews with British ministers in early Feb., 1810.

However, their proposals were quickly dis-

On April 27, Napoleon and his new Empress set out for Holland.

missed.

In the course of the journey, Napoleon learned of Fouche's scheme.
June 3, Fouche~ was disgraced and exiled to Italy.
resisted putting into effect the decree.

On

Louis, hcn1ever, still

On June 24, French troops

were ordered to occupy Amsterdam, and on July 3, Louis abdicated and
took refuge in Germany.

On July 8, Napoleon annexed Holland to France.

For a good account of the events surrounding Louis and Fouch~, see
Adams, V, 236-242.
26
ASPFR, III, 384.

27

Armstrong to Smith, April 4, 1810, State Papers and PublicJs

Documents of the United State•••••" 3rd ed., "11 vols. -(Boston, 1819), VII, 463-464.
28
Armstrong to Smith, April 7, 1810, NA Despatches, Vola XI.
29

30

Ibid.
Armstrong to Smith, April 16, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

31

Bourne to Armstrong, April 27, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

32

Armstrong to Smith, May 24, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

33

Madison to Jefferson, May 25, 1810, Letters and Other Writings

of James Madison 4 vols. (New York, 1884), II, 478.
34

Annals, 11th Cong., 2nd aesa., pp. 2512-2583.

35

Adams, V, 195-196.

36Annala, 11th Cong., 2nd seas., pp. 2582-2583.

158

37
Smith to Pinkney and Armstrong, May 4, 1810, NA Instructs., VII,
90; Smith to Armstrong, May 22, 1810, NA Instructs., VII, 96-97.

See

also Smith to Armstrong, June 5, 1810, NA Instructs., VII, 97-98.
38

Smith to Armstrong, July S, 1810, NA Despatches, Vol. XI.

The

original draft was pencilled by Madison and is found in Madison Papers

LC, Reel 12.
39

Stockder, 504.

40

Hi story, 154 •
.
Bemis,

41neconde, History, 99.
42

43

Adams, V, 244.

Melvin, 194.

CHAPTER X

DECREES "REPEALED"
Napoleon, recognizing his Continental System was in need of
change, created a Council of Commerce and Manufactures on June 6,
1810.

1

Through this council, orders and decrees designed to meet the

needs in the license system were issued in an effort to bolster the
French economic position.

Oftentimes these decrees were duplicated,

and the meaning of a public decree was often affected by some secret
decree or order, contributing to civil confusion.

2

When the Council

was created, further tariff revision had already been contemplated,
either as a corrective measure for the high prices of colonial goods
and raw material, or as a safe-guard for French industry, with, of
course, an incidental revenue objective.

The first definite step

toward such a purpose, however, seems to have been instructions to
Montalivet on June 18 1 1810, to prepare a report on the tariff, and to
include certain trade atatistics. 3
In attempting to meet the needs of France as he saw them, and
desiring to prevent the United States from becoming an ally of Great
Britain, Napoleon hit on a plan he thought would accomplish his objectives.

He pretended to make satisfaction for the United States, at the

same time maintaining his system in order to hurt Great Britain.

The

actual reasone Napoleon instituted changes in his Continental System
at this particular time are debateable.

Quite possibly the Emperor was
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alarmed by the reports of increasing anti-French sentiment in the
United States. 4 Additionally, he may have aeen an opportunity to embroil the United States with Great Britain by relaxing his decrees.

He

alao recognized that the European economy required goods which only
5
Americana could provide.
However, the Emperor was aware that American
ships which did

co~e

to France would risk being sequestered, because

all of them would either have been visited by English ships, or would
have touched in England.

Napoleon realized it was probable that few

American ships would venture into French ports without knowing for sure
what France meant to do with them.

6

Napoleon recognized that he could do one of three things:

(1)

maintain his decrees, (2) expressly revoke them, or (3) appear to revoke them while in fact maintaining them. Characteristically, the
Emperor opted for the third course of action.
Since Napoleon'• primary motive at the time was conmercial, the
Emperor devised a plan to withdraw hia decrees as they affected
American commerce.

Deviously, Napoleon proposed to replace them with

customs regulations that would effectively prevent the importing of
goods which he did not want or need, or which were primarily the products of British colonies.

The repeal, then, would be nominal and, in

essence, allow the system to remain intact while appearing to have been
changed or dropped.

Napoleon further explained his projected scheme:

Thia situation will have no influence on the customs legislation, which will always regulate arbitrarily duties and prohibitions. The Americana will be able to bring sugar and coffee
into our porta,--the privateer• will not atop them becauae the
flag covers the goods; but when they come into a port of France,
they will find the customs legislation, by which we shall be
able to say that we do not want the sugar and coffee brought by
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the Americans because they are English merchandise; that we
do not want tobacco, etc.; that we do not want such or such
goods, which we can as we please class among prohibited
goods. Thu' it is evident that we should commit ourselves
to nothing.
The Emperor issued a decree, passed on July 5, but not then promulgated, recognizing neutral rights by issuing licenses under the
name of "permits" for thirty American vessels.

The legal thirty vessels

carrying cargoes consisting of cotton, potash, codfish, indigo, or logwood, would come from one of two ports--New

Yor~

would bring with them certificates of origin.

8

or Charleston--and

The ahips could only

enter at one or two designated French ports, and would be required to
take, in return, wines, cognac, silks, and other French goods equivalent to the value of the incoming cargo. 9
When Armstrong became aware of this decree, he was upset with
it and with Napoleon's scheming.

Armstrong was further suspicious of

Napoleon's motives and more certain of the Emperor's lack of good faith
when told that it was not a convenient time for Armstrong to· press for
the fulfillment of the Emperor's earlier promise to provide a ship for
the Minister's return to the United States.

Armstrong stated:

was the fact--but what are promises now a days?"

11

Such

10

Napoleon's new system apparently was founded upon the decrees of
July 3, 5, and 25, 1810.

These three decrees may be regarded as the

comp0nent acts for the reconstruction of the French navigation system
upon the license trade.

The f irat decree blocked out the general plan

and worked out the importation features except for neutral countries
supplying their own goods.

The decree of July 5 on American permits
I

remedied this omission, for both imports and exports from neutrals.
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The decree of July 25 filled out the scheme by bringing all French
export trade under uniform regulationa.

11

This third decree forbade

ships to leave a French port for a foreign port without a license,
which, in the Emperor's eyes, gave that ship the character of being
French. 12

In other words, the Eoperor's scheme was founded on and left

intact his Berlin and Milan Decrees, except for the license feature.
The licenses themselves were classified in thirty different aeries:
for the ocean, the Mediterranean, England, and so on.
the cargoes to be carried inward and outward.
between neutrals and enemies.

They designated

They made no distinction

The license that authorized a voyage

from London was the same, except for its aeries, as that which covered
a cargo of cotton from Charleaton.

Any distinction was limited to

imposing on the neutral additional trouble to prove that his goods were
not English.

In theory, the importation of such English merchandise as

would have relieved England's distress was forbidden, and the exportation of French merchandise was encouraged, not only in order to assist
French industry, but also in order to drain England's specie.

Sugar,

coffee, and cotton from the colonies were especially prohibited, but
when captured by privateers or confiscated on land, colonial produce
was first admitted to the custom-house at a duty of fifty per cent, and
then sold for the benefit of the Imperial treasury.

Napoleon

~mpoaed

13

this system and tariff on all countries under

his control, including Switzerland, Naples, Hamburg, and the Ranae
Towns, while he exerted all his influence to force the same policy on
Prussia and Russia.

As far aa it concerned the United States, the only

neutral left, the system classified American ships either as English
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when unlicensed, or as French when licensed.

Thia new system, another

form of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, was in some respects more
offensive than the original.

14

THE CADORE LETTER A."'il> TRIANON TARIFF OF AUGUST 5, 1810
Although news arrived in Paris that the American Non-Intercourse
Act had been repealed and Macon'• Bill No. 2 had taken its place,
Armstrong himself failed to receive official notice of these events
from his government.

However, through an American who had recently

been in London, Armstrong received despatches from Pinkney, which
included a copy of the Act of May 1, 1810. Around July 9, Armstrong
communicated the passage of Macon's Bill No. 2 to Cadore as reported in
a newspaper.

Cadore responded that such an unofficial form could not

be made the basis for any governmental proceedings, but he, nevertheless, forwarded the newspaper to the Emperor. 15

For three weeks

Napoleon made no decision on the subject of the American act, probably
due to his pre-occupation with the annexation of Holland, and formulation of his tariff system.

Then, on July 31, 1810, the Emperor dis-

regarded Cadore's sense of proper form and, ostensibly as a result of
Macon's Bill No. 2, decided that his Berlin and Milan Decrees would be
repealed as of November 1, 1810.

In a note to Cadore, the Emperor made

known his decision, and instructed Cadore accordingly:
After having much reflected on the affair• of America, I
have thought that to repeal my Decrees of Berlin and Milan
would have no effect; that it would be better for you to make
a note to Mr. Armstrong by which you should let him know that
you have put under my eyes the details contained in the American newspaper; that I should have liked to have a more official
comnunication, we may regard this aa official,--he can consi-
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der that my Decrees of Berlin and Milan will have no effect,
dating from November 1; such Act of the American Congress,
on condition that (I condition que) if the British ·council
does not withdraw its Orders of 1807, the United States Congress ahall fulfil the engagement it haa taken to re•eata•
blish its prohibition• on Britiah coamerce. This appears
to me more suitable than a decree which would cause shock
(qui ferait secouaae) and would not fulfil my object. This
method appears to me more conformable to my dignity and to
the aeriousneas of the affair.16
On August 2, 1810, the Emperor himself dictated the letter that
was sent to Armstrong on August 5.

He made numerous changes in its

text during the three day interval, but at last it was signed and sent
to the American Embassy.

17 On August 5, 1810, Cadore delivered what

became known as the Cadore letter.

It has generated a great deal of

historical debate, and has had a significant effect upon the subsequent
course of American relations with both France and Great Britain.
The letter essentially reiterated what Napoleon had written to
Cadore on July 31.

Cadore informed Armstrong that he had placed the

newspaper containing the Act of Congress of May 1 before the Emperor,
and that the Emperor had expressed the hope that this act, as well as
all other acts of the United States government which interested France
would always be made known officially to him.

According to Cadore, the

Emperor had remarked that, in general, he only had knowledge of American acts indirectly, and then only after a long interval which was
quite inconvenient,

18

an obvious gross misstatement of fact.

Cadore wrote that the Emperor had applauded the Embargo laid by
the United States, although it had the effect of hurtingFrance, and
caused her to lose the colonies of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and Cayenne.
Despite these adverse effects, the Emperor did not complain.

He made
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this aacrif ice to the principle which had caused the Americans to lay
the Embargo, inspiring them to restrict themselves rather than submit
to the law1
the oceans.

Qf

GfCAt

Britain who 1ought to make herself the

tyrant of

19

Cadore further stated incorrectly that the Emperor had not known
about the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809 until
very recently.

He referred to it as most injurious to the interests of

France, interdicting to American vessels the commerce of France, while
at the same time authorizing that to Spain, Naples, and Holland.

It

also announced confiscation against all French vessels which would
enter the ports of America.

Reprisal for confiscation against French

vessels was, therefore, a right, demanded by the dignity of France,
a circumstance on which it was impossible to compromise.

20

Seeming to have presented a defense of past French actions, the
Emperor, through Cadore, stated that the United States had in fact
retraced her hostile steps by revoking the Act of March 1, thus opening
the ports of the United States to French cOfilt\erce.

In short, Congress

had engaged itself to oppose the belligerent which continued to refuse
to acknowledge the rights of neutrals.

Responding to the new circum-

stances, Cadore informed General Armstrong that he was authorized to
declare that:
••• the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that
after the lat of November they will cease to have effect; it
being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the
English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the
new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish;
or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just
COIIlllunicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the
English.
It is with the most particular satisfaction, air, that I
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make known to you this determination of the Emperor. His
majesty loves the Americans. Their prosperity and their
commerce are within the scope of his policy.
The independence of America is one of the principle titles
of glory to France. Since that epoch, the emperor 11 pleased
in aggrandizing the United States, and, under all circumstances, that which can contribute to the independence, to the
prosperity, and the liberty of the Americans, the Ernperor ytll
consider as conformable with the interests of his empire. 2
Armstrong must have found these professions of love almost comical.

How could a man who had seized and even burned American vessels,

confiscated the cargoes, and imprisoned the crews profess to actually
love Americans?

No doubt this was merely another scheme designed to

camouflage his true intentions.

Napoleon's true affections toward

Americans is better illustrated by the fact that, on the very day of
the Cadore Letter, the Emperor put into effect his secret Trianon
Tariff, which established customs regulations effectively halting imports.

22

Napoleon's objective was to diminish the duties rather than

to augment them, yet to maintain the colonial products at the price
which they were in France so that goods from America could enter into
competition with them.

23

The Trianon Tariff of August 5 was actually

evidence that the old Continental System of rigid exclusion, of a
commercial crusade against England, had failed.

While it had nominally

been abandoned, it had really only given way to a new system of regulation, to navigation acts, and to a continental protective system aimed
at England and her colonial products. 24
Simultaneous to the introduction of the secret tariff, Napoleon,
in a secret decree of the same date and name, ordered the sale of
sequestered American ahipa in French ports which had arrived between
May 20, 1809 and May 1, 1810.

From August 5 to November 1, 1810,
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American ships would be allowed to enter French port•, but they had to
obtain a license before they could discharge their cargoes.
decree was never publiahed, not
existence.

25 Thia

was Armstrong ever informed of its

Albert Gallatin accidentally discovered a copy of the

decree some ten years later when he was Minister to Paris, and realized
what effect the knowledge of this decree might have had on the course
of American affairs if it had been known at the time:
••• no one can suppose that if it had been communicated or
published at the same time [as Cadore's lettetl, the United
States would, with respect to the promised revocation of the
Berlin and Milan-decrees, have taken that ground which ultimately led to war with Great Britain. It is indeed unnecessary to cormnent on such a glaring act of combined injustice,
bad faith, and mean~~ss as the enacting and concealment of that
decree exhibits ••••
Napoleon, as usual, had no intention of actually alleviating the
American position, though he tried to appear to do so.

Armstrong

quickly informed the secretary of State of the contents of Cadore's
letter of August S.

27

On the same day, Armstrong also wrote to

President Madison, further explaining Cadore's letter as he saw it.
He noted that, on July 27, advices had been received from England
stating that Congress had been called into special session.

The object

of this special session was thought to be a declaration of war against
France.

Although Armstrong may have overrated the influence produced

by this report, he felt that •uch a report, if credited at all, would
not fail to produce considerable interest.

Armstrong informed the

President that repeated inquiries had been senttohim, wanting to know
what he knew and what he believed.

Armstrong disguised nothing.

Sensing a possible position of strength, he tried to make the moat of
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his position by being as completely honest to the inquirers as possible.
He told Madison that he knew the inquirers to be respectable men and

likely, frCllltheir connections with the
informed.

United States, to have been well

Armstrong told them that he had seen the letters, that he

believed a special session was indeed likely, and that if it did take
place, it could only be for the purpose of declaring war as had been
suggested, since the Preaident•e powers were competent for any course
of action short of a declaration of war.
opinion.

M. Petry was also of the same

According to Armstrong, the revocation of the decrees, as

stated in Cadore 1 s letter, proved two things:

(1) although France had

no objection to frightening the United States, she had no desire to
actually fight her.

France, whose ambition, gigantic and terrible as

it was, would find herself fully occupied for twenty years to come in
establishing her dominion over Europe; and (2) tired of expedients in
which ahe had lost character and money, and under which her people were
fast becoming impoverished, France was again returning to a certain
degree of justice, moderation, and good sense.

28

Armstrong further informed the President about the new Trianon
Tariff which amounted to nothing less than fifty per cent of the marked
price of articles.

It made no difference to French officials if Arm-

strong told them that this would be self-def eating by keeping the articles enumerated out of the market, or even worse, by smuggling them
into it.

Armstrong had no doubts that the rrew tariff would be adopted.

In concluding hie letter to the President, Armstrong once more indicated hie intention tO aall for the United Statea, thla time by
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October 1 from Bordeaux.

29
REACTION IN AMERICA

News of the Cadore Letter first reached Washington, D.C. on
September 25, 1810, in unofficial form from Pinkney in London, in a
30
newspaper statement reporting the letter from Cadore to Armstrong.
Exactly what transpired within the Cabinet is unknown.
was consulted, he left no trace of his opinions.

If

~allatin

Robert Smith within a

year would attack Madison publicly for the course that was pursued, and
would give the impression that it was a result of Madison's judgment
alone.

31 One may ask what .the reasons were for Madison issuing his

proclamation of November 2, 1810.
One plausible explanation was that, in order to make use of
the provisions contained in Macon's Bill No. 2, Madison had to proclaim
that France had indeed revoked or modified her decrees so that they
ceased to violate the commerce of the United States.
Madison had was an unofficial copy of Cadore's letter.

At the time, all
He certainly

was not justified in making any sort of decision based upon the supposed revocation of the decrees.

It was certainly not correct to say

that the decrees were revoked when their effect was not to cease until
November 1, and thenonly if one of the two conditionswerefulfilled. 32
In a legal sense, the decrees, which had been promulgated as fundamental
laws of the land, could not be repealed simply by a note from the Minister of Foreign Relations to the diplomatic representative of a foreign
power.

33

Subsequent event• have clearly demonstrated that Napoleon had no
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intention of actually repealing his decrees, although he wanted Madison
to believe that they had been.

In accepting Napoleon'• deception,

Madison walked into the trap and took Congress with him.

34

Napoleon

"promptly bamboozled" Madison with falae declarations of the revocation
of his decrees.

35

What then induced Madison to act so impulsively and

proclaim on November 2, 1810, that the Cadore letter was enough to
satisfy the criteria that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been
revoked?
Perkins, somewhat sarcastically, states with confidence that
Madison's actions were similar to those that had:
••• characterized fish from time immemorial, President Madison
believed it possible to feed on the bait without swallowing
the visible hook. Delay would encourage Napoleon to pull his
line from the stream, whereas immediate acceptance might
cause Greal Britain to cast even more appetizing food upon
the water. 6
By grasping at this opportunity, Madison hoped to be able to force
Great Britain into repealing her decrees, especially as it had been
two years since he had told Erskine that the United States would be
fully justified in having recourse to hostilities with either belligerent, and that ahe only hesitated to do so from the difficulty of contending with both.

37

From approximately the end of 1807 until 1810,

the aim of the American government had been to divide the belligerents
by inducing one or the other to revoke its edicts, so that the example
would lead to a revocation by the other, or the contest would at least
be limited to a single one.

38

Thia may be seen in a letter from Smith

to Pinkney of October 18, 1810, in which the Secretary stated:
It ought not to be doubted that this step of the French
Government will be followed by a repeal on the part of the
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British Government of its orders in Council. And if a termination of the crisee between Great Britain and the United States
be really intended, the repeal ought to include the system of
paper blockades, which differ in name only from the retaliatory ayatem comprized in the orders in Council.3 9
Although no official correspondence had yet been received from
Armstrong, Smith did nonetheless state that, when it was received, and
if it corresponded with the printed matter contained in Pinkney'&
despatch, then Pinkney was to let the British Government understand
that, on November l, the President would issue his proclamation in
conformance with the Act of Congress, and Non-Intercourse would be
revived against Great Britain.

40

On October 31, 1810, Smith sent for

Turreau and informed him of the decision that had been reached by the
President and the Cabinet.

He stated that the Executive was:

••• determined not to suffer England longer to tranmel the
commerce of the United States, and he hopes to be sustained
by Congress. If, then, England does not renounce her system
of paper-blockades and the other vexations resulting from it,
arrangement with that Power is to be expected; and consequently you will see, in two days, the President's proclamation
appear, founded on the provisions of the law requiring the
non-intercourse to be enforced against either nation which
should fail to revoke its edicts after the other belligerent
had done so •••• Although we have received nothing directly
from Mr. Armstrong on this subject, which is doubtless very
extraordinary, we consider as sufficient for the Government's
purposes the communication he made to Mr. Pinkney, which the
latter had transmitted to us.41
On the very same day this interview with Turreau occurred, New
York newspapers announced the arrival of the despatch schooner, Spencer,
with despatches from General Armstrong.

Released from sequestration at

Armstrong's request, the ship had taken seven weeks to disentangle
herself from French bureaucratic red tape, and to make the crossing
from Bayonne, having left on September 29.

Disembarking at New York,
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the despatch carrier travelled almost 250 miles overland in two days in
order to reach Washington before the President's proclamation was issued.

42

Upon examining the despatches, Madison and the Cabinet found

two letters of July from Armstrong to Smith, confirming press reports
that American trade would be limited to 30 vessels carrying French
licenses; Cadore'a letter of August S, with a short cover note to
Secretary Smith, and a private letter to President Madison concerned
with it; a printed copy of the August 5 tariff; and letters dated as
late as August 24 on various other subjects.

43

President Madison certainly hadgroundato justify withholding the
proclamation.

In spite of the questionable evidence that the French

decrees had actually been revoked, the President accepted that evidence
and issued his proclamation on the basis of the revocation of the
decrees.
pired.

He, therefore, waa moat reaponaible for what then tranaHaving made the decision, on November 1, to accept Cadore's

letter as proof of repeal of the French decrees, within the meaning of
Macon's Bill No. 2, the President, on November 2, 1810, issued his
proclamation, declaring that:
••• it has been officially made known to this Government that
the said edicts of France have been so revoked as that· they
ceased, on the said first day of the prese~ month, to violate
the neutral commerce of the United States.
Also on November 2, instructions were sent to Armstrong, which
included a printed copy of the President's proclamation.

Armstrong waa

to let the French Government know that the proclamation had been issued
on the grounds that the repeal of these decrees included revoking all
the edicts of France which actually violated American neutral rights,
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and that in issuing the proclamation, the requisition . in the letter of
July 5 to Armstrong, on the eubject ofaequestered property, would have

been satisfied.

45

Madison's decision was rash, but to him the moment seemed fleeting.

Napoleon's character was such that, if the United States had

delayed or haggled, the Emperor could have imnediately swung back to
the decrees that he had so tenaciously defended.

46

To Madison, the re•

peal of the French decrees promised at least an extrication from the
dilemma of a shameful peace, or a war with both the great belligerents.
In 1810, he was not confident about the prospects of a British repeal.
He took consolation in the thought that, even if the desirable goals
could not be attained without war, the country would at least unite
when the time came to assert its rights.

Writing to Jefferson, on

October 19, 1810, Madison stated: ''We hope from this step the advantage
of at least having but one contest on our hands at a time."

47

Unfortunately for Madison, he, like his predecessor, had not
learned that logic did not always govern men's decisions.

Madison

ignored American partisanship and Anglophilia, and expected the people
to support the government's demand for justice from England.

The

goverrunent also minimized the emotional commitment of England to her
Orders in Council.

The President had hoped that Great Britain would

seek material advantages through concession; if she did not, he expected
Perceval to be too sensitive to domestic criticism to prosecute an
armed conflict with the United Statea. 48

''These miscalculations grew

out of Madison'• central mistake, a belief that Napoleon could be
49
trusted to execute the bargain he offered."

However, Madison was not
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so idealistic as to expect generosity, and the instructions of November

2 showed that he was at least apprehensive that Napoleon would narrowly
interpret the Cadore

letter. Nevertheless, Madi1on did expect Napoleon

to recognize the advantages that would come from uniting the United
States against England, as well as the potential disadvantages of
insulting people already balky due to Continental abuses.

''Hindsight

shows us that most of them [Madlaon•a calculatlon.J were wrong, but the
initial decisions understandable.

The President is most to be con-

demned for failing to revise his analysis when new facts became available."

50

Again, the President must be held responsible for his actions,

especially in light of reports from Armstrong's successors, Jonathan
Russell and Joel Barlow clearly indicating that the decrees had not
been repealed.

When Madison, in spite of the evidence, allowed Non-

Intercourse to be reinstated on February

i,

1811, he had committed the

United States to Napoleon's Continental System, against Great Britain,
which was likely to draw the country into a war with Great Britain.
More than likely, Madison allowed this to happen, in part, because he
had already suffered a great deal of humiliation over the Erskine
Agreement.

He refused to admit that he might have been wrong again. 51

Melvin sums up the position which confronted Madison and the United
States:
When President Madison by his proclamation of 2 November 1810
and 2 February 1811 met the co~ditions of Cadore's 5 August letter, by which Napoleon had accepted the challenging repeal of
the non-Intercourse law, the outcome was a pretty problem for
diplomatic haggling •••• In American diplomacy it was a period of
small honor, and much watchful waiting. It was a situation
whlch invited the bullying of Wellesley, and the double-dealing
of Napoleon. 52
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ARMSTRONG CRITICIZED

Aa might have been expected, Armatrong'• performance during the
la•t couple of month• of hia diplomatic career in France ha• indeed
been criticized. 53 Some criticism may be justified. However, major
critics have been excessively harah.

The reasons for thia criticism

need to be examined more closely to more accurately assess Armstrong's
performance in France.
The moat common complaints against Armstrong'• performance during
his last two months in France are: (1) After having received the Cadore
letter, Armstrong refrained from stating anything more than was necessary in his reports.
the Emperor's promise.

He failed to express an opinion as to the faith of
He also failed to make further protests against

actual reprisals, keeping silent so aa not to deal with difficult queationa because he wanted to bask in what little glory there may have
been in the receipt of Cadore'e letter itaelf.

54

(2) Had Armstrong in-

slated upon the prompt release of the despatch schooner allotted to him
a month earlier, or had he made proper use of the Hornet, which had been
sent especially to receive hie de•patchea, and reached France about
September 6, full knowledge of French policy would have reached Waahington before decisive atepa were taken by the President and Cabinet.

In-

stead, Armstrong left Paria on September 14, and spent nearly two month9
in French •eaporta waiting for the release of hie own transport, the
Sally, which wa• caught up in a tax debate.
follow hie in•tructiona.

55

(3) Armetrong did .not

tndeecl, hla entire· courae of action after

Auguat S waa on par with thia dereliction.

Had he obeyed hia July 5,
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1810 instructions, he would have notified Cadore on the day they arrived, August 7, that France would have to agree to restore American
property in order to bring about action against Great Britain.

He

could have obtained "either an agreement or an equally illuminating
refusal."

When he finally did raise the issue of confiscations, on

September 7, he gave no hint that restoration was a sine gua non.

In-

stead, he invited an unfavorable reply by asking whether it was the
Emperor's will that seizures should be a subject of present or future
negotiations between the two goverrunents, or if the acts already taken
by the Emperor were to be regarded as conclusive against remuneration.
He had already infuriated Napoleon with a note castigating the misconduct of French privateers, just after the Emperor had heard that his
advice boat, La Franchise, had been seized at New Orleans.
known that the President had ordered the ship released.)

(It was not
Finally,

Armstrong's last action before leaving for Bordeaux was to propose that
American ships be restored to their owners

~n

conditions that they put

up bonds equal to the full value of the property--the bonds to be
payable'withinsix months if the Emperor made a decision to that effect.
M. Petry presented the American case far more strongly to Cadore, and
Cadore presented it far more strongly to the Emperor than Armstrong had
to any of them.

''His inaction and weak action, contrary both to the

spirit and command of his instructions, removed the last barrier to the
sweep on Bonaparte's rapacity. 1156

By withholding the Trianon Decree

from publication, Napoleon retained a free hand either to keep on confiscating American vessels seized before May 1, 1810, or to drop that
policy without any visible inconsistency.

Armstrong's delay forced the

•
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President to make his first and most important decision with a misleading indication of French policy before him.
simple, though.

His decision was

If harm resulted from hie action, it would be curable

by Congress after February 2, 1811, when Non-Intercourse against Great
Britain was to be renewed.

57

(4)Armstrong used the concession from Napoleon, even though an
ambiguous one, as the occasion for leaving his diplomatic post in order
to avoid a potentially embarrassing situation, living in fear that the
Administration would disgrace itself and him by revealing his position
as one of "mere gasconade." 58
In response to the first criticism of General Armstrong, an examination of the official correspondence does seem to reveal that he may
not have communicated as much as might have been normally expected
after having received a letter such as Cadore 1 s.

He did, as has already

been demonstrated, imnediately notify the Secretary of State and the
President of the existence of Cadore'a letter of August 5, however, his
failure to comment and aaaeaa the sincerity of Napoleon's intentions may
have indicated, initially at least, that he believed he had finally
achieved a diplomatic victory.

No doubt Armstrong would have been de-

lighted to have capped his diplomatic career with auch a success.

Al-

though Madison must bear the greatest responsibility for issuing his
proclamation on November 2, Armstrong muat also accept some responaibility for possibly mialeading Madison initially.

Quite possibly, however,

Armstrong may have refrained from commenting more thoroughly about
Cadore'a letter, because of hie desire to allow time to test the sincerity of the Emperor's actions before forming any concrete conclusions.
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Although Armstrong may not have offered aa much analyaia as he should
have, he did, in fact, offer what he thought was a plausible explana-

tion for the letter. In hi1 de1patch to the President of August 5,
1810, he had told the

President that he attributed the Cadore letter

to the fear of a possible war between the United States and France.

59

Although this may have been overrated aa a reason, it was still an
attempt at analysis of the circumstances which had produced the letter.
To the charge that Armstrong did not further protest actual
reprisals ao aa not to raise difficult questions, evidence to the contrary exists.

In a letter to the Duke of Cadore of August 20, 1810,

Armstrong informed him that a number of armed private vessels, flying
the flag of France and acting under her authority, had violated the
neutrality of the United States.

Offensive and lawless as these acts

were, they were more aggravating because of proof that they were not
the isolated and occasional depredations of a few private adventurers,
but the commencement of a system, origanized under the patronage of
60
France.
Thia would certainly seem to qualify aa a protest.
To discount criticism that Armstrong attempted to avoid difficult
questions, one need only refer to Armstrong's note to Cadore of
August 20, in which he asked for a full and explicit written declaration of the treatment that American commerce could expect to experience
in the ports of France, both before and after November 1, and whether
the seizures in Spain were to be regarded simply as sequestrations-and open, of course, to future negotiation--or as confiscations, and
beyond the limits of compromise.

61

While he remained in Paris,

Armstrong committed himself to press for an answer to this note.

He
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reported, however, that there did not appear to be the slightest
disposition to make reparation for past wrongs (as required in Smith's

July 5 instructions), although the French officials were careful to
employ terms which would not eliminate the hope that some reparation
would be made.

62

Armstrong again inquired of Cadore on September 7 as

to this issue, and to seek to know what would be the effect of the
Emperor's decree of July, 1810, on American commerce, which had forbidden the departure of neutral ships from the ports of France, unless
provided with imperial licenses.

63

Armstrong wrote to Secretary of State Smith on September 10, 1810,
that he had not received anything worth communicating since his last
despatch until Cadore•s letter to him of September 7.

By this letter

it was learned that the Rambouillet Decree was not in operation and
that American ships entering French ports before November 1 would be
judged under the Berlin and Milan Decrees.

Armstrong offered the

opinion that the system of which those decrees were a part, was
11 • • •

fast recovering the ground it had lost; & I should not be astonished,

were it soon to become aa great a favorite as formerly."

~

Armstrong did not fail to ask difficult questions as he sought to
determine the effect the revocation of the decrees would have on American commerce, were they actually revoked, nor did he fail to protest
outrages that were brought to his attention.

Although he may not have

elaborated a great deal in hia correspondence immediately after receipt
of the Cadore letter, his letter of September 18, 1810, demonatrated
that he waa aerioualy questioning the actual revocation of the decrees,
which implicitly reflected on his faith in the Emperor'• promisea.
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The second major criticism pertaining to the use of Armstrong's

own transport ship, as opposed to others that he might have been able

to employ, appears trivial. How was he to know that the Sally would be
tied up in French red tape for as long as it was?

In criticizing

Armstrong on this point, one critic at least appears to be attempting
to absolve Madison of his responsibility for the decisions that he
made, by implying that if Armstrong had acted otherwise, information
would have been received before Madison issued hie proclamation on
November 2, 1810. 65

The same critic appears to have overlooked the

fact that Madison was inclined to action regardless of the information
available to him.

If he did not possess adequate information prior to

issuing his decree, he did have the opportunity to delay his proclamation.

Again, in February, 1811, the President had the advantage not

only of further despatches from Europe, but also of a personal meeting
with Armstrong on his return to the United States.

Disregarding all

available evidence that Napoleon had not actually revoked his decrees,
Madison gambled again, for whatever reasona, and issued the proclamation of February 2, 1811.

He alone must assume the responsibility for

thia action which ultimately brought the United States into the
Continental System, and hence, involved her in war with Great Britain.
The third major criticism, although partially valid, is much too
severe.

One must bear in mind that transportation difficulties were

a perennial problem during the early part of the 19th century.

With a

war taking place at the same time, diplamatic instructions, when finally
received--if ever--were oftentimes outdated, or no longer appropriate
for the representative abroad.

The diplomat, therefore, needed to
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rely upon his own good judgment to determine what course to pursue-if any--a• a result of newly arrived instructions from his superiors.
No one can know for sure why Armstrong did not notify Cadore on August 7 that France would have to agree to restore American property in
order to bring about action against Great Britain, or why he waited
until September 7 to raise the issue of confiscations.

Quite possibly,

Armstrong had determined to allow time to paes so as to ascertain
Napoleon's sincerity aa contained in the Cadore letter before launching
into demands.

Additionally, Armstrong ia accused of weak action, con-

trary to the spirit of his instructions, when, in his last action before leaving Paris, Armstrong proposed that American ships be restored
to their owners on condition that they put up bonds equal to the full
value of the property.

Ironically, this same critic chastised

Armstrong for having infuriated Napoleon with a note castigating the
mis-conduct of French privateers.
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On the one hand, Armstrong is

criticized for being too firm, and on the other, he is criticized for
being too weak.

Agreeing that Armstrong may not have followed his

instructions precisely, is not to support the contention that he was
derelict in his duty.

Such a conclusion is biased and misleading.

Finally, Armstrong has been accused of using the opportunity
created by the Cadore letter to withdraw from France and from a potentially embarrassing position.

Armstrong had determined, on various

occasions, to return to the United States.

When the Cadore letter was

received on August 5, he was in the process of preparing for his departure, a departure that had been approved by the Secretary of State and
the President.

67

Armstrong had been placed in an embarrassing position
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almost from the very beginning of his mission.

He, more than anyone

else, was fully aware that his mission, at least until receipt of the

Cadora letter, had failed to achieve its objectives. The United States
was merely a pawn that was caught up in the struggle between Great
Britain and France, with her honor completely shattered.

Armstrong

had advocated force to shore up America's prestige, but his counsel was
consistently ignored.

Having been subjected to Napoleonic humiliation

for six years, Armstrong was anxious to return to the United States.
His departure shortly after the receipt of the Cadore letter was, most
likely, coincidental.

The decision to leave had been made a long time

before.
Having examined the major criticisms of Armstrong's actions after
August S, 1810, a student of history, with the distinct advantage of
knowing what actually happened, may engage in academic debates as to
the probable outcome of events if only the leading characters of the
time had acted differently.

However, who can say for sure that the

course of history might have been appreciably different if he had
commented more or leas about the sincerity of the Cadore letter; that
he should have taken a different ship home; that he should have followed this or that instruction more closely, or discarded this or that
one; or that he should or should not have departed from France at the
time he did?

Granted, Armstrong's performance may not have been as

exemplary during the last two months as it had been throughout most of
his career, and he may even have been initially too hopeful that the
decrees had been repealed, but neither was it as derelict as some would
have students of history to believe, even though he was ending his
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mission and preparing to return to the United States.

In the final

analysis, this writer contends that Armstrong's actions, even if they
had been any different than what they were, would probably have not
greatly altered the course of events that ultimately transpired.
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CHAPTER XI
END OF MISSION
On September 14, 1810, General Armstrong ended his mission in
Paris and departed for Bordeaux, where he waited to board his ship for
the return voyage to the United States.

Armstrong left Jonathan

Russell, a newly arrived legation secretary and a native of Rhode
Island, in charge of the American legation.

1 Armstrong's last official

despatch was addressed to Pinkney in London, and was dated September 29,
1810, in which Armstrong offered suggestions to Pinkney on how to deal
with the British government in light of the Cadore letter.

2

After

contending with delay because of a tax squabble involving his transport
ship for almost two months, 3 Armstrong and his family departed from
Bordeaux in November, ending his six-year career as United States
Minister to France.
The thirty-day passage home was a good one until, while making
land, Armstrong's ship struck a reef of rocks during a gail and was
forced to lay at anchor without a rudder overnight.

Miraculously,

however, they made it into New London the next morning around the first
of December.

4

Armstrong was feasted and honored by his fellow citizens in such
cities as Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York.

There was talk of

his running for Governor of Pennsylvania, Secretary of State, and even
for President. 5
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In

be~en

feasts, Armstrong was preoccupied with tending to

personal matters, which included settling his family in New York for
the winter.

These matters prevented him from travelling to Washington,

D.C. immediately, and he expressed his apologies for this delay in a
letter to the President, on December 11, 1810.

6

With these matters

disposed of, Armstrong journeyed to Washington during the middle of the
month, where he met with the President.

7

One can speculate that

Armstrong no doubt answered any questions as fully as he could regarding
the Cadore letter, and the prospects for improved Franco-American relations.
Armstrong's return to the United States was not received without
apprehension on the part of the Administration.

There was fear that he

might plan to run for important political office, such as Vice-President
if he moved his residence to Pennsylvania.

It is almost certain that

he was approached by Republican "malcontents", most probably the
Clintons.

Initially, he appearato have expressed no interest in the

election of 1812, although he was privately disgusted with Madison's
8
policies.
Armstrong, however, was not inclined to be schismatic, even
though he had the reputation of speaking his mind regardleaa of
political expediencies.

He believed as firmly as did Madison that any-

thing which disrupted the Republican Party was not only unwise, but
wrong.

No doubt the Administration was relieved the General did not

settle in Pennsylvania, but retired to his wife's estates in New York,
happy to merely observe the increasing political and diplomatic problems of the Adminiatration.9

As Minister to France, Armstrong had

advocated the use of force to attain American objectives, and as a
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private citizen again, he saw that that was the beat way of solving the
country's Ula, though he knew the Administration lacked the "spirit"
to attempt it.

10

The strained relations between Madison and the Smith brothers,
in Robert Smith's removal as Secretary of State and subsequent public
denunciation of theAdministration, and the appointment of James Monroe
as Smith's successor, sparked Armstrong's interest in the 1812 election,
causing speculation that Armstrong, himself, might even head an antiMadison ticket.

Armstrong was personally annoyed by the Cabinet change.

He not only had severe doubts about Monroe's ability as a diplomat, but
also feared that Monroe would be placed in a favorable position to
succeed Madison to the Presidency.

Armstrong complained to Judge

Spencer of New York about the prospects with Monroe.

He felt that this

would do more to disrupt the Republican Party and the country than
"anything that has yet occurred," and that the strength of the Union
was no more than that of a mere "bundle of twigs."

He further pre-

dieted that if Monroe attempted to succeed to the Presidency, the
Republican Party's ascendency "must and will go."

In his opinion,

neither the Western, Middle, not Northern states would "consent to
take a third President in succession from Virginia.'-'

Armstrong hoped

that Monroe and his Virginia supporters "would steer us clear of this
rock" by turning down Madison's offer.

11 In this, Armstrong was to be

disappointed.
When war finally broke out in 1812, DeWitt Clinton of New York, a
Republican, determined to run for the Presidency against Madison, on an
anti-war platform, appealing to "malcontent" Republicans and Federalists.
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He naturally expected Armstrong's support.
tn support of Madison.

However, Armstrong came out

On July 6, 1812, Armstrong accepted a commis-

sion as a brigadier-general with the command of New York City and its
defenses. 12

Subsequent events and circwnstances compelled Madison to

nominate Armstrong for Secretary of War in January, 1813, and he held
that position until the burning of Washington, D.C., which abruptly
ended Armstrong's public career when he resigned on September 3, 1814.

13

Although General Armstrong's public career may have come to an
end, he was by no means silenced.

He retired to Red Hook, New York,

and devoted the majority of his time to agriculture and writing numerous works.
~

His most important publication was Notices of the War of

(1836), which was primarily a defense of his actions during the

War of 1812.

In this and other public works, aa well as in some of his

letters, he demonstrated the same caustic writing ability which had
first distinguished him as the author of the "Newburgh Letters."

He

also contributed a "Life of Richard Montgomery" and a "Life of Anthony
Wayne" to the Library of American Biography,

14 and A Treatise on

Agriculture (1839), a series of articles that he had written for the
Albany Argus.

15

On April 1, 1843, General John Armstrong, soldier,

farmer, author, and atateaman died in Red Hook, New York.
to rest in Rhinebeck Cemetery, Rhinebeck, New York.

He was laid
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CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION
Having examined the diplomatic career of General John Armstrong
as United States Minister to France, emphasizing the years 1806-1810,
when the United States was increasingly subjected to the hostile effects
of Napoleon's Continental System, what conclusions can logically be
drawn from this study regarding Armstrong's effectiveness and performance?
First, the position of any American diplomat in France at this
particular juncture in history would have been inherently difficult, if
not impossible.

Napoleon was a man with unrivaled ambition.

In order

to accomplish his objectives, he did not shrink from employing not only
force, but whatever other means were within his power, to obtain the
desired results.

He was, foremost, a man of expediency.

He had abso-

lutely no qualms about breaking promises, deceiving, or outright lying
Standard diplomatic interaction with such a man must necessarily have
been a risky and exasperating experience.

To Armstrong's credit, he

discerned Napoleon's personal characteristics and tendencies very early
in his career.

Therefore, he had few illusions about the difficulties

and dangers in dealing with the Emperor or with his ministers.

Arm-

strong was, in most respects, a realist, in contrast to the majority of
American leadership as represented by Jefferson and Madison, who doggedly persisted in the belief for far too long that Napoleon, despite his
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ambition, was still a reasonable man who could logically be counted on
to act according to his best interests as they perceived them to be.
Compounding the difficulty of Armstrong's position was the
miserably weak military and naval posture of the United States, and
American leadership's hesitancy to bolster it, as well as their continued reluctance to employ available force whenever more peaceable diplomatic means had failed to obtain their objectives.

Jefferson and

Madison clung to faith in the principle of peaceable economic coercion,
long after any reasonable hope for success existed.

Recognizing that

standard diplomatic means were not going to achieve diplomatic objectives, Armstrong recommended more forceful measures on numerous occasions to acquire desired territorial objectives, resist increasing violation of American neutral rights by both France and Great Britain, or
support such intangible interests as national honor.

Although flexing

American muscle would have entailed relatively little risk on several
occasions, with almost certain success, the Administration consistently
rejected Armstrong's advice and shied away from conflict.

Armstrong

was, therefore, left to defend the American position by any other means
he could, while functioning in a world governed by force.
As Napoleon intensified his Continental System, violating not
only established international law, but also an existing Franco-American treaty, Armstrong's temper and accompanying official protests increased proportionately.

He firmly and persistently sought the repeal

of the Napoleonic decrees that adversely affected American commerce,
and waa constantly alert to possible new measures.

He did not merely

accept the superficial pretexts oftentimes offered by French officials
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as the rationale for their actions, but earnestly sought to penetrate
the diplomatic gloss to discern their true motives and intentions.
Superb in debate and analysis, Armstrong possessed the ability to
quickly discern errors, misstatements, and obvious fallacies of argument in the countless oral and written correspondences he received from
representatives of the French government.

Almost unequalled with a

pen, his notes, when angry, were laced with the caustic tone which had
long distinguished him.

The Emperor himself was not immune when

Armstrong felt he was deserving of harsh remonstrance, which was most
of the time.
From the year 1808 on, Armstrong was increasingly frustrated and
pessimistic about his mission.

He recognized the futility of maintain-

ing an American minister in France in light of the compounding circumstances.

Despatches increasingly reflected his desire to return to the

United States, although he postponed his departure on several occasions
in order to remain and pursue other avenues which might have held a
slight possibility of improving the American position.

On numerous

occasions, he demonstrated his willingness to take the initiative in
diplomatic gambles.

Twoexamples already diacuaaed, but characteristic

of this trait, were hie efforts to enlist the support of Russian Foreign Minister Romanzoff, and his visit to Holland to encourage the
Emperor's own brother to aid American cormnercial interests.

In both

of these instances, as well as in others, Armstrong's knowledge and
understanding-of events and personalities were obvious. Indeed, hia
information was unusually good.

Armstrong sought most any means as a

potential source of information that might aid his poaition--certainly
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the mark of a good diplomat, though his own colleagues occasionally
frowned on the character of eomeof his sources.

1

Despite Armstrong's diligent efforts to force Napoleon to respect
American neutral rights, and angered by the Emperor's repeated demonstrations of bad faith, Armstrong, after having exhausted all the normal means of diplomatic protest, pursued other means more unconventional
that were quite bold.

In his continual protest of Napoleonic abuses,

one such means was Armstrong's ploy of absenting himself frorn Court.
This was one way for Armstrong to express his extreme displeasure over
Napoleon'• brutal enforcement of the Continental System.

This form of

protest was viewed by most as an effrontery to the Emperor, and not
likely to enhance Armstrong's popularity with French officialdom.

This

move, combined with Armstrong's bold and forceful notes of protest, was
a gesture which Napoleon could hardly fathom from the representative
of a mere republic. 2 Consequently, by 1810, the Emperor's tolerance
reached its limit, and he requested Armstrong's recall.

Ordinarily,

this would be a negative reflection on the minister being recalled, but
given the circumstances and personalities involved, it must be viewed
as a complinent to General Armstrong.

Here, at least, was one repre-

sentative of a foreign government who was not easily intimidated by
Napoleon's awesome power, and one who did not succumb to the Emperor's
every whim.

In standing up to Napoleon aa he did, Armstrong succeeded

in ruffling the feathers of His Imperial Majesty--something to which
Napoleon was not accustomed.

While the United States may have been

almost militarily inconsequential and its leadership unrealistic and

vacillating• at least one individual stood up for her honor.
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In the final analysis, however, Armstrong's mission must be judged
a failure, insofar as he did not accomplish his diplomatic objectives
in Paris, or in convincing American leadership to accept his advice and
employ force on several occasions.

Armstrong was unsuccessful in

fore ing the Emperor to respect American neutrality by repealing hi• off en.
d ecrees. 3
si.ve

Even the Cadore letter, which at firat seemed to be the

crowning achievement of Armatrong•a diplomatic career, aoon proved to
be nothing more than deception ao characteriatic of Napoleon.

4

Although Armstrong may not have been successful in accomplishing
his objectives, he had at least accomplished as much as anyone could
have, given the circumstances of the times, and the character of
Napoleon.

Indeed, the United States of the early 19th century would

have had great difficulty finding another person who could have done
better.

There were certainly many who would not have done as well.

Armstrong's successors in Paris, Russell and Barlow, for exat'lple, though
both competent and able men, experienced the same frustrations and
failures as had Armstrong.

5

Armstrong's shear ability and stamina to

persist in a European diplomatic post for six years during one of the
most difficult periods in American history is a credible feat in itself.
General Armatrong•a yeara as minister to France represented a tremendous personal sacrifice on his part in the service of his country.

He

could have remained in the United States, guaranteed a prominent place
in American politics, or returned from his post when he first recognized the unlikely prospect for success or glory.

Instead, he stayed

for six long years.
In spite of the publicity and debate that surrounded his subse-
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quent tenure as Secretary of War, the United States owes him a great
deal of gratitude and appreciation.
United State•,

As Armstrong returned to the

end1ng hi& diplomatic career, Jefferson expreaaed best

the debt which the American people owed Armstrong for the years of service he had devoted to his country.

Jefferson wrote to Armstrong:

"I

am very happy to see that our fellow citizens are disposed to receive
you with the welcome, and expressions of thankfulness which your exertions for their good have merited. 06
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3
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4

The correspondence of Jonathan Russell and Joel Barlow clearly

illustrates Napoleon's intent to delay and to deceive.

Seizure of

American ships continued under the Berlin and Milan Decrees.

Napoleon

had no intention of revoking his decrees, especially when he regarded
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